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Abstract 
Scholars have dismissed literary irony for many reasons; two common 
objections contend that the device facilitates social disengagement disguised as textual 
play and that it requires of the reader such extensive social, historical, and linguistic 
knowledge that it cannot be fully appreciated outside its context of production.  In “‘Not 
the truth but the way’: The Ethics of Irony in World Literature” I refute these myths and 
demonstrate that the device’s social engagement facilitates readers’ understanding of 
both irony and the socio-historical context that the author describes in the work.  I first 
tackle claims about the device’s capacity for ethical social engagement.  In 
contradiction to Anglo-American formalism and its resonances in subsequent schools of 
literary theory, Søren Kierkegaard’s concept of controlled irony provides a framework 
for understanding how it operates as a mode of social critique.  The fact that the device 
can function in this socially engaged way both challenges the assertion that irony is 
always apolitical and signals to the reader the author’s socio-political concerns.  In 
analyzing a moment of indirect critique, readers learn about the defining concerns of the 
author’s context; in this way, irony can function as an Ansatzpunkt, Erich Auerbach’s 
term for a point of departure, through which readers learn about different nations, 
cultures, and eras.  I analyze three world literary texts—Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s 
Faust and two twentieth-century adaptations of it, Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and 
Margarita and Wilson Harris’s The Infinite Rehearsal—to illustrate this idea.  Not only 
can irony be socially engaged and be understood outside its original context, the device 
also facilitates the circulation of world literature in the global marketplace.  Irony thus 
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contributes to cross-cultural understanding, an ethical stage necessary to the process of 
historical development.   
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Introduction 
Immortal Indirection: 
Irony’s Lives and Afterlives 
 
 By all accounts, irony should be dead. Critics proclaim many events and 
individuals to be the final nail in irony’s coffin, including the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Towers on September 11, 2001; the Iraq War; novels by David Foster 
Wallace and Dave Eggers, nonfiction by Jedidiah Purdy and Christy Wampole, and 
philosophical tracts by Judith Butler, Peter Sloterdijk, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari; Barack Obama’s 2008 Presidential election and, for entirely different reasons, 
Donald Trump’s 2016 Presidential election; Lin-Manuel Miranda’s Broadway musical 
Hamilton; and the ubiquity of social media.1  As novelist Colson Whitehead quipped to 
The New York Times, “[s]omething bad happens, like 9/11, it’s the death of irony … 
Something good happens, like Obama’s win, it’s the death of irony. When will someone 
proclaim the death of iceberg lettuce? I’m sick of it making my salads boring” (qtd. in 
Newman).  Regardless of the number of times it has supposedly died, irony has never 
truly lost its prominence in the pantheon of literary devices.  In some senses, irony is the 
hydra of literary devices, not only refusing to die when its head is chopped off but also 
reasserting its dominance with greater force than ever.    
Irony, more than many literary devices, has sparked vociferous debate about its 
relevance to and appropriateness in public discourse.2  Defining irony might allow us to 
better appreciate the stakes in these perpetual debates, but even the act of defining the 
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device has sparked disagreement.3  While studies of irony tend to begin with the 
disclaimer that there are too many possible definitions to enumerate them all, its most 
fundamental definition is that what is said is the opposite of what is meant; according to 
the Oxford English Dictionary, “the expression of one’s meaning by using language that 
normally signifies the opposite” (1a). When a friend exclaims, “lovely day, isn’t it?” 
during a downpour, or a colleague enthuses “that went well” after a particularly difficult 
meeting, we as interlocutors understand we cannot take these utterances at face value 
but rather must invert their meaning.  In Irony and the Ironic D.C. Muecke identifies 
some of irony’s common features present in most iterations: in crafting an ironic 
utterance the speaker contrasts what is said with what is meant and assumes his message 
will be understood, both conversational partners play active roles in constructing the 
utterance’s meaning, and the interlocutor gains a sense of pleasure from recognizing 
this double meaning (35).  In short, Muecke writes, irony has a corrective function in 
that it stabilizes the unstable and destabilizes the stable elements of society (4).  I 
suggest that this contradiction of explicit and intended meaning also applies to written 
works as well: the reader must recognize that the author’s message is the opposite of 
what he writes. 
The third OED definition, “a state of affairs or an event that seems deliberately 
contrary to what was or might be expected,” is perhaps more popular in contemporary 
popular culture and in literary studies.  It mobilizes this the first sense of the term: the 
“utterance” unfolds over time, either through a novelistic description or in lived 
experience, and the reader gradually discovers that her expectations have been not just 
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violated but contradicted.  The reader must then acknowledge the situation’s unexpected 
outcome and reconcile her mistaken assumptions. 
Satire is related to but distinct from irony.  Northrop Frye writes in The Anatomy 
of Criticism that satire is militant irony because it is directed at an explicit target, 
includes invective, and requires humor (222).  Irony is not necessarily funny (although 
it may be) and its “signals” are subtler than invective tends to be.4  Parody is a distinct 
but related category, as it involves the exaggeration of a work’s formal qualities not out 
of enthusiasm but out of a critique of the form itself, and like satire, parody is often 
funny.  Humor thus factors into this conversation—Søren Kierkegaard posits that it is 
“irony taken to its maximum vibration,” connecting them by degree rather than by kind 
(DD: 36 KJN 225).  Given the overt signals to satire, parody, and humor, these devices 
have been analyzed more frequently than irony in world literature.  
 One of the most prominent disagreements about irony hinges on its tendency 
toward social disengagement: does an ironic standpoint enable the ironist to isolate 
himself from the society in which he lives?  In other words, in using irony does he 
divest himself of social responsibility?  This assertion is answered affirmatively by the 
fact that irony is a two-way process of communication or, as Linda Hutcheon notes in 
Irony’s Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony, that irony does not exist independently 
of communication but rather “happens” in shared “discursive communities” (Hutcheon 
18).  If the ironist assumes his reader understands him but the ironist does not ensure the 
reader’s comprehension, in Hutcheon’s view, then the ironist assumes an elitist position.  
Furthermore, the assumption establishes a hierarchy of listeners: in saying the opposite 
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of what he means, the ironist divides his readers into an “in-group” that recognizes the 
ironic utterance as such, and an “out-group” that does not grasp the intended meaning 
and thus is the ironist’s victim.  This perspective, frequently associated with German 
Romanticism and American modernism, valorizes the figure of the isolated ironist 
detached from his social milieu.  Of course, while critics blame irony as an inherently 
solipsistic and hierarchical perspective, Hutcheon reminds us that people, not devices, 
are exclusionary, and thus that there is nothing inherently inclusive or exclusive about 
irony.  That being said, many scholars, especially detractors of irony like Purdy and 
Wallace, view the device as one that enables anti-social and elitist attitudes.   
 A related debate centers on irony’s intelligibility when an utterance circulates 
beyond the immediate context of its production to other cultures, languages, and eras.  
If irony “happens” in discursive communities, can it be adequately understood outside 
of the text’s intended community of readers?  Many scholars insist that in order for the 
message to be fully understood in its complexity, it must be confined to the context in 
which the author wrote; as Katharina Barbe writes in Irony in Context, “[t]he 
recognition of irony is culturally dependent and not globally unified.  Sweeping 
statements are out of place … One important feature in the description or definition of 
irony is shared background knowledge or common experience” (5).  At best, according 
to Barbe and others, readers grasp an academic appreciation of its meaning; at worst, 
they entirely miss a work’s point.  Removing native language fluency, shared historical 
references, and cultural idiosyncrasies decreases the likelihood that the ironic message 
will be understood and inhibits the distant reader’s independent analysis of that 
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message.   In this respect, irony’s capacity for social engagement is limited because of 
its geographic and temporal specificity. 
 Despite its numerous death notices, irony is a vital if underrecognized device in 
works of world literature.  Texts including, for example, Lu Xun’s “The True Story of 
Ah Q,” Miguel de Cervantes’s Don Quixote, Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children, J. 
M. Coetzee’s Foe, Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, Anton Chekhov’s The Three 
Sisters, José Rizal’s Noli me Tángere, and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s Wizard of the Crow, 
among others, highlight irony.  Moreover, in most of these works the authors deploy the 
device to critique the society in which they live, suggesting its capacity for social 
engagement.  If contemporary critics of irony are correct that the device is elitist, 
disengaged, and dying, what accounts for its enduring popularity in works of world 
literature?  Furthermore, if irony can only be understood by the author’s 
contemporaries, what accounts for its perennial popularity in the canon of world 
literature? 
 In this dissertation I reorient discussions of irony toward studies of world 
literature to better understand both its potential for social engagement and its 
intelligibility in circulation.  Ultimately, I contend that controlled irony—Søren 
Kierkegaard’s term for an ironic utterance in a literary work used to reveal an 
unrecognized contradiction what is said about a society and its actual values—is an 
ethical, socially engaged strategy present in many literary works.  Moreover, this 
controlled irony is a device by which authors highlight their own cultural specificities to 
their readers; in this way, by reading works of world literature that contain such 
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moments, a reader can learn about the author’s socio-historical concerns.  I build on 
scholarly work by Yoon Sun Lee and Benedict Anderson, who propose that irony is a 
fundamental technique of national literatures, and Gloria Nne Onyeoziri and Nicole 
Simek, who explore irony’s prominence in postcolonial literatures.  I extend this 
analysis by demonstrating how this interrelationship between irony and socio-historical 
context can be both socially engaged and intelligible in the global marketplace.  In 
short, my argument is that irony is a socially engaged literary device that facilitates 
inter-cultural understanding in literary texts as they are translated into different 
languages and published in different nations—in short, as they circulate in the global 
marketplace. 
 I divide the following chapters into two sections.  The first is a theoretical 
examination of irony in twentieth- and twenty-first-century literary criticism in which I 
demonstrate the need to reorient our understanding of irony as a socially engaged 
device, despite past efforts that fell short of this goal.  I begin, in Chapter One, with an 
analysis of previous attempts to characterize irony as an ethical perspective.  Critics 
placed literary irony—which they conflated with paradox and ambivalence—at the 
heart of New Criticism and other Anglo-American schools of literary analysis, asserting 
that the device was integral to all “good” works of literature.  In the next generation, 
deconstructionists attempted to refute formalist elitism by instead embracing the 
polyvalence of all language, foregrounding irony as a democratic device.  Postcolonial 
theory and world literary analysis similarly celebrate linguistic indeterminacy, a 
strategy they deem “irony,” as it resists claims of linguistic and cultural mastery 
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essential to imperialistic literature.  However, these supposed reinventions of irony as 
an ethical device recapitulate formalist assumptions that the device is inherently 
hierarchical and thus negate claims about irony’s ethics.  These otherwise disparate 
theorists assert that a reader must have an adequate knowledge of the work’s linguistic, 
cultural, and historical context to unravel the indirect utterance’s meaning; those who 
do not have this information cannot fully understand the text.  Moreover, this unspoken 
emphasis on the imperative for the reader’s erudition forecloses the possibility of world 
literature.  Previous attempts to reinvent irony have not only limited our understanding 
of the device, but also unnecessarily constrict the corpus of world literature. 
 An engaged definition of irony, I posit in Chapter Two, can be found instead in 
Søren Kierkegaard’s magister dissertation On the Concept of Irony with Continual 
Reference to Socrates.  Based on my reading of this work in the original Danish, as well 
as his journals and other archival materials housed at St. Olaf College’s Kierkegaard 
library, I contend that Kierkegaard proposes “controlled irony” as a literary device 
selectively deployed in a literary work to critique a society’s unwillingness to confront 
the truth about its values.  He alleges that people in some places and times, like his own 
Golden Age Copenhagen, are not honest about the society in which they live, but rather 
cling to comforting narratives that contradict their lived reality.  Controlled ironic 
critique is uniquely capable of illuminating this dishonesty and is accessible to the 
reader through “clues,” as Kierkegaard proposes.  Drawing on a robust body of 
scholarship about irony’s engagement in the social sphere—by Angelique Haugerud, 
John Evan Seery, Ross Chambers, Jennifer Bajorek, and others—I argue that irony’s 
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reflection of contemporary socio-political concerns is an engaged approach, one that 
facilitates the author’s contemporaries’ social participation and can be intelligible in 
circulating works of literature.  I develop Kierkegaard’s theory of irony by 
demonstrating how these textual clues can foreground the socio-historical situation in 
which the author wrote, signaling to readers in different contexts the author’s 
contemporary concerns.  In this way, I propose that irony is not only intelligible in 
circulation, but also facilitates readers’ understanding of a different context as the work 
circulates in the global marketplace.   
 The second section analyzes three case studies of controlled irony in world 
literature to demonstrate not only its engaged focus but also the device’s intelligibility 
in circulation.  In Chapter Three, I analyze Goethe’s Faust, a text central to the canon of 
world literature in the field’s current incarnation.  In his epic verse-drama, Goethe uses 
controlled irony to reveal the inadequacies of German Lutheran doctrine in the late 
eighteenth century.  Signaling his use of irony through the bawdy form of Knittelvers 
and through a distortion of the famous first verse of the gospel of John, the poet 
demonstrates the detrimental effects wrought by both emotionalism and intellectualism 
in the Lutheran Church.  
 While it is difficult to prove irony’s intelligibility as a work circulates outside of 
its language, culture, and era of production, I argue that adaptation offers a clear 
indication of the way controlled irony is preserved as a formal strategy in the text.  In 
Chapter Four, I examine how authors of world literature have adapted Goethe’s source 
text, complete with its moments of controlled ironic critique.  The fact that this specific 
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type of irony is preserved in adaptations suggests that the adapting authors understand 
controlled irony as social critique.  Additionally, as in many meaningful adaptations, 
these authors alter the source text to differentiate their work, rather than merely retell 
the original.  In adaptations of Faust, I contend that authors use Goethe’s form of ironic 
critique and adapt the content to reflect their own socio-historical concerns.  I then turn 
to an in-depth reading of two such adaptations, beginning with Bulgakov’s The Master 
and Margarita, in which the Russian dissident excoriates the Soviet state, to illustrate 
my claims.  This fantastical novel rejects official literary culture and reveals the 
fictional nature of State-sponsored historical narratives and exposes the punishments for 
challenging official accounts.  By creating a narrative in which Muscovites’ daily lives 
are more fantastical than the biblical account of Jesus’ crucifixion, the author indirectly 
calls into question Soviets’ expectations about the veracity of State-sponsored history.   
 In Chapter Five, I offer another case study to support my claims: Harris’s 1986 
novel The Infinite Rehearsal, another adaptation of Goethe’s Faust, which positions 
controlled ironic critique in a postcolonial context.  Like Bulgakov, Harris employs the 
formal framework of Goethe’s text but alters its content to address the persistent myth 
of El Dorado in twentieth-century Guyanese politics.  The storyline of Faust seeking 
salvation in the heart of the Mount of Folly ironically exposes the country’s hopes, in 
the 1980s, that foreign investment in gold mining would reinvigorate the declining 
economy.  Despite the vast cultural, linguistic, and historical differences separating each 
of these authors, their works use the framework of controlled irony to confront readers 
with disjunctures between social rhetorics and social realities, and in so doing these 
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works demonstrate not only irony’s social engagement but also their intelligibility as 
they circulate in the global marketplace.     
 Several of these works are canonical texts of Western literature, which could be 
interpreted as my perpetuation of the Western bias of world literature.  While I agree 
with this critique, I want to push back against it by acknowledging the liminal national 
positions from which Kierkegaard and Goethe wrote.  First, while they lived in Western 
European countries (Denmark and Germany, respectively), neither country played a 
significant role in global politics or culture in the early nineteenth century.  In his 
writings on world literature, Goethe laments the backwardness of the German states and 
asserts that German writers would benefit from learning about other national literary 
traditions (“Some Passages Pertaining to the Concept of World Literature” 6).5  
Moreover, in the mid-nineteenth century Denmark suffered military defeats by Sweden 
and Germany and was regarded as a cultural backwater of sorts (Kirmmse 21–22).  In 
other words, neither Goethe’s Germany nor Kierkegaard’s Denmark were dominant in 
global politics or aesthetics, and we must recognize their works as coming from the 
margins of Europe.   The contexts of Soviet Russia and postcolonial Guyana are 
(arguably) peripheral to Western hegemony in the mid-twentieth century.6  Ultimately, I 
argue that all these texts, written in nationally and culturally peripheral spaces, 
complicate the field’s Western focus.    
 This dissertation is, admittedly, comparative in its engagement with world 
literature, which I understand to be a mode of studying texts in circulation that attends 
to local particularities while simultaneously acknowledging cross-cultural themes.  The 
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project, however, is harder to place in a “traditional” department of English literature, 
especially given the strict geographic and temporal categories by which most jobs are 
presently categorized.  Therefore, I feel compelled to defend my choice of topic for a 
project in an English department.  First, my analysis of irony is not limited to the 
context of world literature; while it offers an important mode of understanding how and 
why works circulate, reexamining irony’s capacity for social engagement can help 
scholars better understand the device in other texts more traditionally associated with 
English-language literary canons.  Put simply, my proposed reorientation of irony can 
apply to many different contexts and offers a more robust understanding of literature’s 
socio-political engagement regardless of the language in which the work was written.  
Irony can also act as a potential point of departure—to use Erich Auerbach’s term, an 
Ansatzpunkt (as I explore in depth in Chapter Two)—to literatures beyond English and 
in a diverse array of Englishes, thereby helping non-specialist readers, especially at the 
undergraduate level, begin to comprehend texts that are otherwise inaccessible to them. 
Additionally, in the era of globalization it is difficult to argue for the “purity” of 
the global Anglophone canon.  Given the frequency with which texts are translated and 
ideas transmitted across linguistic and national boundaries, scholars cannot continue to 
maintain that American or British texts are somehow independent of all other literary 
traditions.  In this sense, acknowledging how works of literature circulate and influence 
others, and putting non-English texts into conversation with a canonical work of 
postcolonial literature written in English, articulates a view of the English department 
that more comprehensively captures the interrelation of literary traditions than does an 
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exclusively Anglophone canonical approach.  Finally, and perhaps most pragmatically, 
in the assault on higher education, departments of comparative literature, languages, and 
area studies routinely have their budgets, FTE faculty lines, and required courses 
slashed, if not eliminated entirely.  World literature is increasingly being assigned to 
departments of English literature, as the places where non-English texts would be taught 
are overextended, if operating at all.  If we, as scholars of English literature, teach only 
texts originally written in English we are denying student access to fundamental works 
of literature.  Practically speaking, world literature must feature more prominently in 
departments of English literature, and in this dissertation I hope to begin to show the 
mutual enrichment that can arise from seeing Anglophone and non-Anglophone works 
as complementary, not incommensurate, literatures.   
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Chapter One 
The Ironic Enterprise: 
Formalisms, Paradox, and Sedentary Canons 
 
Irony has long been associated with literary modernism and formalist criticism 
(especially New Criticism); the entry on irony in M. H. Abrams’ A Glossary of Literary 
Terms ends by noting that the device is a central concern of many New Critics.1  Later 
attempts to revolutionize literary interpretation, especially by scholars working in 
deconstruction and postcolonial theory, rejected formalism’s empiricism, claims to 
objectivity, and closed system.2  These subsequent theorists allege that formalist 
depictions of irony best represent this insularity, positing that this interpretation of the 
device enabled readers to stay within the text’s system and not engage with the “outside 
world.”  Paul de Man sneers that formalist criticism is not attuned to lived realities but 
remains within the text: “because such patient and delicate attention was paid to the 
reading of forms, the critics pragmatically entered into the hermeneutic circle of 
interpretation, mistaking it for the organic circularity of natural processes” (29).3  
Formalist conceptions of irony are not genuinely ambiguous, in his understanding, but 
rather project an artificial indeterminacy on to the closed system of the text.  De Man 
tries to reposition irony as an ethical device that facilitates readers’ engagement with 
paradoxical ideas.  Postcolonial critics extend deconstruction’s claims by asserting that 
recognizing these paradoxes is a way to acknowledge the reality of life in postcolonial 
societies.  Homi Bhabha, for example, argues in The Location of Culture that authors’ 
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rejections of binary divisions, especially through literary irony, legitimize marginalized 
peoples and communities by troubling the totalizing rhetoric upon which colonial 
regimes rely.   
Despite these attempts to reinvent literary irony as an engaged device, however, 
many theorists working in the deconstructive and postcolonial traditions recapitulate 
formalists’ assumptions about irony that they claim to disavow.  In making this 
argument I build on previous work by scholars who propose that formalisms have more 
in common with later schools of literary theory than is traditionally acknowledged, and 
I suggest that irony can illuminate these similarities.4  According to both formalist 
critics and their ostensible antagonists, literary irony is ethical because it raises 
questions about a writer’s ability to construct an objective depiction of reality.  Through 
literary irony, authors (according to these critics) represent the full scope of human 
experience and acknowledge the importance of subjectivity in determining meaning, 
and in so doing democratizes the process of literary interpretation.   
Tracing the persistence of formalist irony in these politically engaged 
approaches reveals that these ostensibly ethical literary critics perpetuate the same 
hierarchies as do the formalist critics against whom they write.  In other words, the 
device is not accessible or democratic, but in each of these approaches its meaning can 
only be unraveled by the truly erudite reader.  Ironic works thus create hierarchies of 
readers, with the all-knowing author at the apex, followed by those readers “in the 
know,” and the “out-group” of readers with a limited understanding of these texts’ 
indirect message.  Rather than rejecting formalism outright, deconstructive and 
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postcolonial theorists depict irony in a way that reinforces the hierarchical and insular 
modes of reading they claim to destroy.  In so doing, theorists from each of these 
traditions limit the number and type of works readers are able to adequately understand, 
making a genre like world literature all but impossible for the “average” reader, and 
thereby muting the ethical potential of literary irony.   
 This chapter traces the lineage of formalist irony in its various permutations in 
literary criticism, showing that any claims to radically remake of irony are overstated.  I 
begin with a detailed examination of the features of formalist irony and explore its 
resonances in deconstruction and postcolonial and world literary theory.5  The 
persistence of formalist conceptions of irony in subsequent schools of literary analysis, 
especially the continued equation of irony and ambiguity, paradoxically closes the 
literary worlds accessible to readers and perpetuates the elitist nature of literary 
analysis.  Deconstruction and postcolonial theory not only failed to revolutionize the 
hierarchies of formalist irony, but also built its hierarchies into their fundamental 
assumptions about literary analysis.   Irony is thus not revitalized as a democratic device 
of social engagement; it continues to function as an elitist, self-contained system 
throughout much of twentieth century Anglo-American literary criticism. 
  
The Paradoxes of Anglo-American Formalism 
 In literary criticism, irony is frequently discussed in conjunction with 
modernism and its theoretical branch, New Criticism.6  Indeed, irony (broadly defined) 
is a central device in Anglo-American formalist criticism in the mid-twentieth century, 
16 
 
 
even in scholarship by formalists who do not consider themselves New Critics, 
including the Chicago School Neo-Aristotelians, Wayne Booth, and Northrop Frye.7  
Given their similarities, especially irony’s centrality to their modes of analysis, this 
chapter will discuss together these diverse thinkers and subgroups as “Anglo-American 
formalist criticism.”  Formalists held that the only way to articulate a meaningful view 
of modern life was through the juxtaposition of (often unresolvable) opposites, which 
they describe variously as “ambiguity,” “tension,” “paradox,” and “irony.”  These 
theorists privilege irony in many different registers of a literary text—linguistic 
pluripotentiality, conceptual paradox, and depiction of a complex, often contradictory 
socio-historical context—and contend that irony must be included in all “good” works 
of literature.  However, their overriding emphasis on irony, far from being a 
democratizing gesture that encourages readers’ active engagement with a text, requires 
them to have great deal of cultural, historical, and linguistic knowledge to fully grasp a 
text.   
Below I isolate each of these characteristics to better understand how they will 
later be preserved by deconstructive and postcolonial theorists, and how all of these 
seemingly disparate theoretical schools perpetuate irony as an elitist, opaque strategy 
that limits readers’ literary horizons. 
 While formalists refer to the device by several different names, they describe its 
function in the same way: it preserves multiple meanings within one term or phrase.8  
Allen Tate, for example, uses the term “tension” to refer to the conflict between, and 
mutual dependence of, literal and metaphorical meaning that gives each word its 
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significance, while William Empson labels this same conflict “ambiguity,” suggesting 
that multiple meanings are reconciled in different ways by the reader.  Formalists also 
offered different understandings of how irony should function within a text.  For 
example, while I. A. Richards and John Crowe Ransom argue that irony balances 
“complementary impulses” in the text without resolving them, Tate, Kenneth Burke, 
and Cleanth Brooks contend that these opposites are united under one poetic world-
view.9  Despite these differences, later critics unify these views about linguistic and 
conceptual ambiguity under the term “irony,” as Frank Lentricchia explains in the 
preface to After the New Criticism (xiii).   
 Formalists contend that every word has many possible meanings beyond those 
intended by the author himself: they are tied to historical, etymological, and generic 
connotations or are discovered by the reader.  W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley 
explain the pluripotentiality of language in their article “The Intentional Fallacy,” a key 
text of New Criticism; they propose that multiple meanings can be gleaned through 
dictionary definitions (which can be contradictory), historically and societally 
specifically usages, and incidental juxtapositions.  They laud this approach as a 
democratic one that makes literature accessible to all readers despite a reader’s previous 
literary or historical knowledge.10  In The Structure of Complex Words Empson notes 
that ambiguity, a property inherent in much language, “gives room for alternate reaction 
to the same piece of language … The fundamental situation … is that a word or 
grammatical structure is effective in several ways at once” (1, 2).  For example, he 
explains, “delicate” can alternately be defined as “‘delightful,’ ‘voluptuous,’ ‘self-
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indulgent,’ ‘innocent,’ ‘effeminate,’ ‘fastidious,’ … ‘not coarse, not robust,’ … and 
‘endowed with fineness of appreciation or execution’” (76).  Moreover, Yvor Winters 
claims in “Preliminary Problems” that a term’s associations “are affected by 
connotations due to various and curious accidents,” including those on the page and 
those engendered by readers (Praising It New 79).  Once the reader acknowledges these 
multiple meanings, she must determine which ones she feels are most appropriate in the 
given text.  She could choose one meaning, through a subconscious process Empson 
describes as “reconciling” (240).  Alternatively, she could refuse to restrict herself to 
one meaning and instead embrace the word’s indeterminacy.  Empson suggests that all 
these possible meanings come together “as if with an explosion, to make sense and 
accept the main meaning of a connection of phrases” (Structure 240).  In this sense the 
word’s multiple meanings, contradictory and similar alike, cohere in the word: the unity 
of these disparate meanings is ironic, in that one definitive term belies the existence of 
multiple meanings; ambiguous, in that many meanings are valid; and paradoxical, in 
that many of these meanings contradict one another. 
 Irony extends linguistic ambiguity to the text’s conceptual level; the 
pluripotentiality of meaning is present in a literary work in each word, sentence, and 
theme.11  Irony is uniquely capable of uniting many different ideas, individuals, and 
phenomena.  As Richards contends in Principles of Literary Criticism, “[i]rony in this 
sense consists in the bringing in of the opposite, the complementary impulses” (250), 
and in The Well Wrought Urn Brooks explains that “irony is our most general term for 
indicating that the recognition of incongruities—which, again, pervades all poetry to a 
19 
 
 
degree far beyond what our conventional criticism has been heretofore willing to allow” 
(209–210).12  In this sense, the Anglo-American formalists connect irony with 
conceptual ambiguity and paradox as they all incorporate opposing viewpoints in their 
very structures.13  As with linguistic indeterminacy, Richards and other formalist critics 
do not require these opposing perspectives to be resolved, either by synthesizing them 
dialectically or by choosing one over another.  Rather, they encourage the continued 
coexistence of opposites within the same sphere, idea, or work.  As the “equilibrium of 
opposed impulses,” in Richards’s words, or an unresolved “human conflict” in Northrop 
Frye’s definition, irony allows for, and encourages, divergent ideas to coexist without 
the explicit need for authorial resolution.14   
Irony is valuable in formalist criticism for two reasons, one aesthetic and one 
societal.  First, many formalist critics esteem implicit over explicit meaning; Wimsatt 
contends that figurative language, including irony, is more descriptive than concrete 
language (The Verbal Icon 133).15  Booth similarly proposes that the reader’s awareness 
of these multiple meanings evokes a sense of pleasure in the reader (128).  In this 
account, this understanding of meaning-making as an aesthetically valuable process of 
sifting through many possible meanings is a key premise of Anglo-American 
formalism.  Indeed, in “Irony as a Principle of Structure” Brooks contends that “direct 
statement leads to abstraction and threatens to take us out of poetry altogether” (1).  
Indirect communication is a subtler, more artistic mode of expression that allows the 
reader to stay immersed in the world of the text.  
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  Second, many formalists suggest that the representation of unresolved opposites 
is a more faithful depiction of the contradictions, nuances, and paradoxes of daily life 
than is direct description.  In this way, irony connects formalist texts to their socio-
historical contexts, a perspective that contradicts postcolonial critics’ assertions that 
New Criticism jettisons the outside world.  Brooks believes this view of irony to be true 
because the poet’s task is “finally to unify experience.  He must return to us the unity of 
the experience itself as man knows it in his own experience.  The poem, if it be a true 
poem is a simulacrum of reality … by being an experience rather than any mere 
statement about experience or any mere abstraction from experience” (212–13).  Each 
text is a microcosm of reality and must encompass diverging experiences in an 
“organically related whole” to adequately reflect lived reality.  Additionally, Burke 
explains in The Philosophy of Literary Form that contradiction is fundamental to 
“human psychology, not merely as error but for sound biological reasons” (244).  These 
reasons include, and are particularly influenced by, the contradictions of life in 
twentieth-century capitalist societies; if the poet is shaped by his environment, his 
output will necessarily be influenced by the inherent contradictions of capitalism, 
including the tension between the aesthetic (vocational) and practical (vocational) 
spheres (244, 248).16  Furthermore, Tate proposes that “[p]oetry makes us [as readers] 
more conscious of the complexity and meaning of our experience” (24).  Readers are 
better able to appreciate the full scope of the society in which they live by reading an 
ironic text.  To put it differently, as Burke notes in The Philosophy of Literary Form, 
“true knowledge can only be attained through the battle” of analyzing different 
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meanings and attempting to navigate contradictory meanings (149).  The alternative to 
such multifaceted depictions, according to Empson, is propaganda, not art.  
To adequately understand these linguistic ambivalences and conceptual 
paradoxes, however, readers must have a thorough knowledge of the language and 
context in which the text was written.  To use Empson’s example, understanding the 
term “delicate” as used in a novel requires the reader to not only understand the 
dictionary definitions but also to possess a culturally and historically specific awareness 
of the term’s uses.  A contemporary example might be the term “meme”: it certainly 
encompasses its dictionary definitions, Richard Dawkin’s term for a gene expression 
that adapts over time, and the digital mode of communication involving images and 
interchangeable pithy phrases.  Deeper understanding of this word requires knowledge 
of democratic digital platforms like Reddit, on which memes flourish; the use and 
transformation of a specific set of images overlaid with different phrases; and the 
appropriation of certain images for political purposes.   
In emphasizing ambiguity and paradox, formalist criticism, despite its emphasis 
on democratic access to texts, ignores that readers must have substantial contextual 
knowledge to interpret a work of literature, especially familiarity with the socio-
historical context in which the work was written.  These unspoken prerequisites inhibit 
readers’ meaningful engagement with texts written in other languages, places, and 
times.  Many readers cannot access this information on the scale necessary to 
adequately access and assess ambiguity in works from these different contexts.  In 
short, formalists’ focus on irony, ambiguity, and paradox restricts readers’ access even 
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to texts written in their own cultural milieu.  Works composed outside of those 
parameters, then, are all but indecipherable to non-specialist readers under these 
conditions. 
 
Reconstructed Irony: Formalism, Deconstruction, and Paradox 
Despite its avowed differences from formal criticism, literary deconstruction 
preserves many components of New Criticism’s version of irony; this persistence, 
despite claims to the contrary, solidifies formalistic elitism and hermeticism, and 
narrows the available corpus of texts to which readers have access.  Surveying all 
literary deconstruction to show the full extent of irony’s influence is beyond the 
confines of this chapter, so I use two examples to demonstrate my argument: Paul de 
Man and Jacques Derrida, who shaped the development of the field and continue to 
influence contemporary literary theory.  Both contend that irony, paradox, and the 
juxtaposition of opposites are inherent to language and to literature, and propose that it 
is the critic’s task to uncover and unravel these ironies.   
De Man describes his approach to literary analysis in opposition to formalism.  
In his essay “The Dead-End of Formalist Criticism,” he explains his opposition to the 
earlier generation of literary critics, contending that the intentional fallacy, combined 
with “the totalizing principle of the guiding impulse of the critical process,” leads to 
paralysis (32).  This paralysis is not a reflection of the natural world but rather the 
creation of “a discontinuous world of reflective irony and ambiguity” that vacillates into 
infinity (28).  De Man’s problem is not with the inward, reflexive turn, but with the fact 
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that this reflexivity cannot offer the reader the opportunity to create meaning from her 
experience with the text.17  But even as de Man claims to reject formalism and 
revolutionize literary criticism, his view of irony as literary device and worldview 
shares many characteristics with Anglo-American formalism.   
Like formalist criticism, deconstruction emphasizes the indeterminacy of 
language.  In some ways, the deconstructive view of language amplifies the formalists’ 
position on linguistic ambiguity, a contention most clearly illustrated in de Man’s 
Blindness and Insight.  He proposes that all “social language” is necessarily indirect as 
human desires “are, in the fullest sense of the term, unnameable” and further contends 
that “unmediated expression is a philosophical impossibility” (9).  Human expression of 
all kinds, and especially written expression, is, paradoxically, an attempt to voice 
ineffable desires; literature is the combination of truth (those desires) and falsehood (the 
impossibility of accurately conveying them) (ix).  The paradoxical nature of human 
expression, inescapable but unresolved, shares many of the same underlying ideas of 
formalist critics’ claims that irony, as the combination of unresolved opposites, is the 
most faithful way to represent reality. 
For de Man, the only way to gain insight into language is to empty language of 
inherent meaning and instead to focus on incidental meanings created in and through 
discourse (106, 141).18  This meaning is created in two distinct ways, within language 
itself and as a product of the reader’s subjectivity and contextuality.19  First, he holds 
that all words contain within themselves multiple meanings, so all words and texts 
contain within themselves the ambiguities necessary to deconstruct themselves, a 
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contention analogous to Empson’s claims in The Structure of Complex Words and 
Wimsatt and Beardsley’s assertions about the pluripotentiality of language in “The 
Intentional Fallacy.”  In this emphasis on the inherent ambiguities of each word and 
text, de Man agrees with formalist critics that each text holds multiple contradictory 
meanings that can only be deciphered through context.  Stable meaning is impossible; 
any attempts to discern one is “based on a duplicity within the self that willfully creates 
a confusion between literal and symbolic action in order to achieve self-transcendence 
as well as self-preservation” (113). 
De Man’s understanding of linguistic ambiguity is, as in formalist criticism, 
closely related to irony and paradox.  In his essay “The Concept of Irony,” he proposes 
that literary irony is a mobilization of paradox, the process of endlessly vacillating 
between two opposing poles of meaning.  He illustrates this idea with the example of 
Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde, particularly the chapter “Eine Reflexion.”  This chapter is 
depicted as a philosophical treatise, but as de Man notes, “it doesn’t take a very 
perverse mind, only a slightly perverse one, to see that what is actually being described 
is … a reflection on the very physical questions involved in sexual intercourse” (168).  
These readings are not just different but, as he claims, are “radically incompatible with 
each other.  They interrupt, they disrupt, each other in such a fundamental way that this 
very possibility of disruption represents a threat to all assumptions one has about what a 
text should be” (169).  Juxtaposing these two paradoxical scripts rejects all claims to 
totality and instead demonstrates, “by the undoing of the work, the absolute toward 
which the work is under way” (183).  Put differently, if paradox is the recognition and 
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unification of two antithetical concepts, irony is the process of vacillating between the 
two poles in a “permanent parabasis” (179).   
To offer a more concrete example, de Man suggests that defining irony depends 
on the tension between the possibility and impossibility of comprehension.  He 
explains: “If indeed irony is tied with the possibility of understanding, then [any] 
project of understanding irony is doomed from the start because, if irony is of 
understanding, … what is at stake in irony is the possibility of understanding, the 
possibility of reading, the readability of texts, the possibility of deciding on a meaning 
or on a multiple set of meanings or on a controlled polysemy of meaning” (166–167, 
emphasis de Man’s).  De Man amplifies the stakes of his formalist predecessors’ views 
of linguistic ambiguity and paradox: while the formalists see the coexistence of 
opposing ideas as an accurate representation of social totality, de Man instead suggests 
that this opposition negates the possibility of totality in the first place.  
Derrida also emphasizes irony as linguistic ambiguity and paradox, similarly to 
de Man and to the Anglo-American formalists.  Linguistic indeterminacy is a central 
component of Derridean deconstruction theory, especially evident in the unraveling of 
the “ordered polysemy” of pharmakon in “Plato’s Pharmacy.”  For Derrida, pharmakon 
is a term that resists stable definition and encapsulates a “malleable unity” of various 
meanings (71), including paradoxical ideas like “remedy” and “poison,” “petrification” 
and “vivification,” and “nonidentity-within-itself” (71, 119).20  Readers do not choose 
between these meanings; rather, Derrida asserts that all these terms coexist 
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simultaneously.  In unearthing and unraveling these paradoxical pairings, the reader 
enriches her experience of the text.   
The idea that multiple paradoxes are encapsulated within one term parallels de 
Man’s description of linguistic ambivalence and formalist conceptions of the 
pluripotentiality of language, especially because Derrida also rejects the idea of 
authorial intent (as pharmakon, like all terms, is “caught in a chain of significations” 
beyond the author’s intended meaning [Dissemination 95]).  In her “Translator’s 
Preface” to Derrida’s Of Grammatology, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak begrudgingly 
notes the similarities between Derrida’s approach and that of formalist criticism:  
[T]he text belongs to language, not to the sovereign and generating 
author.  (New Criticism, although it vigorously argued the self-enclosure 
and ‘organic unity’ of the text, and indulged in practice in the adulation 
of the author, had a sense of this last insight in its critique of the 
‘intentional fallacy.’) Derrida, questioning the unity of language itself … 
radically opens up textuality. (xcvii) 
While Derrida and Spivak emphasize the radicality of Derrida’s thought, particularly 
the way he grants the reader power to navigate liminal, paradoxical spaces, his view on 
linguistic indeterminacy, like formalist criticism, challenges the intentional fallacy and 
celebrates the reader’s negotiation of opposing meanings.    
These ideas complicate a term’s, and a text’s, very existence; the paradox 
inherent in pharmakon is the play of presence and absence, the necessity of keeping out 
that which is identical to itself (128).  The term itself is a paradoxical unity of existence 
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and impossibility.  For Derrida, the multiple meanings of each term are important only 
when they are allowed to coexist with, and threaten, one another.  Choosing any one 
meaning over the others forecloses the possibilities of other meanings and makes 
impossible any significant discussion of a term or text.  In this way Derrida claims that 
interpretive translations of pharmakon are inadequate because they “violently destroy” 
the ambiguities of the term, and the chosen interpretive term “forbids itself access to” 
other meanings of pharmakon (99).  For example, translating pharmakon as remedy 
… erases, in going outside the Greek language, the other pole reserved in 
the word pharmakon.  It cancels out the resources of ambiguity and 
makes more difficult, if not impossible, an understanding of the context.  
As opposed to “drug” or even “medicine,” remedy says the transparent 
rationality of science, technique, and therapeutic causality, thus 
excluding from the text any leaning toward the magic virtues of a force 
whose effects are hard to master, a dynamic that constantly surprises the 
one who tries to manipulate it as master and as subject. (97) 
Interpretive translations limit the possibilities of a word’s signification and its 
connections to human experiences and thus can never capture the complexities of the 
original word.  They impoverish the text and, with it, the reader’s experience. 
Irony, according to Derrida, is the process of reading paradoxical meanings in 
contact with one another: 
Irony does not consist in the dissolution of a sophistic charm or in the 
dismantling of an occult substance or power through analysis and 
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questioning.  It does not consist in undoing the charlatanesque 
confidence of a pharmakeus from the vantage point of some obstinate 
insistence of transparent reason or innocent logos.  Socratic irony 
precipitates out one pharmakon by bringing it in contact with another 
pharmakon.  Or rather, it reverses the pharmakon’s powers and turns its 
surface over—thus taking effect, being recorded and dated, in the act of 
classing the pharmakon, through the fact that the pharmakon properly 
consists in a certain inconsistency, a certain impropriety, this 
nonidentity-within-itself always allowing it to be turned against itself. 
(119, emphasis Derrida’s) 
These paradoxes, unraveled in the process of literary interpretation, do not nullify but 
rather enrich one another.   
These paradoxical unities are predicated on différance, Derrida’s neologism 
referring to both the deferring and the differing of meaning.  The first element of 
différance is the disappearance of an originating force (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 167), which 
allows all possible meanings of a word to coexist at the same level of importance and 
significance.  Additionally, these meanings are united and mutually constituting. As 
Derrida writes in “Plato’s Pharmacy”: 
Différance, the disappearance of any originary presence, is at once the 
condition of possibility and the condition of the impossibility of truth.  
At once.  “At once” means that the being-present (on) in its truth, in the 
presence of its identity and in the identity of its presence, is doubled as 
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soon as it appears, as soon as it presents itself.  It appears, in its essence, 
as the possibility of its own most proper non-truth, of its pseudo-truth 
reflected in the icon, the phantasm, or the simulacrum. (168, emphasis 
Derrida’s) 
This unity of opposing meanings, of their mutual constitution, extends and amplifies the 
formalist insistence that all language and literature necessarily hold in tension opposing 
elements.   
Derrida further claims that it is impossible to mediate between or reconcile 
paradoxical terms; rather, the act of moving between two extremes is the essential 
component of knowledge production.  Derrida’s writings on untranslatability emphasize 
the reader’s active role in constituting meaning, a further commonality with formalist 
criticism and its rejection of the intentional fallacy.  The notion of “untranslatable” 
words or sentences does not refer solely to linguistic translation, although that could be 
one element of a text’s untranslatability; rather, it refers to the fact that a text could 
possibly mean several different things, even if it is interpreted by a linguistically and 
culturally fluent reader.  One example Derrida provides in Aporias is the phrase Il y va 
d’un certain pas, which could mean several different things: it could emphasize the 
subject of the sentence (il), the gait at which he is going to a place (d’un certain pas), or 
the double play of pas as both “way/gait” and “not” (9–10).  The point, for Derrida, is 
not to choose between possible meanings, but to recognize that the sentence rejects one-
to-one equivalences between a term and its signifier and instead embraces the ambiguity 
of all meaning.  The reader’s task is then to navigate and negotiate between these 
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possible meanings, gleaning sense from the phrase’s context but also analyzing the 
meanings that arise in the juxtaposition of these opposing translations.  In other words, 
while the phrase is inherently ambiguous, the reader must find meanings that arise from 
the text. 
In Aporias Derrida further illustrates this idea in lived experience, using the 
example of national border lines.  A nation needs to acknowledge, welcome, and 
assimilate immigrants, but also to distinguish those native-born citizens from more 
recent arrivals (18).  He offers the example of European nations’ position of welcoming 
others as both an altruistic and self-serving gesture.  Many European nations invite 
foreigners “in order not only to integrate them but also to recognize and accept their 
alterity: two concepts of hospitality that today divide our European and national 
consciousness” (qtd. in Aporias 18).  Derrida contends that it is in and through this 
paradox that we, as nations (and as selves) articulate how we are distinct from, yet 
dependent upon, our others for our continued existence.  In his view, borders symbolize 
the unresolvable opposition between the self and other, as the self depends on the other 
for its very existence and thus no longer can be opposed to the other.   
Deconstruction, particularly in de Man’s and Derrida’s writings, perpetuates the 
same hierarchical approach to literary analysis it purports to reject in Anglo-American 
formalist criticism.  De Man and Derrida proclaim their emphases on paradox to differ 
from the totalizing claims to representation celebrated by the formalist critics, instead 
jettisoning the notion that human life can be fully represented.  Despite these claims to 
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innovation, they unwittingly solidify formalistic claims about linguistic, and lived, 
contradictions.   
Much of the analysis de Man and Derrida advocate requires the reader to have 
extensive background knowledge of etymology, history, language, and culture.  For 
example, Derrida’s reading of pharmakon relies on his reading of the term in Greek in 
the historical context of Socrates’ execution by the state.  If the reader does not possess 
his knowledge of the linguistic and historical context, her engagement with the text will 
be much more limited or, perhaps, almost entirely stymied.  Thus de Man’s and 
Derrida’s modes of literary analysis reject the possibility that non-specialists can 
adequately understand texts that circulate outside of their context of production.  As 
with formalist criticism, thorough analysis of a text is reserved for readers with 
knowledge of the language, culture, and era in which the text was written, making a 
category like world literature impossible at best.  
 
Global Unintelligibility: Irony and the Ethics of Paradox in World Literature 
 Postcolonial and world literary critics emphasize literature’s contextuality and 
social engagement, analyze how writers represent formerly colonized nations, and argue 
for the importance of discussing works written by marginalized peoples.  Their 
analyses, as Fredric Jameson notes in The Political Unconscious, are bound up in 
community identity and politics and seem to have little in common with formalist 
criticism.21  While postcolonial and world literary theorists foreground the impulse of 
social engagement in their work, their reliance on formalist and deconstructive irony 
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inhibits the fulfillment of that engagement.  Many foreground irony as paradox as a 
central mode of literary expression, a focus that connects postcolonial theory to 
formalism; in this way, irony continues to circumscribe interpretive practice.  
Adequately interpreting irony, especially in translated texts, and often are politically 
and socially engaged, requires the reader to have the necessary linguistic and cultural 
fluency to unpack ironic expressions.  The conditions for fulfilling the social 
engagement for which these works call are reserved for the elite few who can 
adequately interpret works of world literature.  
 While postcolonial theory and world literary theory are two distinct modes of 
interpretation, sometimes opposed to one another, they share some crucial similarities.  
I do not minimize the substantial differences between the two approaches, especially 
given the antagonism between postcolonial theory and historical discussions of world 
literature.  Many critics of world literature argue that Weltliteratur, especially as Goethe 
described it in Über Kunst und Alterthum and his personal correspondence, is 
Eurocentric and excludes texts from the “global periphery.”  Even in his sympathetic 
description of Goethe’s fragments on Weltliteratur, Christopher Prendergast 
acknowledges the relevance of these critiques: “While it would be absurd to accuse 
Goethe of a kind of blind Eurocentrism (given the extraordinary sensitivity with which 
he entered into the spirit of Persian and Chinese literatures), in several of the fragments 
there is what appears to be a virtual identification of world literature with European 
literature” (“World Republic of Letters” 3).  These critiques are certainly valid but tend 
to refer to the field’s focus in the past rather than the possibilities it affords to future 
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criticism.  Goethe’s comments about world literature emphasize the possibilities for 
intercultural understanding and appreciation made possible through the circulation of 
texts.  As he proposes in Über Kunst und Alterthum, the circulation of texts in other 
languages and nations offers a better understanding of its nation and culture of origin: 
“the idea is not that the nations shall think alike, but that they shall learn how to 
understand each other, and, if they do not care to love one another, at least that they will 
learn to tolerate one another” (Comparative Literature: The Early Years 8).  Moreover, 
as a work re-circulates back to the location in which it was written and first published, 
the culture of origin learns more about itself through understanding how it was received 
in other cultures and languages (8).   
While idealistic, Goethe’s view of world literature as a vehicle for mutual 
respect and understanding between different cultures aligns with postcolonial theory’s 
stated goals of making legible the experiences of individuals and nations in the formerly 
colonized world.  As Simon Gikandi notes in “Realism, Romance, and the Problem of 
African Literary History,” postcolonial literary works—Gikandi specifically mentions 
those written during the Bengali Renaissance and African decolonization—aim to 
authentically represent people’s lived experiences in the former colonies, reclaiming a 
sense of legitimacy for their own experiences and conveying them to readers unfamiliar 
with that context.  In this sense, postcolonial literature and criticism embodies Goethe’s 
hopes for world literature; taken at their best, both foster a sense of cross-cultural 
understanding and encourage respect for a nation on its own terms.  In this chapter I 
take together these theoretical approaches as a means of comparing postcolonial and 
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world literatures’ emphasis on social, cultural, and historical context with formalism’s 
insularity.   
 In his seminal monograph The Location of Culture, Homi Bhabha purports to 
reinvent irony as an ethical mode of marginal expression, but his description of the 
device shares many characteristics with formalist irony’s elitism.  All knowledge is the 
process and product of constructing meaning out of two opposing ideas.  Rather than 
synthesizing this knowledge, choosing one option, or compromising between them, 
Bhabha echoes de Man in his assertion that that the process of vacillation is the 
meaningful moment of human life.  He writes: “The ‘true’ is always marked and 
informed by the ambivalence of the process of emergence itself, the productivity of 
meanings that construct counter-knowledges in medias res, in the very act of agonism, 
within the terms of a negotiation (rather than a negation) of oppositional and 
antagonistic elements” (33).  Bhabha contends that the paradoxes of human experience 
do not need to be resolved, and indeed they cannot be resolved; put differently, the 
point of human experience is the struggle to make meaning, rather than the product of 
that struggle.   
Bhabha illustrates the ethical potential of these unresolvable paradoxes by 
showing its relevance to, and importance for, writers in formerly colonized nations. For 
Bhabha, irony and paradox pervade all works of literature, both at the semantic and 
structural levels, and he argues that the ambivalence and liminality of all forms of 
postcolonial expression complicate the false binaries of contemporary Western culture, 
including the juxtaposition of the private and public spheres and the past and the present 
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(14, 19).  Bhahba asserts that recognizing ambiguity in lived experience is a political 
strategy.  As writers navigate between two opposed categories of lived existence—
public and private, truth and falsehood, past and present, familiar and foreign, inside 
and outside—they resist binary logic.  For example, in an interpretation of Toni 
Morrison’s Beloved and Nadine Gordimer’s My Son’s Story, Bhabha asserts that an 
“intimacy” exists between juxtaposed poles that “represents a hybridity, a difference 
‘within,’ a subject that inhabits the rim of an ‘in-between’ reality” (19).  This hybridity 
“contests the terms and territories of both” opposed stable categories (41).  Rejecting 
binaries and acknowledging multiple possibilities is an ethical process, according to 
Bhabha, because it encourages an empathy and cross-cultural understanding not 
possible in identity politics: “To live in the unhomely world, to find its ambivalences 
and ambiguities enacted in the house of fiction, or its sundering and splitting performed 
in the work of art, is also to affirm a profound desire for social solidarity: ‘I am looking 
for the join … I want to join … I want to join’” (26–27).  The rejection of binaries is an 
important way to recognize, and develop solidarity with, marginalized cultures.  Bhabha 
contends that depicting these interstitial places, especially in the so-called “third world,” 
has ethical ramifications in politics and cross-cultural understanding.  
Some theories of world literature are similarly founded on a belief in linguistic 
ambiguity and in the importance of preserving paradox in literature.  Emily Apter’s 
writings, both in The Dictionary of Untranslatables and in Against World Literature, 
illustrate this approach.  Where Bhabha emphasizes the cultural paradoxes of 
postcolonial expression, Apter analyzes the linguistic ambiguities that are produced and 
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imperiled by the process of literary circulation and translation.  She argues that all 
meaning is linguistically, culturally, and historically contextual, a contention with 
which I do not disagree; however, following Derrida, she contends that some terms are 
untranslatable because they have been imbued with multiple meanings that cannot be 
captured by one translated term.22  The Dictionary of Untranslatables, Apter’s adapted 
translation of Barbara Cassin’s Le Vocabulaire européens des philosophies: 
dictionnaire des intraduisibles, assembles many different definitions and connotations 
of each entry in the same place, not giving primacy to any meaning but instead showing 
how one term encapsulates very different, sometimes paradoxical, ideas.  Apter 
emphasizes the importance of recognizing these many possible meanings and holding 
them in tension with one another.23   
For example, Apter explores of the title of Immanuel Kant’s Zum ewigen 
Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf (“Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical 
Project”), parsing the meaning of ewig as both “perpetual” and “eternal,” to show how a 
term can incorporate multiple meanings.  Ewig has political and religious connotations, 
and Apter explains how each meaning alters Kant’s argument.  In one sense, ewig 
“sounds a distinctly ecclesiastic note typical of liturgical expressions … Ewig in this 
sense is a word destined to culminate in the Christian belief in eternal bliss (Seligkeit)” 
(132–133).  In another sense, the phrase has secular connotations: “If we go back to the 
standard translation of ewiger Friede as ‘perpetual peace,’ the word peace is framed 
from the perspective of property … To have peace in perpetuity would then be 
comparable to possessing a right to own some piece of peace; to have a stake in it, as 
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one might in a trust, or testate, or commodity future” (134).  To complicate matters 
further, Apter suggests that “peace is valued as a form of negative liberty—freedom 
from conflict, a mode of stasis,” particularly the absence of unbalanced political fights 
(135).  These multiple connotations offer different lenses through which readers 
interpret the essay: attending to these meanings “frames the word ‘peace’ in relation to 
ongoing debates around stasis, faction, and civil war. It highlights temporal and 
cosmological dimensions of what peace might mean (a politics of eternity or 
infinitude?), and it raises the question of what peace-brokering aims to achieve if its 
purview is restricted to the world of humans” (131–132).  This one term can include 
various connotations, and recognizing these multiple possibilities enriches and 
complicates the meaning of the term and of Kant’s text as a whole.    
Attempting to translate untranslatable words reveals the futility of expressing 
multiple connotations with one equivalent term in translation.  According to Apter, an 
untranslatable term is “an incorruptible or intransigent nub of meaning that triggers 
endless translating in response to its resistant singularity” (235).  Choosing one meaning 
simultaneously forecloses and opens up the possibility of meaning itself.  While this 
approach is Derridean in inspiration, her emphasis on the pluripotentiality of language, 
especially the encapsulation of unresolvable opposites in a term, shares much with 
Anglo-American formalism, particularly Empson’s, Tate’s, and others’ argument that 
one word signifies several ideas at once.  Like Bhabha, Apter distinguishes her 
approach from formalist criticism by emphasizing the socio-historical embeddedness of 
each term. That being said, she (like her formalist predecessors) contends that 
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understanding the full range of potential meanings is vastly more important than the 
choice between them.   
Moreover, Apter’s idea of “world literature” is paradoxical in its goal of 
negotiating the binary categories of global and national literatures.  For example, Cassin 
posits that world literature depends upon linguistic idiosyncrasies only possible through 
national production and the “global culture” made possible through global capitalism 
(39).24  In other words, Cassin and Apter propose that world literature is not possible 
without distinctive local literatures, but simultaneously depends upon the market’s 
homogenization of culture and literature through globalization.25  This approach to 
world literature includes the same type of paradox as do formalist descriptions of 
literary irony in that contradictory elements are preserved, rather than sublated.  
Although Apter’s reliance on the concept of Untranslatability purports resists the 
“bulimic” drive of world literature to encapsulate all texts, at the same time it 
paradoxically incorporates a variation of this bulimic impulse in its recognition of 
global literary culture and simultaneous preservation of national difference (3).26   
To adequately understand Bhabha’s examples of ambivalence, or Apter’s 
untranslatable terms, a reader must once again have a great deal of cultural, political, 
historical, and linguistic knowledge.  In other words, for a reader to fully appreciate the 
ethical valences of Gordimer’s My Son’s Story she must be aware of the colonial history 
of South Africa, the development of Apartheid, the anti-Apartheid movement, and the 
contested role of the English language in South Africa, among other social contexts.  In 
this account, Gordimer’s novel can only truly resonate for South African readers or 
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those who are intimately knowledgeable about the culture.  That is not to say that 
readers without this knowledge cannot appreciate Gordimer’s text, but rather that an 
awareness of the work’s socio-political relevance is exclusive to specialists.  Apter’s 
and Bhabha’s continued insistence on ambivalence undercuts their understanding of the 
purposes of literary irony; put differently, when full understandings of textual 
ambiguities are reserved for an elite few, fewer readers can develop social solidarity.  
To use Bhabha’s phrase, while we can look for the join, we cannot find it.  Although 
they attempt to emphasize a text’s socio-politial and historical context, Apter and 
Bhabha carry forward the same types of literary analysis proposed by the formalists, 
albeit in a different guise—rather than examining the ambiguity of a word in a closed 
system, the reader of postcolonial texts is required to unravel its semantic and thematic 
ambiguities in a specific historical, linguistic, and social context.   
 
Unethical Irony 
 Irony, together with linguistic ambivalence and conceptual paradox, is the 
central device in the otherwise divergent schools of formalism, deconstruction, and 
postcolonial and world literary theory.  The device’s similar role in each of these 
approaches is compelling not because later theorists consciously echo these formalist 
tenets, but rather because these ostensibly different schools articulate similar 
understandings of irony’s definition and function.  The notion that irony reflects the 
ambiguities of lived experience hinders the device’s potential for social engagement.  If 
irony passively mirrors the contradictions of human experience, rather than critiquing 
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them or offering alternatives, ironic literary works simply look down upon society from 
a superior position and are unable to do anything other than reproduce social totality.  
This position is succinctly articulated in Ezra Pound’s charge against Jules Laforgue’s 
writing: the “delicate irony” in his work is “the citadel of the intelligent” (“Irony, 
Laforgue, and Some Satire” 94).  Put differently, the great Modernist (contradictorily 
enough, especially given his reliance on irony in his own works) lambastes Laforgue’s 
irony for its elitist conception of knowledge and the limited access thereto.  As irony 
continues to be characterized in the same manner in subsequent schools of literary 
criticism, it will continue to be a disengaged device.   
 This view of irony has serious implications for the scope and methods of literary 
analysis, more broadly speaking.  First, the ambivalence of language limits the number 
and type of literary texts to which a reader has meaningful access.  In order to have full 
philological, etymological, social, and historical knowledge of any term, the reader 
must be well educated in the language in which the author wrote, as well as in the 
philosophy and literary history with which its author is familiar.  As the entry on Geist 
in The Dictionary of Untranslatables shows, to properly understand the nuances of the 
term a reader would have to have knowledge of German, to be able to distinguish 
between Geist and other synonyms, to be aware of other words traditionally associated 
with Geist, and so on, to be able to arrive at the level of knowledge Apter contends is 
necessary for meaningful literary interpretation.  Such knowledge is not always, or 
fully, available to non-specialist readers.   
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Translations pose a related problem.  While Apter, Lawrence Venuti (in his 
foundational work The Scandals of Translation), Spivak, and others hold that 
translation can provide some level of intelligibility from which analysis or interpretation 
can occur, they insist that translation simultaneously closes off the work’s original 
pluripotentiality, especially if translation is understood as direct duplication rather than 
the creation of a different literary work.   Derrida’s understanding of linguistic and 
conceptual translation also requires of the reader a thorough knowledge of the language 
of composition and of etymology or philosophical history in order to properly 
understand a text.  Few readers can properly recognize and interpret these ambiguities, 
meaning that the full scope of literary analysis is only available to erudite readers.  We 
can see how easily irony gains the reputation of being insular and hierarchical. 
 Not only is linguistic and philological knowledge essential to literary 
interpretation, so too is cultural knowledge.  While few would deny that a reader should 
learn about a text’s historical and cultural context, linguistic ambivalence and 
conceptual paradox require a reader to be fluent in the history, norms, and customs of 
the author’s “home” culture.  Recognizing the presence of cultural paradoxes requires a 
high level of cultural fluency, an argument especially clear in Bhabha’s essay 
“DissemiNation.”  His understanding of collective identity as a “people” describes the 
emergence of an identity  
 … within a range of discourses as a double narrative movement … the 
people are historical “objects” of a nationalist pedagogy, giving the 
discourse an authority that is based on the pre-given or constituted 
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historical origin in the past; the people are also the “subjects” of a 
process of signification that must erase any prior or originary presence of 
the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principles of the 
people as contemporaneity: as that sign of the present through which 
national life is redeemed and iterated as a reproductive process. (209, 
emphasis Bhabha’s) 
Recognizing these constituting factors of national identity, both as lived experience and 
as past representation, requires more than a base level of cultural knowledge; it 
demands of the reader a deep understanding of colonial history, nationalist movements, 
and their associated rhetorics.  Readers without this broad and deep knowledge would 
not only miss the nuances of a text that purports to represent the life of a people, they 
would also negate the political and social impact of postcolonial works.  Bhabha’s 
description of hybridity and postcolonial agency, engendered from paradox, means that 
these works are all but inaccessible to many readers.  Works could only be interpreted 
by the author’s temporal, cultural, and linguistic peers if they are to retain their full 
social and political impact.  Bhabha’s understanding of irony and the agency of 
ambiguous expression, then, further limits the type of works to which readers have 
access.   
 The reliance on paradox and unresolved opposition in formalism, 
deconstruction, and postcolonial criticism limits the possibility of world literature, as 
defined in its current Goethean incarnation.  As David Damrosch explains in What Is 
World Literature? the term can refer to a number of different things: a body of texts 
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(emphasized in earlier descriptions of the field, the “great books” approach), a mode of 
reading (typically associated with Franco Moretti), and a process of literary circulation 
(as described in Pascale Casanova’s World Republic of Letters).  Damrosch attempts to 
incorporate the various facets of this definition, and he explains the three tenets he sees 
as integral to the field: world literature is “an elliptical refraction of national literatures 
… writing that gains in translation, … and not a set canon of texts but a mode of 
reading: a form of detached engagement with worlds beyond our own place and time” 
(281).  While Damrosch’s description of world literature may lead to 
oversimplification, particularly on the emphasis he places on “universal values” 
throughout the text, he does emphasize that world literature is culturally and temporally 
specific and that through circulation readers gain a nuanced understanding of the world 
described in the text.  All three components of his definition are made extraordinarily 
difficult, if not impossible, if examined through the above discussions of irony.  
Readers, ranging from undergraduates to scholars trained in departments of English 
literature, would likely not have the level of knowledge required by these theories to 
understand a work in translation and circulation, much less analyze it.  In this sense, the 
emphasis all three theoretical approaches place on irony as paradox perpetuates the 
elitism of literary criticism and further ossifies the hierarchies the formalists were trying 
to escape, between erudite and uneducated readers, those who are able to comprehend 
and interpret paradox and those who are not.  This approach limits the possibility of 
world literature and further precludes irony’s social engagement.  
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 In literary theory, irony is restricted to one definition, that of linguistic 
ambivalence and the juxtaposition of opposites, that resonates in different schools of 
literary theory from the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  This monolithic 
understanding of what irony is and how it functions in literary expression limits the 
number and types of texts to which readers have access—in this understanding readers 
can only adequately interpret those works produced in their own cultural, historical, and 
linguistic context, which means that works cannot be meaningfully read in translation or 
circulation.  However, it is not necessary to limit irony in this way.  Indeed, in the next 
chapter I argue for a redefinition of irony as a socially engaged mode of ethical critique 
during specific historical moments and as a literary device that is essential to world- 
historical development.  Reorienting the definition of irony opens the process of literary 
analysis to a much broader audience and even makes possible the idea of irony in 
translation and circulation.  In short, irony’s restriction to the formalist definition is an 
arbitrary one; alternate descriptions of the device show how it makes literature 
accessible and how it plays a role in socio-historical development. 
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Chapter Two 
Earnest Eirons:  
Ethical Indirection in World Literature 
 
 Given the fact that irony, despite the many professed reinventions of the device, 
continues to refer to a paradoxical and disengaged stance, theorists of world literature 
and postcolonial literature would be forgiven for dismissing irony out of hand as a 
meaningful trope and perspective for world literature.  If a reader needs extensive 
linguistic, cultural, and historical knowledge to exactly decipher the twentieth-century 
ironies described in Chapter One, claims to this extensive knowledge dangerously 
approach the notion of mastery.  Any reader’s claims of mastery are highly contentious 
in world literature, evoking imperialist rhetorics of the “civilized” colonizers’ ability to 
comprehend the rudimentary literary output of colonized peoples, regardless of the 
author’s or reader’s nationality.  Through this lens, Timothy Brennan’s assertion that 
modernist irony is antithetical to the values of world literature makes perfect sense.  
This type of irony, as Brennan defines it, is an aesthetic position “firmly convinced, 
dismissive of its opponents, and eager to mock them” that further celebrates “an ethics 
of reading opposed to all literary interpretation” (“The case against irony” 383).  As a 
world view it is duplicitous, “fragmentary,” novel, complex, and subjective, and its 
esteem in the contemporary global market prevents recognition of literary works that 
are “repetiti[ve], sincer[e],” and personal (381).  Under these conditions—which are 
later recapitulated by deconstructive and postcolonial theorists, as I argued in Chapter 
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One—I wholeheartedly agree that modernist irony cannot be a central device of world 
literature.   
 In contrast to the modernist irony currently en vogue in texts circulating in the 
global marketplace, I assert that a different mode of irony—controlled irony—can be, 
and has been, a device of social engagement in works of world literature.  In his 
magister dissertation The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates, Søren 
Kierkegaard defines controlled irony in a way that highlights its ethical potential, 
especially when the ironist’s overarching world-view is harnessed and selectively 
deployed in discrete moments of critique in a literary work.  Unlike Brennan, I do not 
hold Kierkegaard’s work to be a precursor to this modernist, aesthetic irony, nor do I 
see it as an elaborate defense of Romantic irony.1  I argue that this particular text refutes 
the subjective vacillations Kierkegaard is said to support (and which he does support in 
later works); instead, he describes irony as a device central to the process of world-
historical development and is therefore ethical.  As I will show below, Kierkegaard 
proposes that irony has the unique ability to illuminate social contradictions under 
conditions in which earnest critiques are ineffective, thus paving the way for social 
reevaluation, an essential component of world-historical development.   
Additionally, I argue that Kierkegaard’s controlled irony is fundamental to the 
project of world literature.  Many literary signals denote irony—the “clues” to “stable 
irony,” Wayne C. Booth’s term for indirection where the author’s message is easily 
discernible—and draw the reader’s attention not just to the ironic passage but also point 
readers toward the author’s concerns for the society in which the work was written.  
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Controlled irony is not hierarchical or unintelligible in different contexts, but rather 
offers the opportunity for readers to learn more about the depicted context.  Controlled 
irony acts as an Ansatzpunkt in a work of world literature, to use Erich Auerbach’s term 
for a point of departure from which the reader can begin to more fully comprehend the 
text, as I will examine in depth below.  These “clues” signal to the readers that irony is 
being employed, encouraging them to further investigate the relationship between what 
is said and what is meant; in many cases the clues are accessible to culturally, 
linguistically, nationally, temporally, or otherwise distant readers, prompting them to 
further analyze the work and its socio-historical context.2  In this way irony, in world 
literature is recognizable as such, stimulates deeper understanding of a work’s context, 
and thus serves an ethical function in world literature.   
 This argument does not mean I believe that all ironies are intelligible for all 
readers, nor do I hold that all ironies (even when controlled, as I will explain below) are 
ethical.  Many authors have written, and continue to write, ironic works from a position 
of aesthetic superiority; James Joyce comes to mind here.  I do, however, reject the 
notion that all ironies are necessarily unintelligible in world literature.  Perhaps it might 
be more appropriate to say that I am arguing for an acknowledgment that while irony 
can be accessible in world literature, theoretically speaking, there are degrees of 
intelligibility in the author’s depiction and reader’s interpretation of ironic 
commentaries. Additionally, controlled irony can, and has, served a conservative 
function that upholds social order, but here too I assert that irony does not by definition 
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work in this way.3  When skillfully employed, literary clues to ironic critique facilitate 
social evaluation as the work circulates.  
This chapter is divided into three parts.  In the first, I analyze Kierkegaard’s 
(frequently misinterpreted) comments on controlled irony and contend that controlled 
irony fulfills an ethical role in world-historical development.  In the second section, 
using Johann Gottfried Herder’s theory of world literature and world-historical 
development as a framework, I argue that irony can circulate across national 
boundaries, can be intelligible when translated into different languages, and can be 
adequately understood across historical eras.  To contrast claims about the 
unintelligibility of world literature, I turn to translation theory in the third section to 
explore the circumstances under which readers can learn to interpret irony in 
translation.  Galvanizing Kierkegaardian irony in the service of Herderian world 
literature, I contend that moments of controlled ironic critique in world literature can 
foster a sense of cross-cultural respect and facilitate world-historical development. 
 
Beyond “Absolute, Infinite Negativity”: Kierkegaardian Irony as Social 
Engagement 
Literary scholars often cite Kierkegaardian irony as a mode of aesthetic 
disengagement, a perspective that facilitates the author’s and reader’s isolation from 
society to mock its failings from a position of authority.  Indeed, Kierkegaard advocates 
that position in his later works, including Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), 
and in many of his pseudonymous writings he enacts this brand of sneering critique.  
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However, to restrict Kierkegaardian irony to this perspective impoverishes both his 
work and literary understandings about how the device functions.  Attending to his 
definitions in The Concept of Irony (1841), I argue that he offers a vision of irony that 
allows authors to use it as a mode of social engagement; moreover, this reinterpretation, 
and especially his view of controlled irony, better reflects how authors use the device in 
works of world literature. 
One of the biggest impediments to understanding Kierkegaardian irony is the 
opacity and protracted structure of The Concept of Irony.4  In the long first part, he 
summarizes depictions of Socrates and Socrates’ daimon and analyzes the Greek 
philosopher’s significance in world history.  After this extended exegesis he turns to 
irony—and then as a lengthy refutation of German Romantic irony.  Only in a few 
sections of the second part, roughly 10% of the whole dissertation, does Kierkegaard 
offer an explicit definition of the device.5  He proposes that irony is an expression or 
orientation in which the phenomenon does not correspond to the essence, the ironist is 
negatively free regarding what he says and to whom he speaks, the message has a self-
cancelling nature, the ironic message adopts an attitude of superiority, negativity is 
absolute and infinite, and the standpoint is subjective.6  The following paragraphs 
isolate each element to analyze them; only after looking at each component part can we 
synthesize them into a cohesive definition.   
Three of these characteristics resemble, in many respects, the formalist ironies 
discussed in Chapter One: the opposition of phenomenon and essence, the subject’s 
negative freedom, and the ironist’s sense of superiority toward his interlocutor.  First, 
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the phenomenon does not correspond to the essence, but instead is “the opposite of the 
essence” (247).7  Kierkegaard explains: “When I am speaking, the thought, the 
meaning, is the essence, and the word is the phenomenon … Now, truth demands 
identity, for if I had the thought without the word, then I would not have had the 
thought; and if I had the word without the thought, then I would not have the word, 
either” (247).  Truthful communication requires the phenomenon (the spoken message) 
and the essence (the intended message) to be identical.  In ironic communication, 
however, what is said is the antithesis of what is meant.  While Kierkegaard’s 
description of the juxtaposition between explicit and intended meaning differs from 
formalism’s emphasis on the role of the interpreter in deciphering ironic 
communication, this first quality does share with formalism the idea that this non-
identity holds paradoxical ideas in suspension.   
Second, since what the ironist says is not what he means, the speaker is 
negatively free in relation to what is said and to whom he speaks.8  Kierkegaard writes: 
“If … what I said is not my meaning or the opposite of my meaning, then I am free in 
relation to others and myself” (247–248).  Once the ironist conveys his message in 
which word(s) and meaning(s) do not correspond, he divests himself of responsibility, 
for both the words themselves and for his interlocutor’s ability to comprehend them.9   
Third, this negative freedom endows the ironic expression with a sense of its 
own superiority, which “derive[s] from its not wanting to be understood … with the 
result that this figure looks down, as it were, on plain and simple talk that everyone can 
promptly understand; it travels around, so to speak, in an exclusive incognito and looks 
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down pitying from this high position on ordinary, prosaic talk” (248).  This claim shares 
some similarities with the formalist critics’ assertion that irony is the highest form of 
expression.  But the ironist does not necessarily assume the same aloof posture that 
modernist authors do; while irony embraces its superiority and unintelligibility, the 
ironist does not necessarily do so.  Kierkegaard rejects hierarchical irony that is used by 
“the higher circles” in which individuals “speak ironically so that people will not be 
able to understand them” (249).   
However, the next characteristic diverges from formalist irony and instead 
focuses on how irony can be understood.  Kierkegaard asserts that irony has a self-
cancelling nature, which facilitates its capacity for social critique.  He notes that “[t]he 
ironic figure of speech cancels itself, however, inasmuch as the one who is speaking 
assumes that his hearers understand him, and thus, through a negation of the immediate 
phenomenon, the essence becomes identical with the phenomenon” (248).  The ironist’s 
assumption reunites what is said with what is meant, and in this respect, Kierkegaard 
holds, irony wants to be decoded. Ironic communication therefore reestablishes a 
connection of sorts between speaker and listener as well as phenomenon and essence.  
This reorientation is made possible, in some respects, by Kierkegaard’s rejection of the 
ironist’s superiority.  That being said, the ironist is not responsible for ensuring that his 
interlocutor is able to interpret this indirect communication properly; that task he leaves 
for the interlocutor.  This ironic communication is not intentionally obfuscating 
because, Kierkegaard posits, irony includes clues that enable the listener to discern the 
true relationship between phenomenon and essence: “it is like a riddle to which one at 
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the same time has the solution” (248).  His understanding of irony differs from 
dissimulation, duplicity, and insincerity, because the ironist does want his message to be 
understood as irony and is not trying to mislead or misinform his interlocutor.   
Kierkegaard does not explain how irony contains those clues to facilitate 
comprehension, but I propose that the ironist employs specific rhetorical devices to 
signal to readers the presence of irony.  Booth explains this practice in his seminal 
monograph A Rhetoric of Irony when he suggests that a number of literary techniques 
convey to the reader that what is meant is the opposite of what is said, including litotes, 
hyperbole, parabasis, antiphrasis, peripeteia, logical or argumentative fallacies, and 
other contextual clues.  In Irony’s Edge, Linda Hutcheon proposes that structural clues 
include a change in register, incongruity, and repetition (156).  To cite one example of 
“clues” to irony, Jonathan Swift uses hyperbole in his essay “A Modest Proposal” to 
signal to his readers that the explicit message must be interpreted ironically.10  He 
presents the idea of selling children from poor Irish families as food for wealthy English 
people to critique the British government’s ludicrous suggestions to Irish peasants on 
how to improve their lives.  Swift and other writers insert clues to show their audience 
that what is being written is not meant to be taken literally, and that the reader must 
delve into the text more deeply to discern its intended meaning.  In this way, 
Kierkegaard’s definition of irony hinges on the author’s inclusion of keys to decipher 
the text’s meaning, clues that the reader learns to identify in reading the text.   
Kierkegaard asserts that irony is socially engaged because it illuminates a gap 
between what is said about a society and its reality, and when unrecognized that gap 
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impedes world-historical development.  The ironist negates a specific social context and 
its claims to validity: 
Irony sensu eminentiori is directed not against this or that particular 
existing entity but against the entire given actuality at a certain time and 
under certain conditions.  Thus it has an intrinsic apriority, and it is not 
by successively destroying one portion of actuality after another that it 
arrives at its total view, but it is by virtue of this that it destroys the 
particular instance.  It is not this or that phenomenon but the totality of 
existence that it contemplates sub specie ironiae (under the aspect of 
irony). (254) 
Rather than selectively critiquing a society, he suggests, an ironist begins by rejecting 
the whole actuality.  The key phrase in the above passage is “against the entire given 
actuality at a certain time and under certain conditions.”  Irony rejects a specific 
actuality in its entirety, but not the possibility of all actualities, a position for which he 
critiques German Romantic irony which, he claims, “was not in the service of the world 
spirit.  It was not an element of the given actuality that must be negated and superseded 
by a new element, but it was all of historical actuality that it negated in order to make 
room for a self-created actuality” (275).11  The ironist rejects one specific actuality in its 
entirety because it is “no longer valid.”12  For example, Kierkegaard rejects his own 
society because it is inauthentic: “Our age demands more; it demands, if not lofty 
pathos then at least loud pathos, if not speculation then at least conclusions, if not truth 
then at least persuasion, if not integrity then at least protestations of integrity, if not 
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feeling then at least a verbosity about feelings” (246).13  Irony only negates the 
actuality; it does not offer a positive critique of the ironist’s actuality, nor does it 
construct an alternative actuality to replace the invalid one.  The ironist can only 
illuminate this gap when members of that society do not recognize it and do not respond 
to earnest critique.14   
This negation does not lead to the ironist’s further retreat from society, but 
rather enmeshes him further in that actuality.  In Kierkegaard’s view, ironists 
necessarily exist in a social context; while they are alienated from their actualities, they 
cannot function without them.  This dependence is reciprocal, as the society, broadly 
speaking, cannot progress without the ironist’s assistance.  The ironist’s task is to 
converse with individuals in his actuality, using irony “to mystify the surrounding 
world, seeking not so much to remain in hiding itself as to get others to disclose 
themselves” (251).  The ironist points out the disjuncture of what is said about society 
and its lived realities, making it possible for his interlocutors to realign their perception.  
As Mark C. Taylor notes in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship, this “dialectical 
method of indirect communication is constantly saying to the reader, ‘Your move!’  It 
prepares the way for personal commitment by helping the reader to clarify his situation 
through illustrating an individual’s possibilities” (62).15  In this way, Kierkegaard’s 
interlocutor is not an alazon, a figure to be fooled by the ironist; rather, through ironic 
critique the interlocutor is empowered to view her actuality more clearly and to change 
it.  As Alastair Hannay notes in Kierkegaard: A Biography, “here, in the dissertation, 
irony is presented as a leveling process, creating a clearing in which the world can 
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reappear as a gift and a task, and with it the possibility of a reconciliation between 
subject and object” (147).  Put differently, Kierkegaard’s engaged irony facilitates the 
realignment of essence and phenomenon, a process in which the ironist plays the pivotal 
role of leading all his interlocutors to see that their perception of their shared actuality is 
inaccurate.16   
This vital realignment of essence and phenomenon, both in the text and in the 
material world, restarts the process of world-historical development.  In Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel’s concept of dialectical development, which Kierkegaard reiterates in 
The Concept of Irony, phenomenon and essence must correspond for sublation to 
occur.17  If individuals in a specific actuality are unable to recognize its essence (true 
values), or if the essence and phenomenon (lived reality) do not correspond, then 
history cannot progress.  Kierkegaard illustrates this abstract claim with the example of 
the Reformation’s reorientation of essence and phenomenon.  Martin Luther objected to 
the practice of selling indulgences, in which Christians paid a priest to absolve them of 
their sins; while church officials touted this practice as eminently Christian, Luther 
pointed out in his Ninety-Five Theses that it contradicted Biblical teachings that humans 
receive salvation through grace.  Individuals must restart this process for ethical 
reasons; Kierkegaard, like Hegel, sees in world-historical development the unfolding of 
consciousness and freedom.  As Hegel writes in The Philosophy of History, “Universal 
history … shows the development of the consciousness of Freedom on the part of Spirit, 
and of the consequent realization of that Freedom.  This development implies a 
gradation—a series of increasingly adequate expressions or manifestations of Freedom, 
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which result from its Idea” (63).18  In other words, in each stage of historical 
development, the universal Spirit becomes increasingly more perfect in its 
understanding of itself and “its religion, its polity, its ethics, its legislation, and even its 
science, art, and mechanical skill” (64).   
Similarly, as Kierkegaard argues in the final pages of The Concept of Irony, 
actuality is valid  
as history in which consciousness successively matures, yet in such a 
way that salvation consists not in forgetting all this [each progressive 
stage of development] but in becoming present in it.  Actuality, 
therefore, will not be rejected, and longing [for world-historical 
perfection] will be a sound and healthy love, not a … wanting to have 
the perfect prematurely.  Therefore actuality acquires its validity through 
action.” (328–329)   
In both Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s understanding of historical development, if a society 
remains stagnant then its ethics and social structures will stagnate as well, providing no 
opportunities for individual or collective improvement.  Kierkegaard’s understanding of 
irony facilitates the development of ethical consciousness, as well as artistic expression 
and human freedom.  If the dialectical process stagnates, humans suffer individually and 
collectively.19   
Kierkegaard considered literature—and especially poetry—to be an ideal vehicle 
through which the ironist critiques his society, doing so not through a complete 
rejection of actuality but rather through discrete moments of ironic critique.20  These 
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ironists harness their “absolute, infinite negativity,” their rejection of the entire actuality 
in which they live, and interject pointed ironic critiques in their literary works, to 
demonstrate to their readers the most pressing incongruity the authors see in their 
societies.  In other words, authors present their irony as a discrete literary device, not as 
an overarching world view, and deploy it at meaningful moments throughout their text.  
This limited irony—what he calls “controlled irony” or irony as a “mastered 
moment”—is effective because it is harnessed and used sparingly for maximum effect.  
He also contends controlled irony is an effective way to critique social actualities 
because it does not provide an ultimate truth, but rather helps readers find their own 
path to the truth.  As he writes, “[e]ven though one must warn against irony as against a 
seducer, so must one also commend it as a guide … woe to him who cannot bear to 
have irony seek to balance the accounts.  Irony as the negative is the way; it is not the 
truth but the way” (327).21  Ironic critiques can illuminate the contradictions the author 
believes are hindering historical development and facilitate necessary change(s).22   
I do not wish to overstate the political implications of this approach; 
Kierkegaard was not a liberal thinker, despite his seemingly radical vision of irony’s 
ethical potential.  Kierkegaard was politically conservative, a monarchist, and an 
aristocrat by birth; after his father’s death he was able to live comfortably on his 
inheritance, as Bruce Kirmmse explains (Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark 26).23  
Throughout his life he remained in the aristocratic circles of Copenhagen’s elite, an 
insular community of some 3,000 to 4,000 people (Kirmmse 79).  Clearly, 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of irony’s ethics was not populist, and in that sense 
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scholars rightly criticize his work for its elitism.24  However, the world-historical 
development made possible through his description of ironic reorientation is one that 
would, in time, benefit everyone in that actuality, given the fact that these readers were 
often clergymen, government officials, and the educated elite—those individuals who 
possessed the power to alter political policy and social norms.  Additionally, reading 
Kierkegaard’s description of irony in this way does not foreclose the possibility that 
literary controlled irony could be understood by a wider audience; he seems to suggest 
that anyone able to read these texts has the ability to interpret the ethical critiques 
within the works.   
  My argument hinges on a serious reading of The Concept of Irony, which 
contradicts prominent Kierkegaard scholars’ arguments that the work is a satire of 
Hegelian philosophy, and as such I must digress to explain my reasoning before 
returning to my thesis about controlled irony and social critique.  In his influential 
monograph Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, Niels Thulstrup famously advocated the 
position that Kierkegaard wrote the work as a critique of Hegel, a position now called 
the “ironic hypothesis.”25  Later scholars follow Thulstrup’s critique and ridicule the 
work’s Hegelian themes: John Vignaux Smyth deems The Concept of Irony a “parody 
of Hegelianese” (146), Roger Poole asserts that Kierkegaard empties all Hegelian terms 
of all substance and therefore subverts Hegelian philosophy internally (3), and others 
contend that Kierkegaard’s anti-Hegelian writings in Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
act as a litmus test against which all his works must be understood.26  I argue against the 
ironic hypothesis for several reasons, predominantly because the Hegelian themes of the 
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dissertation are not exaggerated or distorted in any way, as one might expect in an 
ironic work.27  In other words, Kierkegaard’s magister dissertation contains no “clues” 
that signal an ironic message.  Following Jon Stewart’s argument in Kierkegaard’s 
Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, I contend that The Concept of Irony was a work 
written during Kierkegaard’s Hegelian phase and as such should not be viewed as the 
opening salvo of Kierkegaard’s existentialist thought.28  Additionally, while some 
scholars propose that the work was written ironically to appease certain dissertation 
committee members, recent scholarship by Stewart, Bruce Kirmmse, and Robert J. 
Wiedenmann convincingly refutes this argument.29  Of course, I do not dismiss the 
tensions between Hegelian dialectics and Kierkegaardian irony, but rather propose that 
these tensions are not central to the work.30  
In fact, Kierkegaard’s discussions of Hegelian ideas are nuanced and 
demonstrate a careful distinction of his own ideas from Hegelian philosophy.31  For 
example, as Stewart explains, the discussion of Socrates in Kierkegaard’s work shares 
many similarities with Hegel’s discussions in The History of Philosophy, Lectures on 
the Philosophy of History, and Philosophy of Right (Stewart 150–157).32  After several 
pages of exposition about Hegel’s understanding of Socrates’ daimon, Kierkegaard 
indicates his point of divergence: “This concludes my exposition of Hegel’s 
presentation, and, here as always when one has Hegel along …, I have thereby acquired 
a footing from which I can safely start out on an excursion to see whether there might 
be some particular worthy of note to which I can safely return whether or not I have 
found anything” (165).33  Notably, Kierkegaard does not accept Hegel’s ideas wholesale 
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but rather critiques what he perceives to be an error in Hegel’s description: Kierkegaard 
accuses Hegel of not paying sufficient attention to the individual figure of Socrates and 
instead of focusing too much on “the historical concept [Begriff] that is represented by 
the Greek world or in irony as a concept in a general theory of aesthetics” (Stewart 
153).  Kierkegaard insists that his approach and analysis of Socrates constitute a return 
to the individual level of history.34  This nuanced engagement with Hegel’s thought 
does not suggest an ironic perspective; if Kierkegaard was trying to show the 
ridiculousness of Hegelian thought, he would not spend such time showing its failings.   
Kierkegaard’s journals further confirm his seriousness about irony.  We can, and 
should, regard these journals as a “neutral” text that might help us to detect irony within 
Kierkegaard’s authorship, suggest Hannay, Taylor, and Maria Mikulová Thulstrup.  
Many journal entries written before 1841, the year he defended his magister 
dissertation, are tonally consistent with The Concept of Irony.  One entry written in 
1837 discusses irony’s ability to purify the world: “When in its polemic irony (humor) 
has placed the whole world, heaven and earth, under water … when it is ready to be 
reconciled with the world again, it lets a raven fly off, and then a dove, which then 
returns with an olive leaf” (DD: 83).  This aphoristic entry, I argue, prefigures his later 
arguments about irony’s social engagement.  In both this entry and the dissertation, he 
suggests that irony negates the validity of an entire actuality—placing it “under water,” 
in his phrase—not in order to submerge it eternally, but rather to prepare that actuality 
for much-needed reform.  He uses the metaphor of the biblical story of Noah’s ark, in 
which God punished the world for its lawlessness not by destroying the earth but rather 
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by making possible a better, more authentic (and more faithful) society.  Irony, in a 
similar way, rejects the current actuality to facilitate a more earnest society.   
In later journal entries Kierkegaard despairs of his previous allegiance to 
Hegelian philosophy:  
Influenced as I was by Hegel and whatever was modern, without the 
maturity really to comprehend greatness, I could not resist pointing out 
somewhere in my dissertation that it was a defect on the part of Socrates 
to disregard the whole and only consider individuals numerically.  What 
a Hegelian fool I was!  It is precisely this that powerfully demonstrates 
what a great ethicist Socrates was.  (JP 4: 4281, qtd. in Stewart 142) 
If Kierkegaard had written the dissertation as an ironic critique of Hegelian philosophy, 
then there would be no need to recant his theoretical positions in his earlier works.35 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of controlled irony—again, his term for the limited 
deployment of the ironist’s negative world-view, as one device among many in a work 
of literature, to illuminate these social disjunctures—as a facilitator of world-historical 
development makes it an ethical approach to both interpersonal communication and 
literature.  He rejects irony’s isolation and hierarchy and instead emphasizes the 
device’s capacity for social engagement.  However, his definition still leaves 
unanswered how such irony can be used effectively in world literature.  If irony can be 
identified and decoded through the “clues” left by the ironist, it does not necessarily 
follow that readers can understand an ironic work written in different time, place, or 
language.  In the next section, I examine the idea of world literature in greater depth to 
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show how returning to the original articulation of world literature in the works of 
Herder and examining how texts circulate across national, cultural, linguistic, and 
historical boundaries provides a framework within which irony can be understood 
outside of the context in which the text was written. 
 
Irony on the Move: Accessible Indirection in World Literature 
Like “irony,” “world literature” (Weltliteratur) is a notoriously slippery term 
and scholars have debated its definition and appropriateness since the early nineteenth 
century.36  Franco Moretti, Djelal Kadir, and Pascale Casanova, among others, renewed 
scholarly interest in world literature in the 1990s, and in the ensuing decades a great 
deal has been published on this topic from a variety of theoretical perspectives.37  
Definitions of world literature are especially contested, and it seems as if each scholar 
uses her own criteria to define it.  One of the only consistent definitions actually comes 
from arguments against world literature; its detractors, like Emily Apter, Stephen 
Owen, Françoise Lionnet, and the editors of n + 1’s “Evil Issue” (in an article entitled 
“World Lite”) allege that it represents a naïve belief in universal human values 
accessible throughout space and time and conveyed intelligibly in translation.38  
Furthermore, in Forget English! Aamir Mufti argues that world literature is “a plane of 
equivalence” that renders possible “comparison, classification, and evaluation.  World 
literature is therefore fundamentally a concept of exchange or, in other words, a concept 
of bourgeois society” (Mufti 11).  World literature is thus Orientalist in its predication 
on and perpetuation of Otherness, exacerbated by current Anglo-American-centered 
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publishing practices that prize English-language novels above those written in other 
languages (Mufti 19).   
While arguments in favor of world literature vary wildly in terms of their 
definition of the concept, they can be assigned to three overarching categories: that 
world literature is a method of reading a wide range of texts from a distance; a body of 
texts that contrasts works written in colonialist “centers” and the global (formerly 
colonial) “periphery”; and a mode of literary circulation, to use the phrase favored by 
Pascale Casanova and David Damrosch.39  While each category has its own strengths 
and weaknesses, all these often fall back on formalist modes of interpretation, especially 
a belief in an ideal reader who is fluent in the text’s language of composition, is an 
expert in the historical context, and has a full understanding of the text’s significance in 
literary history, as demonstrated in the first chapter.  For many scholars, world literature 
is only available only to the intellectual elite.  
 I do find some merit in these claims; however, I contend that they obscure 
Johann Gottfried Herder’s definition of world literature, which emphasizes the 
importance and ethics of world literature in circulation.  He defines world literature as a 
body of texts in international circulation and translation that can be understood as they 
cross national, linguistic, and temporal boundaries.40  Even though he was the first to 
propose a theory of world literature, he is largely omitted from narratives about the 
development of the field, perhaps because the Nazis appropriated his thought, as Robert 
Reinhold Ergang asserts in Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism.  When 
Herder is mentioned, it is often in a negative sense.  Postcolonial theorists have been 
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relentlessly hostile to him: Dipesh Chakrabarty, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Homi 
Bhabha, Aamir Mufti, Kwame Anthony Appiah, and others oversimplify Herder’s 
position, arguing that he xenophobically promotes imperial practices.41   Instead, I argue 
that Herder’s philosophy of literature and world-historical development respects other 
nations in a deeply contextual way, more so than many formulations of the field.  
Prominent scholars of world literature have adapted his theory in their own definitions 
of world literature, progressing from Goethe (Herder’s former student and one-time 
friend), Fritz Strich, Erich Auerbach, Edward and Maire Said (especially their 
translation of Auerbach’s essay “Philology and Weltliteratur”), and Leo Spitzer to 
Pascale Casanova and David Damrosch, among others.  Returning to Herder’s 
articulation, and only then interrogating these later iterations, gives me the opportunity 
to examine what I hold to be the least muddled definition of world literature.42  
Furthermore, his writings have the most to say about how literature responds to, and 
acts upon, the society in which it is produced as well as the society in which it is 
received.  In the following paragraphs I explore the facets of Herder’s definition of 
world literature and its relationship to historical progress before connecting this 
definition to Kierkegaardian controlled irony. 
 Herder’s understanding of world literature is intimately tied to world-historical 
development; only after interrogating the way cross-cultural respect facilitates historical 
progress can we understand literature’s role in fostering respect for different nations and 
eras.  As do Kierkegaard and Hegel, Herder views world-historical development as an 
ethical process; when each nation recognizes how it fits in the progression of 
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development, it contributes to the development of human civilization.43  Historical 
development is thus a cumulative process that requires learning from other nations as 
well as contributing to the development of one’s own nation, facilitated by the cross-
cultural circulation of literature.44  Humanität (humanity) is the universal human value, 
which Herder describes as a perpetually unfolding quality essential to human nature and 
present in all nations (Knoll 11).  As Hans Adler, Robert T. Clark, and other scholars 
have noted, nowhere does Herder define this term or list its characteristics, but scattered 
references throughout his works suggest that it includes a capacity for happiness, 
nobility of spirit, ability to reason, freedom, self-awareness, a sense of responsibility, 
and good health (Philosophical Writings 335; Adler 99–100).45   
In examining the way a culture describes these characteristics, according to 
Herder, readers learn more about that culture’s social, linguistic, and temporal context.46  
Many factors alter the expression of these values, including climate, historical 
circumstance, language, and prevailing scientific and philosophical ideas.  In Fragments 
on Recent German Literature, Herder explains that language is influenced by geography 
and social circumstance (Philosophical Writings 60).  Furthermore, the nation’s 
language influences what topics can be described in literature:  
As long as a language shapes itself as the language of necessity, 
notwithstanding all discomforts that come with insufficiency, vigor is its 
advantage.  As long as the language is not yet a book language, but the 
language of song, it has a wealth of images and the most exalted 
harmony.  As it becomes the language of civilized people, it gains a 
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greater wealth of political expression, but the exalted harmony and the 
fullness of the images are toned down.  As a book language it becomes 
richer in concepts, but the poetic harmony turns to prose; the image 
becomes parable, the vivid, ringing bywords disappear.  As a 
philosophical language it becomes precise, but impoverished; it loses its 
synonyms and does not esteem images and harmony. (“Conclusion, on 
the Ideal of Language,” Selected Early Works 160, emphasis Herder’s)47 
All these contextual factors impact a nation’s literary output, both in form and content.48  
Carefully attending to the language an author uses can signal to the reader the forces 
that shaped the author’s prose, so in reading a work of world literature and analyzing its 
form, the reader learns more about the context in which the work was written. 
 Moreover, according to Herder, the content of each work reflects the major 
concerns of the nation in which the author wrote.  In other words, he regards each 
literary work as a representation of national values; these values are specific not just to 
the nation in which each work was written but also to the era and culture in which the 
author lived.  As he famously writes at the beginning of “Results of a Comparison,” 
“[p]oetry is a Proteus among the peoples; it changes form according to the peoples’ 
language, customs, habits, according to their temperament, the climate, even according 
to their accent” (Princeton Sourcebook in Comparative Literature 4).  For example, he 
celebrates Shakespeare for representing his nation in his works: each play is “History in 
the broadest sense … in the end each play remains and must remain what it is: History!  
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A history play bringing to life the fortunes of the nation during the middle ages!” 
(Aesthetics 307)49  He writes more generally:  
In every era [poetry] has been the embodiment of a given nation’s faults 
and perfections, a mirror of its dispositions, the expression of its highest 
ideal (oratio sensitive anima perfecta).  Juxtaposing these pictures 
(ideals more and less accomplished, true and false) yields an informative 
pleasure.  In this gallery of various ways of thinking, inclinations, and 
wishes we are sure to get to know eras and nations more deeply than we 
would by treading the deceiving, desolate path of their political and 
military history.  In the latter we rarely learn more of a people than how 
it was governed and destroyed; in the former we learn about its way of 
thinking, what it wished and what it wanted, how it rejoiced and how it 
was guided by its teachers or inclinations. (6)50   
Literary works more truthfully convey these contextually created values than do 
political treatises.  That is not to say that Herder insists on a united or unchanging 
national character; he acknowledges that there is diversity within unity, but that the 
diversity does not threaten or invalidate that unity.51   
Moreover, readers must appreciate each work according to the aesthetic tastes of 
the time and place in which it was written.52  Using a botanical analogy, Herder writes 
that readers must “leave every flower in place and … scrutinize it there just as it is, 
according to era and form, from the root to the crown … Lichen, moss, fern and the 
richest spice plant: each flourishes in its own position in the divine order” (7).  To 
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dismiss or devalue a work based on the reader’s own aesthetic preferences reinforces a 
linear view of history, expressly the sentiment against which Herder argues.   
 Expanding on Herder’s notion of the writer’s expression of national character in 
literature, I contend that analyzing ironic expressions can teach readers, who are 
encountering a given text in different nations and eras, about an author’s socio-
historical concerns.  Put differently, if (as Kierkegaard suggests) controlled irony 
illuminates contradictions between what is said about a society and individuals’ lived 
reality, then if readers attend to these expressions in works of world literature they can 
learn about the author’s major concerns for that society.  In this way, controlled ironic 
critique offers readers a window on the specific social, historical, and political forces 
shaping the nation being described in the text, which facilitates Herder’s goal of 
literature fostering cross-cultural understanding.  If readers do not adequately 
understand or appreciate that context or judge it by the standards of their own nation, 
they cannot understand the depicted nation, which impedes the next step of Herderian 
world-historical development: uptake.   
If the reader truly understands another nation or era, Herder suggests, she has a 
duty to integrate useful ideas from that culture into her own socio-historical context.  In 
other words, the point of circulating world literature is not just to facilitate intercultural 
understanding, but to refine one’s own ideas and institutions.53  He writes that this type 
of development is impossible if the reader believes in her own superiority: “Indeed, our 
very enjoyment of the things we boast of [in our own culture] may cut us off from 
experiences which might have proved superior” (Herder on Social and Political Culture 
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213–214).54  The process of learning must be a thoughtful one in the sense that readers 
should not uncritically import cultural ideals or customs into their society; imitation 
without reflection can be dangerous.55  Readers must process information, evaluate its 
relevance to their national context, and import, adapt, or reject that information as 
appropriate.  Herder calls this process assimilation or organic education; it is only 
through this process of assimilation that Humanität develops.56  For example, in This 
Too a Philosophy of History he suggests that “proper” assimilation would allow a 
nation to develop skilled doctors who also have a “human heart,” suggesting that 
eighteenth-century medical advances would benefit from doctors’ bedside manner of 
earlier times (Philosophical Writings 344).   
I propose that his notion of uptake encourages readers to reflect on their social 
realities, a process in which controlled irony can participate.  As readers learn more 
about the author’s concerns for his nation, as expressed through controlled irony, they 
must also consider whether a similar critique could be offered of their own nation(s).  
Put colloquially, in reading works of world literature readers may recognize when 
history is repeating itself.  These moments of controlled irony, deployed discretely in 
world literary texts, not only speak to the context in which the text was written but also 
can highlight the need for change in other nations and eras as well.    
In this sense human history is a continually developing process; he writes that 
“one day teaches another, one century instructs another century; tradition is enriched” 
(Churchill 458).57  Put differently, the reader uses these texts to “become what they [the 
predecessors] could not be.  Perhaps we will make up in fruit from our poor show of 
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flowers; perhaps we shall achieve by permanence and pervasiveness what they attained 
by vitality and fervour” (Herder on Social and Political Culture 252).58  Since readers, 
from their positions, can see the trajectory of historical development, trace the 
development of human civilization to that point, and judge each era on its own terms, 
they can see that differences in enlightenment are by degree and not by kind (Herder on 
Social and Political Culture 313).59  Herder’s understanding of historical development 
links all times and nations.  He writes in This Too a Philosophy of History: “The 
Egyptian was not able to exist without the Oriental, the Greek built upon them, the 
Roman raised himself onto the back of the whole world—truly progress, progressive 
development, even if no individual won in the process!” (Philosophical Writings 209, 
emphasis Herder’s).60    
Herder illustrates this concept by arguing that proper assimilation of older texts 
in Enlightenment Europe might lead intellectuals back to an embodied approach to logic 
and reason.  He dislikes Enlightenment rationalism because it deepened the opposition 
between mind and body and in so doing distanced people from the truth accessible 
through sense perception.61  Karl Menges explains that Herder’s writings promote the 
belief that during the Enlightenment “[p]rogress ha[d] obliterated cultural traditions and 
collective memories, leaving behind a sophisticated but anemic ‘culture of writing’ that 
contrasts sharply with the natural wisdom of ancient peoples” (Adler 193).  Rationalist 
writers no longer relied on their surroundings and did not reflect their nations in their 
works.  Herder argued that authors should instead incorporate more strategies used by 
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their ancestors, especially those grounded in sense perception; only then would 
literature reflect the nation and facilitate world historical development.62   
It does not necessarily follow, however, that irony can circulate and be 
understood within the framework put forth in Herder’s writings.  But pairing 
Kierkegaard’s concept of controlled irony with Herderian world literature offers a 
framework to explain how an ironic work might circulate outside of its source culture 
and language.  That many texts that use this type of controlled irony have longevity and 
geographic reach is evident in contemporary pedagogical practices—the fact that The 
Norton Anthology of World Literature includes works by Shakespeare, Cervantes, 
Tayeb Salih, Lu Xun, and Nikolai Gogol, to name a few, suggests that works of literary 
irony can be deciphered even when the reader interprets a text written in another nation, 
era, or language.  I contend that irony’s clues—its “wanting to be found out,” to use 
Kierkegaard’s phrase—facilitate readers’ ability to comprehend a work of world 
literature.  Far from being unintelligible, these clues—which include hyperbole, 
anaphrasis, repetition, and other thematic and formal clues—function as an 
Ansatzpunkt, or point of departure, to a literary work.   
In his essay “Philology and Weltliteratur,” Erich Auerbach explains how, given 
the wide range of texts in the corpus of world literature, readers can comprehend a text 
written in a different time and place.  Auerbach posits that a reader can only 
comprehend a “foreign” work by identifying an Ansatzpunkt, a point of departure is a 
theme or device familiar to the reader, identified through intuition, “a comparatively 
modest general knowledge and … advice” (14).  Good points of departure are 
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circumscribed, concrete, precise, and inherent in the works themselves, rather than 
foisted upon the work by the interpreter.  Possible points of departure include “[a] 
semantic interpretation, a rhetorical trope, a syntactic sequence, the interpretation of one 
sentence, or a set of remarks made at a given time and in a given place …” (15).63  
While Auerbach presents this mode of analysis as a general approach to literature, I 
propose that the clues so critical to Kierkegaardian controlled irony can serve as an 
Ansatzpunkt for an individual work: recognizing an ironic signal can help the reader 
decipher the text’s intended meaning.   
Moreover, the reader learns these clues in her process of reading the work of 
literature, learning about the cultural conventions that the text both adheres to and 
subverts.  In short, as she better understands the conventions of a device or behavior (as 
displayed in the text) she is better able to recognize those that deviate from these 
conventions.  For example, in Cervantes’ Don Quixote, the contradiction between the 
elevated prose and Don Quixote’s lofty ideals on the one hand and the mundane subject 
matter on the other hand suggests to the reader that the story should not be taken at face 
value.  The juxtaposition of narrative tone and content signals Cervantes’ ironic 
perspective, reaffirmed by the peasants’ derisive reactions to Don Quixote, and offers 
readers a point of entry from which to analyze the novel’s socio-historical context.  The 
ironic “clue” therefore acts as an invitation to the reader to learn more about that nation 
and era.   
The Ansatzpunkt also acts as a point of comparison; with a clear grasp of the 
ironic signal, the reader can then connect the way that device, theme, or idea is 
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deployed in other works of world literature.  Auerbach describes this characteristic as 
the Ansatzpunkt’s “potential for centrifugal radiation … Once chosen it must have 
radiating power, so that with it we can deal with world history [Weltgeschichte]” (15).  
In other words, Auerbach proposes that an Anzatspunkt will allow a reader to trace how 
a device, theme, or idea appears in different works, as opposed to a scholarly approach 
“investigating the position of the writer in the nineteenth century,” for example, that 
pays attention to one historical and cultural context (15).  Auerbach’s analysis of 
representations of literary realism, and specifically the figura (a word that refers to an 
event that “signifies not only itself but at the same time another, which it predicts or 
confirms, without prejudice to the power of its concrete reality here and now” [Mimesis 
555]) throughout different eras and literary traditions, is a key example of this 
centrifugal comparative approach.  In Mimesis he connects diverse texts including 
Germinie Lacerteux, the Odyssey, and Gargantua and Pantagruel through their unique 
deployments of figura; this approach is in contrast to a survey of European nineteenth-
century literature, for example, or an analysis of figura in French texts.  The centrifugal 
nature of an Ansatzpunkt—and, I would contend, an ironic Ansatzpunkt—provides a 
point of departure to synthesize many works of world literature.  Far from being 
unintelligible or irredeemably contextually specific, Kierkegaardian irony in world 
literature (with its all-important signals) can facilitate intercultural understanding, a 
critical moment in world-historical development. 
Of course, readers encounter texts in circulation, and the cultures, nations, and 
eras in which they were produced, at a distance.  The reader can never be fully 
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enmeshed in the national context described in a work of world literature, but this 
distance is very much in keeping with the spirit of the ethics of world literature as it 
offers the reader some perspective on her own culture.  As Damrosch writes in What Is 
World Literature?, in analyzing a work of world literature readers take specialists’ 
knowledge to situate the work within the frame of world literature, a construct of the 
reader’s making:  
[W]hen we read the Genji as world literature, we are fundamentally 
translating it out of its home culture and into a new and broader context.  
We can make this translation far more effectively if we attend to the 
insights that specialists possess, but we will use this information 
selectively and for different purposes.  Whereas the specialist attempts to 
enter as fully as possible into the source culture, the student stands 
outside, very much as Benjamin describes translation itself standing 
outside a work’s original language, facing a wooded ridge that each of us 
will forest with our own favorite trees. (297)   
Damrosch suggests that, with the help of specialists’ knowledge, including but not 
limited to explanatory footnotes, alternate translations, and historical context, students 
can begin to comprehend texts from very different nations, eras, and languages.  
Damrosch’s injunction that a reader, and especially a non-specialist, can never fully 
comprehend such a “foreign” work does not diminish the benefits she gains through 
reading the text; these benefits become even more important given the self-reflection 
made possible through reading works in circulation.  I extend Damrosch’s assertion by 
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suggesting that controlled irony is one strategy that facilitates this cross-cultural 
circulation of texts.  Through these ironic critiques (and specialists’ analyses thereof), 
non-specialist readers learn about the context in which the text was written, even if they 
are unable to fully immerse themselves in that context.  
 This distance complicates my assertion that translations objectively convey the 
literary and cultural norms by which readers—particularly non-specialists—learn to 
recognize signals to irony.  Of course, translations have distorted, and continue to 
distort, our understanding of literary, historical, and societal conventions, thereby 
inhibiting, if not preventing, our ability to comprehend an author’s ironic critique.  
Moreover, as Talal Assad notes in “The Concept of Cultural Translation in British 
Social Anthropology,” an individual reading a “foreign” text (or culture) interprets that 
text through the lens of her home culture, which complicates the reader’s ability to 
understand the norms by which she must recognize devices and behaviors that deviate 
from them.  In both circumstances, irony cannot be identified or interpreted through the 
text alone.  While readers might find it difficult to reject their own cultural norms when 
reading a text written in a different place and time, I propose that additional scholarly 
apparatuses help prevent, or at least mitigate, these assumptions by conveying 
information regarding the author’s context and its conventions.    
 
Beyond Holy Originals and Profane Copies 
I argue that world literature’s ethics stem from the way it facilitates historical 
development.  However, scholars frequently cite the issue of translation—both its 
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possibility and the right to translation—as a counterargument to world literature.  As I 
discussed in Chapter One, many postcolonial and world literary critics argue that 
translation is in some sense impossible given the reader’s inability to grasp the 
linguistic potentialities of all words in both the source and the target languages.  Others, 
notably Susan Bassnett and Harish Trevedi in their introduction to Postcolonial 
Translation, argue that translation is an aggressive act that perpetuates Western 
hegemony, silencing local languages to the benefit of Western powers.64   I recognize 
that this approach to translation has been dominant throughout much of Western history 
to justify war and imperialism, among other horrendous acts.  Examples of this 
linguistic and cultural violence are legion and many scholars have thoughtfully 
analyzed its impacts.  However, I argue that translation itself is not, by definition, 
violent; rather translators enact that violence through mistranslation, failing to provide 
adequate contextual information, or choosing one meaning without acknowledging 
other possibilities.  In this respect, it is theoretically possible to advocate for a culturally 
sensitive ethics of translation, one that does not damage a text but rather preserves its 
unique characteristics as much as possible, aims for the reader’s comprehension of the 
cultural context described, and facilitates cross-cultural respect.  
Contemporary translation theorists have attempted to make this change by 
moving away from the “genealogical” model of translation in which translators 
faithfully reproduce an identical work to the original.  In their insistence that translators 
produce an entirely new text, related to but different from the original, these theorists 
make possible the circulation of ideas, techniques, and literary forms among nations and 
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languages.  As Benjamin writes in “The Task of the Translator,” translation must be 
understood as a distinct text, related to but not coeval with the original: “the language of 
a translation can—in fact, must—let itself go, so that it gives voice to the intentio of the 
original not as reproduction but as harmony, as a supplement to the language in which it 
expresses itself, as its own kind of intentio” (260).65  Additionally, in George Steiner’s 
understanding a faithful translation is not one that corresponds, word-for-word, with the 
original but one that retains as much of the intention and spirit of the original as 
possible.66  Fidelity is attained when the “balance of forces” has been restored to the 
work by the translator; this restitution is both ethical and economic and “creates a 
condition of significant exchange” in both directions (Steiner 313–318).  Translations 
should be understood not as reproductions of original works, but as new works that help 
a different culture better understand the context in which the original was produced.  
Adequate knowledge of this context is essential to the reader’s lived experiences, to the 
target culture in which the work is read, and to the process of world-historical 
development.  
 The first benefit of translation is that these works broaden readers’ perspectives 
on the world.  In his monograph After Babel, Steiner suggests that translation, and 
especially translated literature, can offer a more complete picture of the world, both 
highlighting national particularities and emphasizing cross-cultural similarities.  He 
speaks of this process as the “dialectic of unison and of plurality”: “each act of 
translation is an endeavour to abolish multiplicity and to bring different world-pictures 
into perfect congruence” (246).  Apter proposes in The Translation Zone that the act of 
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translating a work is certainly dangerous and that its dangers must be recognized; 
however, any misgivings about translation must be balanced with an awareness of the 
empowering possibilities offered by translating a work written in a “minor” or 
marginalized language.67  Apter writes that despite the fact that translation is “an agent 
of language extinction,” and  
[d]espite the questionable stakes of a publishing industry ever poised, 
piranha-like, to exploit the embattled situation of the dissident writer, 
and despite the homogenized, commercialized flavor of translationese 
afflicting many prize-winning works of foreign fiction, efforts must be 
made to keep Algeria, and the many countries that find themselves in 
comparable situations, from being blacked-out or whited-over in the 
international public sphere of letters. (108)   
In its ideal form, translation offers a perspective not otherwise available to many 
readers; it allows readers to better understand the specificities of different national 
characteristics and to identify connections between nations.  It is the translator’s task, 
and the reader’s, to acknowledge and analyze the problems of translation, as those 
problems illustrate the power dynamics of translation. Although Apter rejects this view 
in Against World Literature in favor of her Derridean reading of the impossibility of 
translation, her disclaimer is still valid, especially because it aligns with contemporary 
translation theory.68 
Many of these same scholars also argue that translation, at its best, has a 
reciprocal influence on source and target language and literature.  In other words, a 
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work read in translation can offer the reader a different perspective about her own 
culture, expectations, and language.  Lawrence Venuti proposes that any act of 
translation necessarily constructs, at the same time, a “domestic representation for a 
foreign text and culture” and “a domestic subject and position” (68).69  Put differently, 
the translator can highlight the constructedness of social and political institutions in 
both source and target nation.  Apter extends Venuti’s idea when she claims that a 
translation “reposition[s] the subject in the world and in history” and “render[s] self-
knowledge foreign to itself … denaturalize[es] citizens, taking them out of the comfort 
zone of national space, daily ritual, and pre-given domestic arrangements” (Translation 
Zone 6).  Finally, in “The Task of the Translator” Benjamin claims that the target 
language should be, and is, influenced by the source language; only bad translations 
“[preserve] the state in which [the translator’s] own language happens to be instead of 
allowing his language to be powerfully affected by the foreign tongue” (262).  The act 
of translation should, and can, impact the target culture on a number of different levels.  
Examining a work of world literature in translation shows the reader her own 
conditionality and highlights the changes made to her own nation by the text and its 
source. 
That is not to say that a translated work is sufficient in and of itself; explanatory 
materials offer essential insight both about the socio-historical context and the act of 
translation.  If ironic works in translation circulate in the global marketplace, they must 
be accompanied by explanatory material including introductions, commentaries, and 
marginalia.70  When translators explain their choices in translation as far as possible and 
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provide additional socio-historical context, the reader can better understand the nation 
being depicted and appreciate the politics of translation.71  Including this contextual 
information helps the reader to encounter the source culture “on its own terms.”  As 
André Lefevere writes in “Composing the Other,” including contextual information can 
help translators avoid appropriating elements of the source culture into the target culture 
in violent, ill-fitting ways.  He argues that translators must eliminate translation-by-
analogy:  
When we no longer translate Chinese T’ang poetry “as if” it were 
Imagist blank verse, which it manifestly is not, we shall be able to 
understand T’ang poetry on its own terms.  This means, however, that 
we shall have to tell the readers of our translations what T’ang poetry is 
really like, by means of introductions, the detailed analysis of selected 
texts, and such … a huge investment in re-education/re-socialization is 
needed if we are ever to arrive at the goal of understanding other cultures 
“on their own terms.” (Bassnett and Trivedi 78) 
This contextual information eliminates the question of the reader’s mastery of the text 
by demonstrating the reader’s inability to fully grasp all details of the source work and 
culture, but still provides that reader with the opportunity to better understand it.  In 
other words, as we read this scholarly apparatus we are reminded of the limits of our 
own knowledge, but are still motivated to continue learning about the author’s source 
culture.  This approach, described as the marriage of world literature, translation theory, 
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and area studies, makes visible and accessible the unique cultural, national and 
historical allusions of the text. 
This understanding of translation as well-glossed adaptation, rather than as a 
faithful copy, makes possible irony’s circulation.  Translators may choose between 
several possible terms to convey the sense of the text to the reader in the target 
language.   For example, in “Translating Literary Irony,” Pierre Skorov illustrates how 
explanatory material, especially the translator’s comments about the cultural and 
linguistic valences of the original term, can help readers decipher culturally specific 
irony.  Skorov explains that in Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita (the text 
I examine in Chapter Four), the term самопишущее перо refers both to a fountain pen 
and, more literally, to a “self-writing” pen (Skorov 93).  The translator chooses to 
convey this term as an “automatic pen” to “[hint] at the mechanistic and artistically 
worthless nature of such writing” (Skorov 93).  In this way, the translator’s decision to 
eschew literal translation and instead convey the meaning in the target language 
preserves “the potential of irony at the expense of strictly literal exactitude” (93).  
Translations may also preserve rhetorical devices used to signal irony, even if the 
translation requires alterations.  Devices like hyperbole and litotes, authorial 
interjections, and thematic contradictions can be maintained in this type of translation.  
In other words, it is possible for irony to be translated in a way that preserves textual 
meaning and adapts the text to its target language without sacrificing the heart of the 
author’s ironic critique. 
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Conclusion 
 In his theory of controlled irony, Kierkegaard offers a new way we, as readers 
and literary critics, can understand irony as an ethical and socially engaged device 
essential to national and worldhistorical development.  If we further understand the 
clues to controlled irony as possible Ansatzpunkts in works of world literature, we can 
see how irony can circulate as Herderian world literature.  Controlled irony in 
circulation helps a reader better understand the nation and era in which the text was 
composed, and through that process of understanding another place and time readers 
can evaluate their own society.   
 Up to this point, my discussion of irony’s ethics and the circulation of world 
literature in general has been very theoretical.  The next three chapters interrogate the 
practicalities of this theory in three works of world literature.  I begin by analyzing 
Goethe’s Faust, a work ubiquitous in discussions of world literature.  Then I turn to two 
adaptations of this work—Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita and Wilson 
Harris’s The Infinite Rehearsal—to demonstrate that irony is accessible in its 
circulation as world literature.  I argue that these adaptations of Goethe’s ironic 
critiques, written in different nations and eras, shows that irony can be understood in 
different cultural, linguistic, and historical contexts.  Both authors alter Goethe’s 
depiction of the Faust myth to better address their nations’ unique situations.  This 
process of transformation demonstrates that the controlled irony in the original text has 
been so thoroughly understood and assimilated that it is now used to critique specific 
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elements of the target nation.  In short, Goethe’s ironic critiques in Faust serve as my 
Ansatzpunkts to analyze the role of indirect communication in world literature. 
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Chapter Three 
“The great heathen”1: 
The Ironies of German Lutheranism in Goethe’s Faust 
 
Kierkegaard cited three authors as “masters over irony”—William Shakespeare, 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and Johan Ludvig Heiberg—who used controlled irony 
to critique society.  He was most captivated, however, by Goethe’s epic verse-drama 
Faust (1808); in the years leading up to his defense of The Concept of Irony he wrote 
many journal entries about Goethe’s irony.2  Given Kierkegaard’s deep interest in Faust 
and opaque comments about Goethe at the end of his magister dissertation, it seems 
fitting to begin with Faust.  In this chapter I analyze two moments of ironic critique in 
Faust Part I to explore how the theory of ethical ironic critique, proposed in Chapter 
Two, operates on a practical level.  These moments of critique signal to readers 
Goethe’s frustrations with two strains of German Lutheranism, particularly the 
contradictory intellectualist and emotionalist strains of religious discourse in the late-
eighteenth century.3  Constrained moments of ironic critique, even in a sprawling work 
like Faust, show how socially engaged irony serves an ethical function when the author 
illuminates an unrecognized disjuncture between his society’s stated values and its 
current practices, a process that is necessary to dialectical world-historical 
development.4   
In making this argument I enter a vociferous debate about the nature of 
Goethean irony.  Goethe scholar Benjamin Bennett proposes that Goethe’s irony is 
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opaque and negative as it “definitely conceals, but does not admit the existence of any 
articulable relation whatever to its concealed content,” which thus prevents the reader’s 
resolution of implicit and explicit meaning (Beyond Theory 7, 8).5  He contends that 
Goethe articulates a sense of truth in Faust through misdirection; readers understand 
truth only through our “negative attitude toward it” (50, 60).6  However, Bennett’s 
reading only focuses on Part II which, I argue, risks obscuring Goethe’s social 
engagement in Part I.7  Furthermore, I find suspect Bennett’s claims that Goethe’s 
rejection of objective truth is a political gesture.  He asserts that with no “possible 
determination of its content,” Goethe rejects the bourgeois notions “of ‘symbol’ and 
‘totality’” (Beyond Theory 163).  This argument overstates Goethe’s political beliefs: he 
was a conservative and a monarchist, a fact he openly acknowledged in his 
conversations with Eckermann (14).8  To argue that his ironic critique upends the 
institutions he proudly supported is to read Goethe retrospectively (and perhaps 
wishfully), which inhibits our understanding of his irony’s meaningful, although not 
radical, engagement with the socio-political structures of his day.   
My argument contributes to recent scholarly discussions about Goethe’s 
engagement in his socio-historical context.  Jane K. Brown, Nicholas Saul, Elisabeth 
Krimmer, and others demonstrate that Goethe’s writings were more socially oriented 
than critics typically acknowledge.9  As Krimmer notes, despite being a Lutheran 
Goethe was sharply critical of Protestant beliefs and practices, earning himself the 
moniker “the Great Heathen” from Heinrich Heine (100).  Goethe includes a host of 
religious critiques in Faust, as Elizabeth Wilkinson, Osman Durrani and Jane K. Brown 
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have shown.10  My chapter contributes to this conversation by placing irony at the 
center of Goethe’s social critique.  I analyze two moments of controlled ironic critique 
in Faust I, the first “Study” scene, in which Faust translates the first portion of the 
Gospel of John, and “Martha’s Garden,” when Faust attempts to persuade Gretchen to 
consummate their relationship.  These scenes expose the hypocrisies of German 
Lutheranism.  Goethe ironizes both intellectualistic and Pietistic approaches to religion, 
highlighting how both distort Christian dogma, biblical meaning, and daily practice.  
Goethe’s ironic allusions to and invocations of Christian themes, with (as Eudo C. 
Mason contends) their “external features [preserved] intact” (283), serve as a 
recognizable, decipherable form of social critique.  Goethe’s controlled irony is not only 
an ethical device that illuminates the need for social change and facilitates world-
historical development, but also his deployment thereof illustrates how these moments 
can be depicted in an accessible manner and can be understood as a work circulates in 
the global marketplace.   
 
Why Goethe Again?  Why Goethe Now? 
While Goethe’s Faust does not initially seem an obvious “case study” for a 
dissertation in English literature, his writings generally speaking, and Faust in 
particular, are central to the formulation of world literature.  As such, for a dissertation 
on world literature, what could be more appropriate than starting with Goethe?   He is a 
central figure especially in the recent resurgence of world literature.  Erich Auerbach’s 
writings on Goethe, conveyed to the Western academy through Edward and Maire 
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Said’s 1969 translation of “Philology and Weltliteratur,” established the German poet as 
the paradigmatic figure in world literature; later generations of world literary critics 
influenced by Auerbach and Said, including A. Owen Aldridge, Franco Moretti, Pascale 
Casanova, David Damrosch, Emily Apter, and others, similarly depict Goethe as a 
progenitor of world literature.11  While I disagree with this genealogy, in order to 
intervene in discussions of world literary theory I believe I must engage Goethe’s 
writings on my own terms, as well as to converse with these scholars.   
Moreover, Goethe’s text raises fundamental questions about literature and 
modes of circulation that are relevant to the Anglophone canon and beyond.  Most 
importantly for the purposes of my work, Faust has inspired a huge number of 
adaptations that reflect the nation and era in which the author was working.  
Kierkegaard, for example, asserts that each iteration of the Faust legend reflects the 
society and age in which it was produced: “That the Faust who is meant to represent this 
age differs essentially from the earlier Faust and, in general, from the Faust of any other 
time, is so evident that we have only to be reminded of the fact” (BB: 49).  
Contemporary Faust criticism reinforces Kierkegaard’s assertion; Harry Redner insists 
that Faust’s desire “reflects closely the demands of each age, just as the turning to the 
Devil reflects the crisis of each age” (xiii), and Lorna Fitzsimmons writes that Faust is a 
“fulcral matrix of cultural memory” (1).12  Reading Faust provides the reader a glimpse 
into the author’s socio-historical context.  For example, Americans’ obsession with 
Goethe’s Faust is prevalent in twentieth and twenty-first century popular culture: F. W. 
Murnau’s Faust, Damn Yankees, The Silence of the Lambs, V for Vendetta, The 
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Departed, Wall Street and Wall Street 2: Money Never Sleeps, The Devil’s Advocate, 
and a host of others invoke the trope of “the deal with the devil” to critique Western 
capitalism.13  Adaptations of Faust in Anglophone global literature—including J.M. 
Coetzee’s Disgrace, David Dabydeen’s Disappearance, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s Devil on 
the Cross, Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, Guy Butler’s The Dam, Manjula 
Padmanabhan’s Harvest, and, as I will analyze below in Chapter Five, Wilson Harris’s 
The Infinite Rehearsal, among others—transform Goethe’s narrative to explore the 
lingering influences of colonialism in postcolonial societies.   
Goethe’s Faust takes on valences in different eras and different locations that 
cast light not on the work or the character, but on the society producing the work.  This 
historical specificity is essential to the ethics of world literature as Herder describes it; 
only through recognizing the unique qualities of each nation can the reader fully 
appreciate and assimilate relevant critiques to her society.  Given the fact that Faust 
engages Goethe’s socio-historical context, I argue it is a perfect case study to 
understand how these specificities manifest in ironic critique, how the poet uses irony to 
spur social reevaluation, and how that ironic critique can be legible in translation and 
circulation.   
 
“Now it is exact”: The Heresy of Religious Intellectualism 
Arguably the most pivotal scene in Faust is the first “Study” scene, in which the 
doctor and the devil discuss their potential pact.  The trope of the “deal with the devil” 
is a ubiquitous one not just in popular culture but also in Faust scholarship, but focusing 
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on this trope has, I argue, obscured some of the contextually specific elements of the 
“Study” scene.14  In the translation scene that immediately precedes the initial 
conversation between Faust and Mephistopheles, Goethe satirizes the ridiculousness of 
intellectualist religious attitudes in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.15  
Faust’s translation of the first line of the gospel of John—“In the beginning was the 
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”—parodies the 
intellectualist strains of German Lutheran theology in the early nineteenth century and 
points out the dangerous lengths to which such a perspective can be taken.  By 
distorting the final word of the first line, “Word,” three times in Faust’s translation, 
Goethe exposes the heretical potential of intellectualized religion.16  The fact that the 
critique occurs in this pivotal scene—which, as Mason and John Geary write, is unique 
to Goethe’s Faust—reiterates the importance of social critique in the work.   
At the beginning of the first “Study” scene Faust returns home, followed by a 
stray poodle (actually Mephistopheles in disguise, as he later discovers), railing against 
his intellectual limitations.17  For solace he turns to the gospel of John and attempts to 
translate the first lines into German (ll. 1214–1216).18  He begins the translation but 
stops almost immediately: 
It says: “In the beginning was the Word.” 
Already I am stopped.  It seems absurd. 
The Word does not deserve the highest prize, 
I must translate it otherwise 
If I am well inspired and not blind. 
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It says: In the beginning was the Mind.  (ll. 1224–1229)19   
Inspired by his intervention, Faust continues to refine the first verse:  
Ponder that first line, wait and see, 
Lest you should write too hastily. 
Is the mind the all-creating source?  
It ought to say: In the beginning was the Force. 
Yet something warns me as I grasp the pen, 
That my translation must be changed again. 
The spirit helps me.  Now it is exact. 
I write: In the beginning was the Act.  (ll. 1230–1237)20 
Shortly after this course of translation, Faust calls Mephistopheles to take human form 
by uttering a spell: “If you should be / Hell’s progeny, / Then see this symbol / Before 
which Tremble / The Cohorts of Hell!” (ll. 1298–1302).  In response to the incantation 
Mephistopheles transforms into a hippopotamus and an elephant, and finally assumes 
human form, and proposes the deal with Faust. 
The purpose and meaning of this scene have been hotly debated.21  Some 
scholars, including Franco Moretti, Paul Bishop, and Harold Jantz, assert that the 
translation scene is theologically sound and consistent with German Lutheran 
theology.22  Jantz especially contends that Faust’s translation demonstrates his 
“reverent” attempts to more fully comprehend the nature of divine creation (The Form 
of Faust 104–105).23  Pointing to the parallel between the first lines of gospel of John 
and the creation story in the book of Genesis, Jantz contends that Faust understands that 
91 
 
 
“the logos cannot be a mere word, it must have meaning, significance; beyond that it 
must have the potentiality, the power, to lead over to the divine act of creation” (104).24  
Altering the text in this way, Jantz claims, has profound implications for human 
experience as well.25   
I argue, however, that Jantz’s reading of the scene does not fully explore the 
consequences of this action in the world of the text.  Faust translates this line without 
any context or philological knowledge.  By emphasizing “Acts,” rather than “words”—
and omitting the connection between God and logos in the rest of the verse, “and the 
Word was with God, and the Word was God”—Faust alters the meaning of the verse to 
the point that he produces a heretical new text rather than translating this “sacred 
original.”  This act of altering the holy original—literally, in this sense—allows Faust to 
opportunistically alter biblical meaning to suit his purposes and supplant the Bible as 
humanity’s organizing logic.  Such a misreading extends far beyond Luther’s call for 
individual engagement with the scriptures and moves from translation to rewriting.  As 
Bennett notes, “[b]y misconstruing the opening verses of John, or at least by revealing 
in his construction the negative operation of self-consciousness, Faust unwittingly 
reenacts what those verses talk about” (Goethe’s Theory of Poetry 66, 67).  As a creator 
of a heretical new text, Faust claims for himself divine powers in shaping readers’ 
perceptions of the world.26     
To read this scene as unproblematical or straightforward also obscures the socio-
historical context in which Goethe wrote, especially given Lutheran theology’s 
hegemonic function in the German states in the eighteenth century.  Faust’s rejection of 
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“word” in the first place, calling it “absurd,” goes against the Lutheran doctrine of sola 
scriptura, which holds that the Bible is the sole source of religious meaning; priests and 
religious leaders have equal access to divine revelation as do poor (literate) peasants, in 
Martin Luther’s contention.  Furthermore, the intermediary terms of Faust’s heretical 
translation, “Mind” and “Force” (ll. 1229, 1233), move him even further away from 
Lutheran theology and especially from Luther’s writings.  As Brand Blanshard writes in 
Reason and Belief, Luther was especially hostile to rationalistic theology; I therefore 
contend that for Faust to elevate the mind over the word contradicts one of the 
fundamental tenets of contemporary Protestant religious belief.  Although Faust rejects 
these intermediary terms, Jantz’s easy transition from “word” to “act” is more complex 
than he admits.  Faust’s translation is not a faithful, theologically sound revision.  
Rather, it produces a new, heretical text, departing sharply from not just the holy 
original but also from the Protestant world-view espoused by Lutheran dogma. 
Each successive translation takes Faust further and further from religious 
orthodoxy, a fact especially signaled by his comments leading up to each iteration of the 
translated verse, and relocates meaning from the text’s words to the translator’s 
thoughts.  Faust introduces the first two versions with the phrase “It says”; before the 
third, he declares, “It ought to say”; and before the final, he proclaims “I write.”27  In 
other words, he foregrounds his own active role as an arbiter of textual meaning, over 
and above what is written in the book.  He clearly signals his deviation from the “holy 
original,” as he calls it earlier, and instead shows his encroaching role in crafting the 
verse’s meaning—which would have profound theological implications.  This ironically 
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unraveling translation reveals how intellectualistic approaches to religion can easily 
veer into heretical territory, with the translator doing as much as, if not more than, God 
to shape religion and direct human understandings of the world.28  Through these 
thematic paradoxes between Faust’s practice and religious orthodoxy, Goethe signals to 
readers that this passage should not be taken as an earnest profession of faith, but rather 
as the opposite. 
Goethe also provides several formal clues that signal that what Faust believes he 
is doing is the opposite of what he enacts; put differently, these clues signal the passage 
is ironic.  First is his use of repetition and escalation; he does not isolate the final word 
of the phrase but rather repeats the entire phrase four times.  This repetition encourages 
readers to compare meanings, especially since each phrase occurs at the end of a line, 
which highlights the progression from “word” to “act.”  The translation’s placement on 
the page similarly suggests that the meaning should not be read seriously, as this 
positioning links the translation to absurd moments from earlier in the scene.  
Immediately preceding this passage, Faust is carrying out two “conversations,” one a 
scholarly, high-minded monologue about contentment and human knowledge, and the 
other a spontaneous series of rebukes to Mephisto the poodle.  These two conversations 
are arranged differently on the page—the scholarly ponderings are indented slightly, 
and asides to the dog are flush with the left margin.  While the translation spins out of 
Faust’s high-minded musing, the translation itself is also left-justified on the page, 
linking the translation to Faust’s hotheaded admonishments to Mephisto.  This 
arrangement of the verses is consistent with the manuscript’s first printing by Cotta in 
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1808 and in each subsequent edition published during Goethe’s life, regardless of the 
house of publication (Faustedition.net).  Given Goethe’s active involvement in the 
revising and editing processes, this arrangement on the page is certainly significant and 
likely intentional.  In response to the poodle’s growling, Faust snaps: 
Stop snarling poodle!  For the sacred strain 
To which my soul is now submitting 
Beastly sounds are hardly fitting. 
We are accustomed to see men disdain 
What they don’t grasp;  
When it gives trouble, they profane 
Even the beautiful and the good. 
Do dogs, too, snarl at what’s not understood? (ll. 1202–1209)29   
In other words, Faust insinuates that the poodle is only making noise because he does 
not understand the profundity of the translation.  Given the fact that this remark shares a 
similar left-hand justification with the translation scene, I argue that Goethe suggest 
both the poodle’s snarling and Faust’s translation are dilettantish, meaningless noise in 
response to something neither understand.  The visual connection between the 
translation and Faust’s off-the-cuff remarks, not his intellectual musings, further signals 
that readers should not interpret Goethe’s depiction as earnest or straightforward. 
 The poetic form also signals the translation’s irony.30  Goethe composes the 
scene in Knittelvers, a doggerel-like verse form that suggests a comic or satirical 
content.31  As David Chisholm writes in “Daniel Call’s Schocker: German Knittelvers 
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in the late twentieth century,” this verse form “has been used since the eighteenth 
century to describe four-stress rhyming couplets which seem to be rather simply and 
awkwardly constructed, and whose content is frequently comical, course, vulgar or 
obscene” (7).  After 1677 the verse form was associated with humorous and satirical 
poetry in German, paralleling the French poème burlesque (Goethe’s Knittelvers 7).  
Goethe used Knittelvers in earlier works that satirize theological issues, including The 
Farce of Father Porridge and Lumberville Fair.32  This analysis is echoed by John 
Geary in Goethe’s Faust: The Making of Part I, where he argues that “the lightness of 
the Knittelvers as a verse, the meter, makes us assume a lightness of content, an easiness 
of comprehension” (78).  These rhyming couplets are regular in terms of meter and 
rhyme in a work which is full of Goethe’s liberties in verse and rhyme scheme, which 
signals to the reader that the words on the page are not to be taken seriously.  Goethe 
uses Knittelvers during crude or obscene moments or to denote the speech of the lower 
classes.33 The disconnect between the lofty subject matter and earthy poetic form 
further indicates the scene cannot be read as an easy correspondence of Faust’s explicit 
content and Goethe’s intended message, and with the other thematic clues presented in 
the translation the reader encounters a great deal of evidence that casts doubt on the 
text’s meaning. 
 While the poetic and thematic signals for irony are relatively straightforward, 
the target of Goethe’s ironic critique is not as easily available to the reader.  At this 
point, she must undertake her own analysis to determine the target of Goethe’s ire.  In 
the translation scene, for instance, Goethe’s critique of biblical scholasticism could have 
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any number of targets.  However, careful historical research points to one likely source: 
Carl Friedrich Bahrdt’s adaptation-translation of the Bible, Die neuesten Offenbarungen 
Gottes in Briefen und Erzählungen (published 1773–1775) (Durrani 58).34  Goethe was 
perturbed by what he saw as the intellectualist hubris of Bahrdt’s translation, which 
aimed to provide a colloquial, accessible version of the Bible.  The translation sought to 
remedy a host of issues in previous German versions: Bahrdt claimed to remedy the 
“oriental syntax and dictionary expressions” of the Lutherbibel by using “pure German 
expressions” that better represented the “content of the Bible, not its form” (Sheehan 
140; Bahrdt 5).  In order to make the message clearer to the average lay reader, Bahrdt 
assumed the role of translator and exegete; he frequently “inserted a thought which, 
although not exactly in written form in the text, the author has suggested or authorized a 
parallel” (5, my translation).35  In other words, Bahrdt would make additions to the text 
as he saw fit, adding whole phrases or lines to the original.  In addition, he claimed to 
rescue words that were “simply lost to true thought,” along with keeping elements of 
the text only complementary to the German language and getting rid of that which is 
“incomprehensible or obscure” (5).36  Bahrdt’s translation can be described charitably 
as “free”; the less forgiving Lutheran officials of his day branded him a heretic.  
Throughout his foreword, he celebrates his translatorial prowess, much as Faust does in 
his translation scene.37    
Goethe’s satire of Bahrdt’s work is clear when the two are compared side-by-
side.38  Both authors use simple diction in their translations.  Bahrdt’s word choice and 
syntax are simple: “The Word was already at the birth of this world” (327, my 
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translation).39  Faust’s translation is similarly straightforward, especially emphasized in 
the repetition of the phrase “In the beginning was the word” and the substituted clauses 
at the end (ll. 1224, 1229, 1233, 1237).40  This parallel does not indicate Goethe’s 
admiration for Bahrdt, whose translation was deeply unpopular, even heretical, in the 
late eighteenth century.  As Jonathan Sheehan notes in The Enlightenment Bible: 
Translation, Scholarship Culture, in contrast to the pedagogical functions of biblical 
teaching, Bahrdt’s translation “made his own heterodoxy into a pedagogical instrument 
of reform.  In doing so, he violated that barrier between public speech and private 
teaching that governed the reactions to the Enlightenment Bible” (142).  His translation 
was widely maligned and he was imprisoned for his anti-church stance.  While Goethe 
was no fan of religious dogma, his pantheistic writings have little in common with 
Bahrdt’s zealous intellectualist religion.   
Moreover, Goethe’s 1774 satire of Bahrdt’s translation further confirms my 
argument that this scene is ironic.  In Prolog zu den neusten Offenbarungen Gottes 
verdeutscht durch Dr. Carl Friedrich Bahrdt, an early polemical sketch, Goethe depicts 
a fictional scene in which Dr. Bahrdt’s ridiculous priorities are exposed.41  The sketch 
begins with the fictional Bahrdt’s immersion in his translation: “An idea happens to 
come to me, / Thus should I speak, if Christ I’d be” (Carus 303).42  In the main event of 
the short scene, the writers of the four New Testament gospels (Matthew, Mark, Luke, 
and John) appear to Bahrdt in his study in search of hospitality.  Rather than being 
humbled or inspired by the apostles, Goethe’s theologian castigates their unkempt 
appearances, an outward appearance that mirrors the aesthetic disarray of their gospels:  
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“Your writings are, I must confess, / Just like your beards and like your dress, / Or old 
dollars, no longer at par, / Whose mint-stamps at a discount are, / Were they re-coined 
with copper alloy, / All the people would take them at par with joy” (Carus 303–304).43  
Despite their importance to Christianity, Bahrdt insists that the only way he would find 
the gospel writers acceptable would be if they took baths and changed their clothes.  He 
is wholly uninterested in the substance of their visit, instead placing greater emphasis on 
their external appearances.  This scene could be read as a metaphor for his translation 
practice, one more focused on outward appearance than inner substance.  In this early 
work, Goethe depicts Bahrdt as a ridiculous figure, incapable of acknowledging the 
truth even if it was sitting in his study; this critique is consistent with Faust’s heretical 
translation scene.44   
Through this distortion of the gospel of John, Goethe points out the dangerous 
potentials of intellectualistic religion.  Faust is often analyzed in terms of his quest for 
knowledge at all costs, most clearly articulated in his first monologue of the work—“I 
have, alas, studied philosophy, / Jurisprudence and medicine, too, / And, worst of all, 
theology / With keen endeavor, through and through” (ll. 354–357)—and his secular 
medical pursuits with his father.  However, in this translation scene Goethe shows that 
religious intellectualism is just as harmful as Faust’s secular quest for knowledge.  
Goethe identifies the various shapes that the desire for knowledge can assume to show 
his readers the subtle differences and easy slippages through which that desire, like 
Faust’s translation, gets distorted.  Moreover, this scene occurs immediately before 
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Faust makes his deal with the devil, heightening Goethe’s message about the perils of 
excessive intellectualism.   
 
“Feeling is all”: Slippery Affective Rhetoric in “Martha’s Garden” 
The rest of Part I revolves around Mephistopheles’s continued, and increasingly 
successful, temptation of Faust; arguably Faust’s moment of capitulation to the 
diabolical figure unfolds during his seduction of Gretchen, a village girl with whom he 
is infatuated.  He commands Mephistopheles to “get me that girl, and don’t ask why” (l. 
2619), the devil arranges for their tryst, and Faust abandons the young girl after 
impregnating her, leaving her imprisoned for having a child out of wedlock.  While 
Goethe uses this scene to demonstrate the lengths to which Faust will go now that he is 
under Mephistopheles’s sway, the poet also interjects a moment of controlled ironic 
critique into the seduction story.  Similar to his critique of intellectualism in German 
Lutheranism, in “Martha’s Garden”—the section where Faust persuades Gretchen to 
consummate their relationship, arguably the pivotal point of Gretchen’s storyline in Part 
I—Goethe interjects a critique of Pietistic “feeling” to demonstrate the distortions of 
theology from multiple angles in the late eighteenth century.45   
At the beginning of the scene, Gretchen asks Faust to reassure her by professing 
his Christian beliefs, a strategy she uses to convince herself that if he is also a believer, 
their sin will be less egregious.  After evading several questions about what he does or 
does not believe, in a perfect non-confession he “confesses” to Gretchen and professes 
that outright declarations of faith have no importance because God’s divinity is sublime:  
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Do not mistake me, you who are so fair. 
Him—who may name? 
And who proclaim:  
I believe in him? 
Who may feel,  
Who dare reveal 
In words, I believe him not? (ll. 3431–3437)46 
According to Faust’s confession, God is ineffable; sentiment is the only essential 
element of religious belief:   
Do not we look into each other’s eyes 
And all in you is surging 
To your head and heart, 
And weaves in timeless mystery, 
Unseeable, yet seen, all around you? 
Then let it fill your heart entirely, 
And when your rapture in this feeling is complete, 
Call it then as you will, 
Call it bliss! heart! love! God! 
I do not have a name 
For this.  Feeling is all; 
Names are but sound and smoke  
Befogging heaven’s blazes. (ll. 3446–3458)47   
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Faust eventually convinces Gretchen to leave her door unbolted that evening, secure in 
the knowledge of the imminent consummation, and avoids confessing his lack of faith. 
While some scholars argue this scene is an earnest profession of pantheistic 
faith, I argue that Goethe includes many thematic and formal clues to signal his ironic 
meaning.48  The most prominent formal indication is Faust’s listing of potential names 
for God, which evokes the earlier translation scene and casts doubt on Faust’s 
earnestness.  The repetition of four possible terms—“bliss! heart! love! God!”—echoes 
the four possible translations Faust considers in the “Study” scene and, in creating that 
parallel, casts doubt on his belief in the viability of any one of those words, especially 
the last one (“God”), which corresponds with “Act” in his earlier translation. In other 
words, the fact that this list echoes the earlier translation scene, with its heretical 
overtones, suggests to the reader that Goethe is making a similarly ironic critique in this 
scene.   
Thematic clues also point to a contradiction between Faust’s appeal to Gretchen 
and Goethe’s intended meaning.  Gretchen notes the similarities between Faust’s non-
confession and the religious terms she hears each week at church, but ponders a 
divergence she can’t quite identify: “Those are very fair and noble phrases; / The priest 
says something, too, like what you spoke— / Only his words are not quite so—” (ll. 
3459–3461).  Her earnest confusion over Faust’s appeal further suggests to readers that 
we must not read his profession as a straightforward or theologically sound one.  
Moreover, Faust’s decision to opt for an artful non-confession, rather than lie to 
Gretchen, further represents Goethe’s intentional, and ironic, critique of emotionalist 
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religious discourse.49  In an earlier scene Faust expresses no qualms about lying to 
Gretchen (“Street”) but in “Martha’s Garden” he twists religious discourse to avoid 
indicting himself.50  The contradiction between his professed willingness to lie to 
Gretchen and his non-confession—in other words, Faust does not openly lie to Gretchen 
but develops a twisted argument—suggests to readers that the scene should not be taken 
at face value.   
The contradiction of sacred form and profane content further indicates Goethe’s 
ironic message.  The poet heightens the contradiction of sacred and profane at the end 
of the passage when Faust applies the idea of “feeling,” so central to his professed 
religious belief, to his proposed romantic tryst with Gretchen.  Shortly after 
“confessing” his faith by appealing to her emotions and intuition, Faust attempts to 
direct the conversation back to his goal of consummating their relationship.  He 
implores her, “Will there never be / At your sweet bosom one hour of rest / When soul 
touches on soul and breast on breast?” (ll. 3502–3504)  In Faust’s insistence that she 
focus predominantly on feelings, both religious and sensual, Goethe demonstrates that 
“feeling” can be twisted so far that it can be easily used for base purposes that subvert 
religious teachings.  These thematic contradictions demonstrate that readers cannot, and 
should not, take Faust’s confession at face value.   
The final contradiction of this scene I wish to note is that between theme and 
form.  The theme is fairly explicit—Faust’s opportunistic twisting of religious ideas for 
personal advantage—and it also indirectly highlights the impotence of his non-
confession.  He uses the form of a religious catechism to do so, which further heightens 
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this contradiction.  Gretchen begins by asking three questions of Faust: “How’s it with 
your religion?” “Do you believe in God?” and “Then you deny him there?” (ll. 3415, 
3426, 3431)51  Faust responds with his profession of faith, which, I propose, parallels 
the structure of Martin Luther’s small and large catechisms, the Nicene Creed, and the 
Heidelberg Confession.  Faust’s responses are also relatively short, which evokes the 
catechistic form.  He alters the form slightly by answering Gretchen’s questions with 
rhetorical questions of his own, interrogating whether it is possible, or wise, to profess 
religious belief at all; such a strategy contradicts much Christian practice.  Additionally, 
as Ritchie Robertson notes in “Literary Techniques and Aesthetic Texture in Faust,” 
“Martha’s Garden” foregrounds “free rhythms,” and the lack of any regular rhyme 
scheme shows “the futility of theistic or atheistic affirmation” (6).52  Where the “Study” 
scene’s sing-song cadence and repetition highlight Goethe’s irony, here Goethe rejects 
regular meter and rhyme to echo the catechistic form while simultaneously 
demonstrating its impotence.  For example, to reassure Gretchen of his earnest 
confession Faust explains: “Wherever you go, / All hearts under the heavenly day / Say 
it, each in its own way; / Why not I in mine?” (ll. 3462–3465)  In German, the lines 
each have seven, 12, seven, and eight syllables, respectively, and none of the lines 
rhyme (in contrast to Kaufmann’s English translation).  While the poet evokes the call-
and-response form of religious confession, in this scene he shows its lack of inner 
structure and meaning.  The slippery boundary between religious and sensual feeling 
demonstrates to readers that we cannot see Faust’s as an earnest confession. 
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This continual presence of contradiction does not indicate Romantic or 
deconstructive irony, however; Goethe illuminates these contradictions to expose what 
he sees as the hypocrisies of late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century Pietism.  The 
themes and language Goethe uses in this scene parallel, and distort, the writings of 
prominent German Pietists.  Through this parallel we see that the contradictions of 
Faust’s confession expose the same contradictions of Pietism itself.  Both Faust and 
German Pietists stretch the idea of religious feeling to the extent that it loses any 
religious meaning, in Goethe’s understanding.   
“Pietism” is a difficult term to define; however, for the purposes of this chapter I 
will use the following: it was a seventeenth century Protestant reform movement that 
originated in Germany.53  While there were many offshoots of Pietism within Germany 
and around Western Europe, Scandinavia, Great Britain, and the United States, these 
groups held similar beliefs in “personal renewal and new birth, conventicle gatherings 
for Bible study and mutual encouragement, social activism and postmillennialism, and 
ecumenical cooperation—in contrast to the polemical Protestantism that gave rise to the 
Thirty Years War” (Shantz 7).54  German Pietism rejected scholastic theology and 
instead emphasized the accessibility of faith through the believer’s feelings and 
devotion.55    
Goethe knew Pietism fairly well, both in theory and in practice, due to his close 
relationship with Susanna Katharina von Klettenberg in the early 1770s.  Scholars have 
written about Goethe’s use of Pietist ideas and themes, especially in The Sorrows of 
Young Werther and Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship, both written in the early part of 
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the decade.56  While Goethe was favorably disposed toward Pietism at first—especially 
the Herrnhut Moravians led by Count Nicholas Ludwig von Zinzendorf, to whose 
conventicle Klettenberg belonged—his interest waned significantly in the late 1770s.57  
Very little has been written connecting Faust to these Pietistic themes, even though the 
Urfaust, with its exclusive emphasis on the Gretchen tragedy, was composed between 
1773–1775 (Boyle 224, Mason 188), during what Nicholas Boyle refers to as Goethe’s 
“Pietistic phase” (76).  Two notable exceptions include Thomas Tillmann’s 
Hermeneutik und Bibelexegese beim jungen Goethe and Ronald Douglas Gray’s Goethe 
the Alchemist, in which the scholars (respectively) argue that Faust’s conversation with 
Wagner parallels Goethe’s writings in Zwo wichtigen bisher unerörterten biblischen 
Fragen (Tillmann 175) and that the alchemical themes in Faust are a reflection of 
Goethe’s reading of Gottfried Arnold’s mystical Pietism (Gray 20).  However, these 
works tend to regard Faust’s emphasis on religion as seriously embracing the 
ineffability of religious belief and rejecting creedalism.  For the reasons described 
above I would argue against this position, and instead propose that through Faust’s 
confession Goethe parodies Pietistic insistence on feeling as the basis of belief.  Since 
Goethe’s understanding of Pietism was quite wide-ranging, it is difficult to identify a 
specific Pietist figure that Goethe is referencing.  I argue that Goethe uses the basic 
ideas of Pietism as an amalgam to critique the sect as a whole.58  
 Faust’s rejection of orthodox creedalism and what James Van Horn Melton 
refers to as the “disputational style of Lutheran scholasticism” parallel two trends in 
eighteenth-century Pietism (326).  Pietists of all stripes rejected what they saw as an 
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overly rigorous emphasis on correct terminology at the expense of individual belief 
(Campbell 77, 81).  Johann Arndt, for example, contrasted terminology with faith to 
argue that focusing on correct diction contradicted the basic premise of Christian belief: 
“Many think that theology is a mere science or rhetoric, whereas it is a living 
experience and practice … True Christianity consists, not in words or external show, 
but in living faith, from which arise righteous fruits, and all manner of Christian virtues, 
as from Christ himself” (qtd. in Campbell 81).  Arndt’s successor, Philip Jakob Spener, 
echoed this rejection of doctrine in Pia Desideria; and Arnold contended that earnest 
faith is so far beyond scholasticism that it is unnameable.  Elizabeth Wilkinson writes in 
“The Theological Basis of Faust’s Credo” that: 
Faust’s speech follows the movement of Arnold’s argument [in Historie 
und Beschreibung der Mystischen Theologie] pretty exactly[.]  From the 
initial statement of God’s Unnameability it moves down through the 
various ways of knowing Him which are open to man … to rise again at 
the end to a dismissal of all names, since, although a mirror by which 
God reveals himself, they are at the same time the veil by which he veils 
himself. (234)59   
Furthermore, Faust adopts Arnold’s phrase “befogging heaven’s blazes” (“Umnebelnd 
Himmelsgluth”) at the end of his “confession” to Gretchen.  Faust’s rejection of 
confession is thus more than an attempt to avoid lying to Gretchen; it is an example of 
Pietistic feeling. 
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 Count Nicholas Ludwig von Zinzendorf’s lectures on religion are, I propose, a 
concrete point of comparison from which to analyze Goethe’s ironic critique.  
Zinzendorf was an eighteenth-century religious official who founded the Herrnhut 
Pietists, better known as the Moravians.60  Zinzendorf’s mystical, pietistic writings 
express the same themes as does Faust in “Martha’s Garden.”61  For example, in his 
Nine Public Lectures on Important Subjects in Religion, delivered in London in 1746, 
Zinzendorf proclaims that language is meaningless when it comes to religious belief.  
Insisting on “proper” terminology in discussing religious matters confuses the meaning 
of scripture and obfuscates the truth (43).  Drawing from 1 Corinthians chapter 13, 
Zinzendorf writes: “Even if he [a believer] spoke with the tongues of angels, yet he 
would be nothing more than a ringing bell, impelled by a spirit foreign and unknown to 
himself but not full of the spirit inwardly in the heart” (Lecture V 45).62  Zinzendorf’s 
writings were seen as radical by his main-line Protestant counterparts; John Wesley 
wrote pejoratively that Zinzendorf had “no works; no law; no commandments” (qtd. in 
Forrell xvii).  Of course, it is important to note that the Pietists, and especially 
Zinzendorf and the Moravians, did have their own catechism and creeds, which is 
somewhat of a contradiction to their stated position.63  That being said, Pietists put 
significantly less emphasis on those documents, creedal and otherwise, compared to the 
day’s orthodox Lutherans.   
Scholastic approaches to religion elevated the role of the believer’s intellect and 
gave individuals a false sense of self-importance; according to Zinzendorf, this self-
aggrandizing was antithetical to Pietist practice (Faull 40).  Faith is not equivalent to 
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knowledge, as Zinzendorf writes in the fifth lecture, as “there are … certain people who 
have insights into truths and are not yet saved, [so] it cannot be made a universal 
principle that knowledge saves” (Lecture V 45).  Individual knowledge is inconsistent at 
best and places too much emphasis on the believer’s achievements as opposed to her 
piety.  Words are useless unless the believer feels the Holy Spirit moving within her. 
The main components of religion, according to Zinzendorf, are love and belief, a 
perspective that Faust opportunistically echoes in his conversation with Gretchen.64  In 
his speeches Zinzendorf repeatedly states that the only essential components of religion 
are the believer’s religious feelings (Lecture VII 46, 80).  Zinzendorf exacerbates the 
antagonism between intellect and feeling with a biblical example in Lecture Five: After 
his resurrection Jesus asks his disciple Peter, who denied Jesus three times during Jesus’ 
crucifixion, not “do now you believe in me” but “do you love me?” (48)  Love and 
belief cannot be known, intellectually speaking, but rather are intuited and felt by the 
believer.  As Faull writes, in Zinzendorf’s understanding religious knowledge comes 
from “the heart and not from a priori epistemological structures … Consequently, the 
heart, in contradistinction to the mind, is the place of contact … with God” (41).65  The 
Bible and other religious texts were worthwhile insofar as they deepened the reader’s 
feelings of devotion.  Faith therefore must be “understood not through demonstrable 
proofs but rather through the individual feeling the truth which already resides in God’s 
word” (Faull 33).  Love, faith, and feeling are preconditions for knowledge and 
rationality, not the other way around.  While knowledge cannot engender faith, true 
faith enlightens the believer in every sense, in Zinzendorf’s understanding.  In many 
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respects, this approach to religion was an egalitarian one; emphasizing the interior and 
subjective elements of faith, as opposed to experiences and educational background, 
opened religious discussion and leadership to women and commoners (Van Horn 
Melton).   
The parallel between Faust and Zinzendorf, however, is not a positive one; 
Goethe exaggerates Faust’s Pietistic rhetoric to expose the dangerous potential uses to 
which they could be put.  The clearest ironization of Pietist thought comes with 
Goethe’s reliance on the discourse of “feeling” (Gefühl) to express Faust’s base desires.  
Zinzendorf’s particular brand of Pietism used erotic language to describe a believer’s 
faith and relationship with Christ.  For example, all believers, regardless of their gender, 
considered themselves to be “brides of Christ” and believed God to be both their creator 
and husband (Zinzendorf 5).  Furthermore, much Moravian liturgy focused on the 
“sweet, wet wounds” of Christ, which could also be interpreted to have sexual 
connotations.66  Relationships between believers in a community were described in 
erotic terms as well (Farrelly 19).  Goethe’s decision to use Pietistic language, with its 
easy slippage into the visceral discussion of Gretchen’s and Faust’s liaison later that 
evening—“Will there never be / At your sweet bosom one hour of rest / When soul 
touches on soul and breast on breast?” (ll. 3502–3504)—reveals the dangerous 
potentials of emphasizing “feeling” at the expense of any other religious ideas.  If erotic 
language can be used to discuss religion, he implies, using that same language and 
reasoning to persuade a partner into a sexual relationship is not too far off.   
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Additionally, the fact that Faust employs Pietistic ideas when speaking to 
Gretchen is significant.  They occupy profoundly different social spheres, a fact that 
both parties recognize.  Gretchen is triply disadvantaged because she is a young peasant 
girl.  He weaponizes the ostensibly egalitarian language of Pietism to get his own way 
and assert his dominance over Gretchen.  In this respect Goethe uses the circumstances 
of Faust’s confession to illustrate the dangers to which this discourse can be put.  
Faust’s confession is not an earnest one, but rather stretches Pietist ideas of belief to 
their breaking point to expose their hypocrisies. 
In “Martha’s Garden,” Goethe ironizes the form of the catechism to reveal the 
slippery potentials of Pietistic feeling.  In exposing Faust as an opportunist, Goethe also 
exposes Zinzindorf’s strain of Pietist theology as dangerous, even heretical, in the 
extent to which it can be taken. Again, it is important to note that Goethe introduces this 
socio-historical critique of Pietism at a pivotal moment in the work, the central event of 
the Gretchen tragedy.  By interjecting this specific critique, and combining it with an 
exploration of Faust’s opportunism, at such a crucial moment of the plot, Goethe casts 
doubt on the possibility of German Lutheran Pietism as a coherent world-view.   
 
Beyond “Sound and Smoke”: Ironic Critique in World Literature 
 Through his critique of intellectualism and affect Goethe aims to expose false 
piety; his critique illuminates a serious issue requiring a remedy, in this case a more 
critical attitude regarding religious discourse.  However, he does not uniformly 
condemn Christianity, nor assert that religion as a whole is not useful for making sense 
111 
 
 
of the world.  Indeed, Gretchen’s earnest religious beliefs are held as commendable 
throughout the work, even by Mephistopheles.  For example, in the scene “Neighbor’s 
House” (a few scenes before “Martha’s Garden”) Mephisto remarks about Gretchen, 
“You good, innocent child” in an aside, which demonstrates his lack of ulterior 
motives.67  Gretchen’s religious faith is an “intuitive moral compass” that has the 
capacity to give structure and logic to an individual’s daily life, according to Krimmer 
(110), and suggests that Goethe is not uniformly critical of religion.  Rather, Goethe 
reserves his scorn for “ecclesiastic institutions” (110).68  As Eckermann notes in 
Conversations with Goethe, Goethe remarked that “there is no art in being clever when 
nothing is respected” (134).  Goethe does not deny the validity of religion, nor the 
world governed by religious logic; instead, he points out some troublesome elements in 
need of reform.  In other words, Goethe’s is a controlled irony in the Kierkegaardian 
sense. 
As a true Kierkegaardian master over irony, Goethe does not offer the reader 
any alternative approaches to religion; he does not identify sects, denominations, or 
dogmas that are more appropriate than Pietism.  Rather, he invites the reader to reflect 
on the social context being depicted and acknowledge the need for action.  In other 
words, he does not identify other methodologies or logics that may be more appropriate, 
or less heretical, but rather offers the ironic critique to the reader as an invitation to 
reflection and action.  Goethe implicitly challenges his readers through this critique: 
now that you can see it, he seems to suggest, will you do anything to change it?  As 
Stuart Atkins notes in Goethe’s Faust, in “On Didactic Poetry” Goethe writes that “all 
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poetry should inform, though insensibly, and make man aware of what is important for 
him to inform himself of; the lesson has to be deduced as from life itself” (3).  Goethe 
does not interject moralizing messages in his work, but rather engages readers.  
Through their active analysis of the work’s ironic critique, Goethe facilitates the 
conditions for social change (and perhaps individual change as well).  
This ironic commentary is not especially accessible or self-evident; it requires 
substantial historical research in German sources, as well as knowledge of historical 
verse forms and Lutheran theology.  That being said, I argue that the precise historical 
situation is not as important as are the general ideas being critiqued—excessive 
intellectualism and distorted rhetorics of affect.  In this sense, Goethe’s clues to irony 
become increasingly important.  For example, many fundamentalist Christian sects in 
contemporary America advocate an affective, anti-intellectual religious practice.  
Moreover, the basic critiques he offers of elevating individual interpretation above, and 
sometimes contrary to, the meaning of the text, and of distorting rhetoric to serve one’s 
own purpose, can resonate in many different socio-historical contexts.  While Goethe’s 
critiques address eighteenth-century German religion, they could easily apply to 
distorted intellectual and affective nationalistic texts.  By addressing these historically 
specific issues in an indirect way, Goethe both invites readers to consider how the 
critique applies to his context and facilitates our contemplation about how its themes 
might be extrapolated to other eras, nations, and disciplines. 
 It does not necessarily follow that his clues cannot be preserved in a work’s 
circulation as world literature—that is, as the work is translated and read in a very 
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different national, social, and cultural milieu.  Given the definition of world literature 
offered in Chapter Two above, and the ethics of translation necessary for conscientious 
world literature, I contend these clues can be retained under certain circumstances.  
First, the formal devices Goethe uses to signal irony—hyperbole, contradiction, 
repetition, and listing, among others—can be maintained in translation, especially 
because these clues are so dependent on the thematic context.69  The scholastic 
translation scene will always contradict the affective catechism scene.  Just because 
these clues may not be accessible to all readers in all contexts does not mean that they 
are never intelligible in circulation.  That being said, many of these clues to Goethe’s 
irony are stable because they rely on the work’s content rather than on signals exclusive 
to nineteenth-century Germans.     
 Some clues are less evident, notably the connotations of Knittelvers in 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century German.  Translators have used a few different 
tactics to convey this signal to irony that depends on the socio-historical, linguistic, 
cultural, and religious context of the original work, strategies that correspond to 
Lawrence Venuti’s ideas of domestication and foreignization.  Translators including 
José María Valverde, Lucian Blaga, and Mori Ōgai have adapted the form of 
Knittelvers to reflect or echo a “local” verse form; one example is the play “Faustus in 
Africa,” a South African adaptation of Goethe’s Faust, in which the poet Lesego 
Kampolokeng drew on local popular music to rewrite material in a rap-like rhythm that 
evokes Knittelvers.70  To claim that Western poetry is so unique that it cannot be 
approximated in other languages is hubristic; acknowledging that Knittelvers is one 
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tradition of satirical poetry among many is a democratizing gesture that acknowledges 
the affinities of literary form even when written in diverse cultures.  Ultimately, I 
suggest, the structural convergence of content and form make the signal to irony more 
recognizable as such and therefore more easily translatable. 
 However, I realize that the above naively presupposes an equal exchange 
between literary works translated into English and those translated from English; the 
statistics about the international book market, and the types of books that become works 
of world literature, demonstrate that there is a huge imbalance of works translated from 
English into other languages.71  Translating Goethe’s Faust into a non-Western 
language, and adapting it into a local poetic form, could have the contradictory effect of 
further glorifying English-language (and Western European) literary forms, since the 
idea that one English form can stand in for a host of other very different literary 
traditions does, in some respects, overvalorize the English form and suggest its 
preeminence.72   
Arguably a more effective strategy, suggested by translators and critics of world 
literature, is to adopt an approach that melds world literature, area studies, and 
translation theory, specifically in providing copious explanatory notes to help the reader 
orient herself.73  Put differently, I argue that controlled irony can be better preserved 
through thematic metonymy, made possible through scholarly apparatuses that provide 
the necessary contextual information to help the reader in the target culture interpret the 
text and, especially, moments of controlled irony.  If Goethe’s translation scene were 
thoroughly glossed, explaining the historical, cultural, and literary valences of 
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Knittelvers, the reader would have an increased chance of discerning the author’s ironic 
approach.  Again, as Damrosch and André Lefevere note, the student of world literature 
in translation can never become a complete specialist on the text, but rather in reading 
these works she gains greater perspective on both the context in which it was produced 
and her own.74  Through these explanatory notes a translator of world literature could 
help the reader identify signals to irony, especially those that involve culturally and 
linguistically specific verse forms; facilitate intercultural understanding; and promote 
Herderian world-historical development.   
The reader then assumes an active role not only in recognizing the irony but also 
in searching for, or deciphering, the historical context the ironic passage references.  In 
this way, irony serves as a point of departure (Ansatzpunkt) into the text’s socio-
historical context, and the reader actively comprehends the work and the author’s 
allusions in a way not required of readers in straight-forward texts.  Through these clues 
authors also signal to readers some of the great concerns of their day; in interpreting the 
ironies of a literary text the reader becomes familiar with the society’s concerns and 
priorities.  Recognizing these ironies in a work of world literature facilitates readers’ 
(and writers’) ability to identify similar social concerns in their own context and address 
them appropriately, especially from the sense of perspective facilitated by reading a 
work of world literature on its own terms.  Irony, unlike aspects of world literature that 
focus on “universal themes,” emphasizes socio-historically contextual concerns; with 
the help of explanatory notes and glosses from a translator or content expert, the reader 
becomes increasingly familiar with the society being depicted. 
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Chapter Four 
“Obdurate Facts”: 
Subversive Historians in The Master and Margarita 
 
 In remarks made during a 2013 conference, British Member of Parliament 
Jeremy Corbyn criticized British Zionists’ lukewarm response to an address made by 
Manuel Hassassian, then the Palestinian ambassador to the U.K.  Corbyn proposed that 
one reason for this tepid reaction was due to the fact that the Zionists, “having lived in 
this country for a very long time, probably all their lives, they don’t understand English 
irony” (qtd. in Mead).  In offering this anti-Zionist response (and suggesting that these 
British citizens are un-English), Corbyn reinforced the notion that irony is culturally 
specific.  To be “in” on the true meaning of irony, in this view, requires such a high 
degree of cultural fluency that only central members of a discursive community can 
understand it.  If true, this assertion suggests that irony—even the controlled irony 
described in the previous two chapters—cannot be adequately understood in circulation 
and that the very idea of irony in works of world literature is impossible. 
 However, such an assertion is false, as evidenced by the prominence of ironic 
texts in world literature, chief among them Goethe’s Faust.  In the final two chapters I 
turn to two texts that further demonstrate the intelligibility of irony in circulation: 
Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita and Wilson Harris’ The Infinite 
Rehearsal.  As adaptations of Goethe’s work, these novels support my claim that irony 
is translatable and can be understood outside of its original context of production.  
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Bulgakov and Harris use Goethe’s framework of engaged irony in their adaptations of 
the epic verse-drama, suggesting that both authors understood the original work’s ironic 
critique. The fact that two very different authors, working in different linguistic, 
historical, and socio-political contexts—early twentieth-century Russia and postcolonial 
Guyana, respectively—employ irony in a similar way as Goethe suggests both novelists 
recognized Goethe’s ironic critique as such.   
 However, Bulgakov and Harris do not import Goethe’s indirect critique of 
German Pietism into their works.  Rather, they use his form of ethical irony—one that is 
controlled in the Kierkegaardian sense and includes clues to its meaning—and alter the 
content to critique issues unique to their own societies.  Attending to the ways in which 
authors deploy irony emphasizes the major socio-political concerns of the author’s 
place and time; if a reader considers the engaged function of irony in works of world 
literature, she can learn a great deal about the author’s socio-historical context.  In 
reading works of world literature and learning this information, she thus learns the tools 
to identify similar critiques in her own society and, in so doing, facilitates world-
historical development in the Herderian sense. 
 Bulgakov’s controversial novel The Master and Margarita reflects the process 
of the circulation, uptake, and transculturation of ironic critique.  He signals his reliance 
on Goethe in several ways and employs indirect critique in conditions in which an 
earnest call for change could have resulted in his death.  While Bulgakov offers several 
critiques in the course of the novel, one of the most strident is his exposé of the 
Bolshevik party’s attitude toward history.  The characters’ rejection of historical fact in 
118 
 
 
favor of fictional narrative challenges the political uses of the discipline in Stalinist 
Russia.  Like Goethe before him, Bulgakov draws readers’ attention to the false claims 
of one of his society’s dominant ideologies.   
 In the following pages I break my argument into two sections: the first contains 
my argument that adaptations demonstrate the intelligibility of ironic critique in world 
literature.  In the second I offer a close reading of Bulgakov’s controlled irony in The 
Master and Margarita and draw parallels to the author’s contemporaneous societal 
concerns.    
 
Variations on a Theme by Goethe 
In contemporary American culture, “adaptation” is largely synonymous with 
converting a novel into a film (or worse, the reverse process).  However, the definition 
is much broader than suggested by these recent connotations.  An expanded definition 
of the term offers a framework to better understand the way irony circulates in world 
literature.  In Theories of Adaptation, Linda Hutcheon explains that adaptation can 
alternately refer to a copy/paste process of composition, a mode of reading and writing 
concerned with appropriating another text, and an intertextual mode of writing and 
reading (8).  Put differently, adaptation is a mode of writing that borrows from, and 
makes extended reference to, another text; the finished product must signal clear 
references to the source text and yet mark a new interpretation, setting, or outcome of 
the original.  In addition to this authorial process, adaptations proscribe a mode of 
engagement in which readers, to fully appreciate the text, must comprehend both source 
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and target works and can “oscillate” between them, as I explain further below.  Of 
course, intertextuality is not necessarily synonymous with adaptation; other 
intertextualities include allusions, translations, transcriptions, condensations, 
bowdlerizations, abridgements, censored editions, retellings, and spinoffs (Hutcheon 
171).  
Adaptations do not efface the presence of the original work; rather, many 
authors openly acknowledge their reliance on, and alteration of, an original text.  
Hutcheon notes that an adaptation consciously signals its dependence on the “original” 
text so that the connections between the two are recognizable.  In this way adaptations 
are “palimpsestuous” works, to use Michael Alexander’s term, that always reference the 
source work (Hutcheon 6).  For an adaptation to be successful as an independent work, 
however, it must be intelligible by both readers who are familiar with the source work 
(what Hutcheon calls “knowing” audiences) and those who are unfamiliar with it 
(“unknowing” audiences) (121).  Adaptations must also deviate from the source work in 
meaningful ways, given the author’s artistic innovations and the influence of the 
author’s cultural context.   
As a text is adapted it undergoes a transformation that is not only artistic but 
also cultural.  This change—which Hutcheon calls “indigenization” or 
“transculturation”—is an essential component of the process (Hutcheon xviii, 146, 161).  
Hutcheon proposes that Edward Said’s concept of traveling theory is an analogue to the 
transculturation of an adaptation (Hutcheon 150).  In The World, the Text, and the 
Critic, Said explains that as an idea (or theory) moves beyond its original context, it is 
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met with and altered by “a set of conditions—call them conditions of acceptance or, as 
an inevitable part of acceptance, resistances—which then confronts the transplanted 
theory or idea, making possible its introduction or toleration … [t]he now full (or 
partly) accommodated (or incorporated) idea is to some extent transformed by its new 
uses, its new position in a new time and place” (227).  Hutcheon contends that adapted 
texts function much in the same way.  As the source text to be adapted enters a new 
socio-political, linguistic, and historical environment, the author of the adaptation 
transforms the ideas of the source text to integrate them into the target culture more 
seamlessly: “Almost always, there is an accompanying shift in the political valence 
from the adapted text to the ‘transculturated’ adaptation.  Context conditions meaning, 
in short” (145). The process of circulation and change thus produces the conditions for 
the adaptation to successfully circulate in that new context.1  In this way the original 
work and its adaptations operate much like the “theme and variation” idea in musical 
works, but rather than rely solely on artistic alteration, differences also depend on 
formal constraints, the adapter, the audience, and the author’s socio-historical setting 
(Hutcheon 142).   
 Focusing on the changes made to an original work in an adaptation throws into 
relief the contexts that shaped both source and target texts.  Hutcheon suggests that 
readers’ pleasure in interpreting the palimpsestuous adaptation depends on their ability 
to recognize both the similarities and the differences between source and target texts.  
As readers work through an adaptation they oscillate between the primary text and the 
adaptation, comparing one against the other (xv).  In this way “recognition and 
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remembrance are part of the pleasure (and risk) of experiencing an adaptation; so too is 
change” (4).    These cyclical moments of reading, possible for the reader even if she 
encounters the adapted text first and then reads the original, simultaneously raise the 
question of how much each iteration is shaped by its socio-historical, ethnic, and 
national context of production: “In shifting cultures and therefore sometimes shifting 
language, adaptations make alterations that reveal much about the larger context of 
reception and production” (28).  By comparing the differences and similarities between, 
for example, Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and J. M. Coetzee’s Foe, readers are 
presented with information that enables them to compare prevailing attitudes toward 
colonialism in eighteenth-century England and twentieth-century South Africa, 
respectively.  In this way, adaptations advance Herder’s stated goal that world literature 
in circulation fosters inter-cultural understanding.   
 Irony in world literature—including in adapted texts—highlights both the source 
and target cultures in many ways.  Controlled irony is a socially engaged approach, so 
comparing two authors’ uses of indirect critique highlights the authors’ social 
concerns.2  In this respect irony and adaptation, when considered together, amplify one 
another to emphasize the author’s concerns.  Adaptations of ironically inflected world 
literary texts also demonstrate that these works are intelligible, at least partially, in 
circulation.  The evidence of inter-cultural and international understanding—seen in the 
multiple adaptations of Goethe’s Faust by Hector Berlioz, Osamu Tezuka, and Ngũgĩ 
wa Thiong’o, for example—is further strengthened by the prevalence of controlled 
irony in many target texts.  In adaptations, authors shift the content of ironic critique but 
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maintain its form as a socially engaged device.  Bulgakov and Harris both wield irony 
in a similar manner to Goethe to demonstrate the need for change in their own societies.   
 In his novel The Master and Margarita, Bulgakov uses many of Goethe’s 
formal manifestations of irony, but the Russian dissident alters the content to address 
twentieth-century Russia.  Like Goethe, Bulgakov calls for socio-historical change in an 
era in which earnest critiques were ineffective and facilitates the conditions for world-
historical development.  To support my claim about Bulgakov’s controlled irony, I 
demonstrate first that, contrary to claims by many Bulgakov scholars, The Master and 
Margarita is indeed an adaptation of the German work.  I then analyze how Bulgakov 
transculturates ironic critique to reveal the hypocrisies of historical discourse in Soviet 
Russia. 
 
The Master and Margarita as an Adaptation 
 My initial claim, that The Master and Margarita is an adaptation of Goethe’s 
Faust, is a controversial one in Bulgakov scholarship.  Interpretations of The Master 
and Margarita are numerous and varied, ranging from Elena N. Mahlow’s contention 
that the novel is an allegory of Soviet society, to Ari Belenkiy’s claim that the Master is 
Bulgakov’s autobiographical character, to Leslie Milne’s assertion that the novel is a 
carnivalesque representation of Soviet society.3  One possible reason for these 
numerous and divergent interpretations is the fact that Bulgakov left eight drafts of the 
novel (despite attempting to destroy the first during a period of political exile).  While 
the eighth and final version is largely regarded as the most complete, editors and 
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translators have tried to address the text’s gaps and inconsistencies by incorporating 
passages from earlier drafts.  Bulgakov’s third wife, Elena Sergeevna Bulgakova, also 
shaped the text after the author’s death by deleting and inserting passages based on what 
she felt her husband would have wished.  Finally, the novel’s censorship by the Soviet 
authorities, while now long past, continues to create confusion.  The novel was heavily 
censored by the Soviet authorities upon its initial publication in Novy mir in 1964; this 
censored version was the source text for the first English translation as well.  The full 
version of the original Russian did not come out until 1967.  The fact that so many 
different versions of the novel exists gives rise to these many interpretations.4 
Despite the (often conflicting) abundance of interpretations, I contend that 
Bulgakov’s transformation of Goethe’s epic verse-drama is a critical yet under-
acknowledged layer of meaning to the work.5  Bulgakov’s transformation of Goethe’s 
ironic critiques dramatically alters the story line but the author still references the 
source work in numerous ways, especially through ironic critique.  Many scholars claim 
that the significant differences between the two works discredit any superficial 
connections; however, I will argue below that these differences support my decision to 
read Bulgakov’s novel as an adaptation of Goethe’s Faust.6    
 Bulgakov signals his reliance on the original text in several ways; two of the 
most obvious are the epigraph and the characters’ names.7  The epigraph is taken from 
the scene in Faust I in which Mephistopheles and Faust meet for the first time: “‘Who 
are you, then?’ / ‘I am part of that power which eternally / wills evil and eternally works 
good’” (Faust ll. 1335–1336, Bulgakov 3).  While Andrew Barratt contends the 
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epigraph is a red herring that does not suggest a parallel with Goethe’s text, I would 
argue that including such a conspicuous reference is meaningful because it calls 
attention to similarities between the two works.8  The use of names similarly 
emphasizes the affinities between the two works.  Woland is not a name typically 
associated with the devil, but it is one of Mephistopheles’ names from Faust I.9  
Additionally, Bulgakov called the Master “Faust” in drafts of the novel up to 1934, as J. 
A. E. Curtis notes in Bulgakov’s Last Decade: The Writer as Hero (31), and 
“Margarita” is the Russian form of Margarethe (Gretchen’s full name), which links the 
female love interests of the works’ respective Faust characters.  The similarities 
between the characters extend to their personalities as well: Woland is recognized 
widely as a variation on Mephistopheles, the Master is read as a Faustian character, and 
Margarita is understood to be a (less tragic) twentieth-century iteration of Goethe’s 
Gretchen.10  While the parallels between the Goethean characters and their counterparts 
in Bulgakov’s novel are not always exact, the similarities between them support the 
“theme and variation” reading of the two works.   
Comparing Mephistopheles and Woland illustrates Bulgakov’s reliance on the 
German text.  Both characters are (arguably) the main characters in their respective 
narratives.  As Richard Ilgner notes, the devil’s central role distinguishes Bulgakov’s 
novel as a Goethean adaptation, especially compared to the Faust works by his peers, A. 
V. Lunacharsky and V. F. Odoevsky, who downplay the devil’s significance (179).  
Woland and Mephisto are both agents of change as they upend the Faust figure’s life 
and challenge the prevailing social order.  More importantly, both facilitate conditions 
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for others to sin.  Woland is not the active tempter Mephistopheles is, instead leaving 
that task to his henchmen Koroviev, Azazello, and Behemoth; but like Mephistopheles, 
Woland exposes humanity’s underlying greed and selfishness.  Smaller details also 
strengthen the parallel between the two characters and thus the two works.  For 
instance, poodle imagery recurs throughout both source and adapted texts: Woland 
carries a cane with a poodle head as the knob, and during Satan’s Ball Margarita wears 
a necklace plate with a poodle on it and rests her feet on a cushion embroidered with a 
poodle (10, 261, 263–4); and Mephistopheles (of course) appears to Faust in the shape 
of a poodle (ll. 1154–1321).11  I do not deny that there are differences between these 
two characters—I agree with Proffer that Woland is an ironic tempter, not a nefarious or 
worldly character (545), and even Haber’s assertion that Bulgakov’s devil “reassert[s] 
life” is distinctly different from Mephistopheles’ “attempts to annihilate it.”12  That 
being said, there are more similarities than differences between these two figures.13   
 In addition to these character similarities, the structure of Bulgakov’s novel 
parallels that of Goethe’s text.  In “Story and Symbol: Notes Toward a Structural 
Analysis of The Master and Margarita,” Bruce A. Beatie and Phyllis W. Powell 
identify several parallel scenes between the two works, most notably including 
“Walpurgis Night” and “Satan’s Ball” (224).14  The centrality of the romance is another 
shared element that shows The Master and Margarita as an adaptation of Faust.  Barratt 
notes that Goethe adds the love story to the Faust myth; the romance between Faust and 
Gretchen is unique to Goethe’s version and is absent in later renderings of the legend, 
including Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus (Barratt 278).  The romance between 
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Margarita and the Master, when combined with the other structural similarities, 
confirms the work as an adaptation of Goethe’s Faust.  The works have strikingly 
similar outcomes as well, as A. C. Wright proposes in “Satan in Moscow”: “The details 
may be different but the overall comparison remains valid.  And in general terms, the 
duality of good and evil in Goethe is not far removed from that in Bulgakov …” (1163).   
 Of course, this is not to say that the two works are similar in every way.  
Bulgakov’s characters diverge from Goethe’s in a number of ways: the Master is 
accused of being a failed Faust; Woland and Mephistopheles do not expose human 
failings in the same way or for the same purpose; and Margarita is a more active 
character than Gretchen.15  Moreover, scholars have identified several possible source 
texts for Bulgakov’s work, including Pavel Florenskii’s treatise “The Imaginary in 
Geometry”; Ernst Renan’s La vie de Jésus, Arthur Drews’ The Christ Myth, and Henri 
Barbusse’s Les Judas de Jésus; Tacitus’ Annals; and his father’s theological writings, 
among others.16  Laura Weeks concludes that Bulgakov’s work is not an adaptation but 
is rather a subversion of Goethe’s Faust because the Russian novelist alters so many 
elements (“What I Have Written, I Have Written” 22).17   
However, I argue that these differences, far from negating the parallels, actually 
support reading The Master and Margarita as an adaptation of Faust.  Again, one major 
requirement for an adaptation is that it emphasizes both similarities to, and differences 
from, the original; the reader’s pleasure of consuming an adaptation lies in the 
recognition of both parallel and divergent elements.  The discontinuities between these 
works demonstrate Bulgakov’s transformation of Faust to speak to 1920s Russia.  The 
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Master and Margarita is an independent text that is enriched by the similarities with 
Goethe’s work, not dependent on them.  If Bulgakov had not transformed the Woland 
character from Goethe’s humorous corrupter, who creates conditions for sin and revels 
in it, into an aloof, sardonic tempter, who observes the Muscovites as they indict 
themselves without his assistance, the work would have remained a retelling of Faust 
rather than an adaptation. As Curtis writes in Bulgakov’s Last Decade, “Bulgakov 
borrows suggestive images from a text, but then leaves them to acquire a new life of 
their own in a fresh context” (170).  In short, the parallels between the two works are so 
strong, and the differences so contextually specific, as to justify reading The Master and 
Margarita as an adaptation of Goethe’s Faust. 
Another reason I argue The Master and Margarita is an adaptation of Goethe’s 
work is due to Bulgakov’s use of controlled irony.  Like Goethe, the Russian novelist 
uses moments of indirect critique to expose under-recognized hypocrisies in 
contemporary social ideology.  Bulgakov employs several literary devices to signal his 
critique: for example, he parodies the Eucharist in “Satan’s Ball” by having Woland 
drink blood from Berlioz’s severed skull, adds incongruous interjections to question the 
skaz narrator’s legitimacy, and uses Aesopian language (passive, agentless sentences) to 
allude to the secret police.18  These moments of ironic critique do not invalidate the 
narrator’s veracity or cast doubt on objective truth, as I will argue below.  Rather, in the 
spirit of Goethe and Kierkegaard’s controlled ironist, Bulgakov uses this form of 
indirect critique in limited moments to draw attention to social contradiction, 
simultaneously signaling the solution to deciphering the riddle.   As David Bethea notes 
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in The Shape of the Apocalypse, “Bulgakov’s lyrical flights and satiric strafing missions 
are always under the control of a restrained and calculating pilot” designed to expose 
societal issues without invalidating the whole society (193).   
Most of these ironic critiques are aimed at the Soviet state.  While scholars have 
debated the target of Bulgakov’s comments, proposing that he attacks Socialist Realism, 
rationality, and Joseph Stalin, I argue that the primary object of critique, and the most 
Goethean in nature, is that of the Soviet concept of history.19  Through these critiques 
Bulgakov highlights the cross-purposes of historical discourse in Soviet Russia: 
although Soviet historians in the 1920s claimed to rewrite Russian history to more 
accurately reflect the Bolshevist spirit, in actuality they distorted historical fact to suit 
party doctrine.  Bulgakov highlights distorted history through repetition, as three of the 
main characters (Woland, the Master, and Ivan) are historians with uneasy relationships 
to state authority.  Through these politically indeterminate figures Bulgakov questions 
the veracity of Bolshevist historical narratives.   
 
Outsider Historians 
 From the novel’s first scenes at Patriarch’s Ponds, Bulgakov establishes an 
opposition between historical truth and party narrative.  One of the most overt ways he 
signals this tension is in contrasting the narratives associated with each perspective.  
There are, scholars generally agree, three narrative voices in the novel that serve 
different functions: the skaz narrator in Moscow gossips about the literati’s intrigues; a 
limited third-person narrator explains Woland’s antics in Moscow; and an omniscient 
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narrator in Yershalaim narrates the story of Pontius Pilate’s trial of Jesus and its 
aftermath.  The account offered by the skaz narrator, the central narrator in the Moscow 
sections who discusses official literary matters, is the ostensibly factual one in 
Bulgakov’s novel because it recounts the day-to-day events of Muscovite society.  As I 
will show below, however, this narrator has notoriously faulty and incomplete 
knowledge of events, and Bulgakov uses moments of incorrect interpretation to raise 
questions about the veracity of official accounts (Amusin 364).  The Yershalaim 
narrator, on the other hand, offers a credible explanation of the events of Jesus’ trial and 
crucifixion through neutral reportage. The factual tone conveying the mythical story 
implies that this section is more factual than the one set in Moscow.   
However, despite their (ostensibly) true knowledge of historical events, the three 
characters are not commended for this understanding; on the contrary, they are 
ostracized from official society.  Historical knowledge is depicted as antithetical to 
party doctrine.20  These characters’ marginalization directly contradicts the prominent 
status accorded to historians in Soviet Russia during the 1920s, especially as they were 
among the most politically inclined academics working to support Stalin’s agenda.  This 
disjuncture between the world of the novel and Bulgakov’s reality illuminates the 
Russian novelist’s critique of the Bolsheviks’ opportunistic uses and abuses of history.    
 Bulgakov first signals his ironic critique of “party-approved” history through the 
skaz narrator’s tone.  A skaz narrator, according to the Oxford Dictionary of Literary 
Terms, is a colloquial first-person narrative style, marked by slang and dialect, and 
evokes spoken stories rather than written ones.  In Bulgakov’s novel, the skaz narrator 
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acts as an intermediary between characters and readers, demonstrating to readers how 
each event should be interpreted; however, the skaz narrator has suspect interpretations 
and thus does not act as the work’s neutral perspective.  Mikhail Berlioz, the “editor of 
a fat literary journal and chairman of the board of one of the major Moscow literary 
associations, called Massolit for short” (Bulgakov 7), commissioned and rejected an 
anti-religious poem written by the then-poet (later historian) Ivan Nikolaevich Ponyrev, 
known by the pseudonym Bezdomny (“Homeless”).21  Berlioz rejects the poem because 
it depicts Jesus as a historical figure; however, the way in which the narrator describes 
Berlioz’s reaction undercuts his claims to the truth.   The editor, as the narrator explains, 
lectures that: 
… this same Jesus, as a person, simply never existed in the world, and 
all the stories about him were mere fiction, the most ordinary theology 
… Displaying a solid erudition, [Berlioz] also informed the poet, among 
other things, that the passage in the fifteenth book of Tacitus’s famous 
Annals, the forty-fourth chapter, where mention is made of the 
execution of Jesus, was nothing but a later spurious interpretation. (9) 
Loaded terms like “erudition” and “spurious,” immediately suggest the narrator’s 
hyperbolic position; moreover, the narrator does not identify Berlioz’s historical error in 
the editor’s assertion that Flavius Josephus does not acknowledge Jesus’ historical 
existence (Peavar and Volokhonsky 398 fn. 7).  The narrator so quickly and 
enthusiastically agrees with Berlioz, and his faulty knowledge, that Bulgakov calls into 
question the veracity of both character and narrator.  As Vida Taranovski Johnson 
131 
 
 
suggests in “The Thematic Function of the Narrator in The Master and Margarita,” “the 
ironic voice of this intrusive narrator is so strong that it defines the satirical level of the 
work … The narrator thus acts as a moral barometer, clarifying the author’s attitudes 
and directing the reader’s response to characters and events” (281).22  Through 
hyperbole, enthusiasm, and uncritical acceptance, the skaz narrator signals to readers 
that Berlioz’s knowledge is incomplete at best.23   
 The Yershalaim narrator, and those characters with privileged access to events 
described therein (Woland, the Master, and Ivan Bezdomny), conversely are suggested 
to be objective arbiters of historical truth.24  The novel’s three historian characters are 
the only characters with direct experience of the Yershalaim story; they are not passive 
listeners of Woland’s story, but rather Ivan and Berlioz witness the events as if they 
were experiencing them in real time.25  The second chapter concludes with the 
(somewhat) sympathetic figure of Pilate pronouncing Jesus’ execution and then 
returning to his palace, and the third chapter begins with the same words that concluded 
the previous chapter, as if Woland had told the whole story to Berlioz and Ivan.  When 
the story is done, both men “awake” suddenly from the story, feeling as if they had 
fallen asleep; Ivan puzzles, “‘How is it I didn’t notice that he’d managed to spin a 
whole story? … It’s already evening! … Or maybe he wasn’t telling it, but I simply fell 
asleep and dreamed it all?’” (42)  Later, in his dreams, Ivan watches Jesus’ crucifixion 
(171–182).  Bulgakov confirms the veracity of the Yershalaim narrative with Woland’s 
assertion to Berlioz that he “was personally present at it all.  I was on Pontius Pilate’s 
balcony, and in the garden when he talked with Kaifa, and on the platform, only 
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secretly, incognito, so to speak” (43).  Given these facts, we infer that these characters 
were transported to these events alongside Woland, or at the least that Woland gave 
them access to his first-hand account.26   
Bulgakov’s use of irony in this section aligns with the Oxford English 
Dictionary’s third sense of the term—that the outcome of the situation is contradictory 
to the reader’s expectations.  Paradoxically, even though the four chapters in 
Yershalaim are ostensibly less believable than the material existence of life in 
Moscow—given their biblical nature—the omniscient narratorial voice offers none of 
the skaz narrator’s hyperbolic interjections or faulty interpretations, but rather creates 
the atmosphere of objective historical narrative.  The scenes in Yershalaim are 
presented in a straightforward manner, without exaggerated elements or language, 
which suggests to the reader that they should be read unironically.  This presentation of 
historical fact is a neutral approach to history and is more trustworthy than the skaz 
narrator’s biased approach.  In juxtaposing these narratives, Bulgakov indirectly 
encourages readers to ponder their willingness (like the skaz narrator) to agree with 
Berlioz’s orthodox view of history. 
Despite their access to objective truth, the novel’s three historians operate on the 
fringes of official Bolshevik society, suggesting that this historical knowledge is 
incompatible with party doctrine.  This incompatibility is identifiable as ironic—again, 
in the OED’s third sense—in Bulgakov’s violations of readers’ expectations about the 
discipline of history.  Through Berlioz’s insistence on “correct” historical interpretation, 
Bulgakov indicates the discipline’s centrality in the orthodox world of the novel.  
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Regardless of what we, as readers, think about Berlioz’s false erudition, the editor 
places significant importance on historical narrative; this adherence to party ideology is 
echoed several chapters later, when the Master explains that his novel about Pilate was 
denounced for “attempt[ing] to foist into print an apology for Jesus Christ” (144).  The 
fact that three of the novel’s main characters, as historians, deviate from this narrative 
so insistently suggests to readers that this violation of expectations demands attention.   
Woland’s intimate knowledge of the Yershalaim sections immediately 
establishes him as a man outside of the official orbit, a perception that is reinforced in 
several ways.  Berlioz identifies Woland as a historian, given that Woland claims he 
comes to Moscow to examine the “original manuscripts of the tenth-century 
necromancer Gerbert of Aurillac” (18).27  In the following chapters he makes no 
attempt to abide by Soviet norms or policies—for example, while Nikanor Ivanovich 
assumes Woland should live at the Metropol, Koroviev insists that “He doesn’t like 
hotels!  I’ve had them up to here, these foreign tourists!” (98)  Even as a diabolical 
judge Woland is a passive observer, allowing the members of his retinue to engage in 
Moscow’s official circles while he watches, and judges, citizens from the sidelines.  
Azazello, Koroviev (also known as Fagot), Behemoth, and Hella antagonize 
comfortable Muscovites, tempting them to sin; Woland, on the other hand, observes 
society from a distance.  Woland consistently distances himself from contemporary 
Moscow, especially its official structures and apparatuses.  He is a historical expert who 
wants nothing to do with Soviet society or party doctrine.28   
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 The Master, a historian by education, is similarly isolated from official 
governmental and social structures due to his historical knowledge of the Yershalaim 
narrative, as represented by and contained in his novel.29  While many scholars have 
debated whether the Yershalaim chapters represent the body of the Master’s novel, I 
argue they are for several reasons.  One of the clearest illustrations of that fact is 
Margarita’s reading of the burned manuscript in chapter 25—the words she reads from 
the singed notebook (298) are the same as those that begin the next section of the 
Yershalaim narrative (299).  I further propose that the Master’s novel is not an artistic 
creation but, rather, is a retelling of empirical historical truth.  Several characters—
Berlioz, Woland, the Master, Ivan, and Margarita—have direct experience with this 
novel through dreams, visions, and readings.  Despite the fact that each character 
encounters this narrative in different ways, the story recounted remains consistent in 
tone and focus (Amusin 66).  In the sanitorium, Ivan tells the Master of the vision to 
which Woland had granted him access, recounting Jesus’ audience with Pontius Pilate; 
the Master’s response—“Oh how I guessed!  How I guessed it all!” (135)—suggests 
that the Master channeled historical fact rather than crafted a fictional tale.   
The Master’s historical knowledge is regarded by government officials as deeply 
dangerous.  When he shares his work with the government-sponsored literary 
organization, Massolit, his work is rejected outright and he is denounced in the 
newspaper and then imprisoned for three months (143, 149).  His peers’ strong 
reactions against his work, especially given their official governmental positions, 
suggests that the knowledge the Master presents is too dangerous to be passed on to 
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other citizens.  Moreover, these officials believe that the Master must be discredited to 
prevent his ideas from being taken seriously.  He is imprisoned for his writings; when 
he returns to Moscow from his imprisonment, he commits himself to the sanitorium as 
he has nowhere else to go and feels completely isolated from Muscovite society (199).  
His knowledge of the historical events depicted in the Yershalaim section have 
imperiled his life to such a degree that the only place in which he is safe is in a 
madhouse.  Through his depiction of the Master, Bulgakov demonstrates the serious 
consequences of not adhering to party doctrine.  Historical truth is anti-Bolshevik and 
dangerous to the whole society. 
 Ivan, the third historian, is similarly a man on the fringes of official society.  
Ivan is first introduced as a party member in good standing, someone committed to 
strengthening party doctrine; however, he immediately betrays his own ignorance 
because, unlike his mentor Berlioz, Ivan cannot discern the correct historical narrative 
to use in his poem discrediting Christianity.  In his earnestness to write an anti-religious 
poem to publish in Berlioz’s journal, he misses the fact that the party holds that Jesus 
did not exist at all.  Even in his most politically engaged moments, therefore, Ivan 
stands apart from his fellow party members.  Ivan moves further away from Bolshevik 
ideology after his experience with Woland in Patriarch’s Ponds, especially in the 
asylum where he has a vision of Yeshua’s crucifixion and death.  Both he and the 
Master have extended recourse to this historical narrative only in the mental institution.  
As Tomislav Z. Longinović suggests, “Bulgakov actually wants to emphasize the fact 
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that historical truth is often on the side of those who are excluded from the realm of 
‘normality’” (43).   
At the end of the novel Bulgakov demonstrates just how far Ivan strays from 
Bolshevik party doctrine regarding historical narratives and suggests that his historical 
knowledge prevents his meaningful, sustained engagement in Bolshevik society.  Once 
a year the erstwhile poet, now a professor at the Institute of History and Philosophy, has 
a solitary breakdown on the anniversary of Woland’s arrival in Moscow.  He visits the 
bench at Patriarch’s Ponds where he and Berlioz sat and conversed with Woland, and 
gazes in the windows at Margarita’s former residence (393); after making this nocturnal 
journey he “returns home completely ill” and recovers after his wife gives him a 
sedative (394–95).  Even though he has given up one party activity for another, poetry 
for history, Ivan cannot fully “enter the fold” of political orthodoxy but remains distinct 
from official society in this significant way.30 
The party officials, including Berlioz, Lunacharsky, Ariman, and Latunsky, 
paradoxically dismiss the historical fact of the Yershalaim section, instead adhering to 
the fictional narrative established by party doctrine.  For example, Ariman and Latunsky 
denounce the Master’s novel in the press, claiming that it is “an apology for Jesus 
Christ” and that the Master is an “icon-dauber” (144).  While Berlioz does have limited 
experience with this narrative—he, like Ivan Bezdomny, sees the vision of Pilate’s 
conversation with Yeshua in chapter two—he is killed by a tram-car shortly afterwards.  
I propose that Berlioz’s swift death, after being shown the truth, suggests a fundamental 
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incompatibility of official ideology and historical truth.  Historical narrative is thus 
depicted as antithetical to party approaches to history.   
In this novel, party officials’ professed respect for history is repeatedly 
overturned by their punishment of those who articulate a veracious narrative, an ironic 
contradiction that challenges the Soviet historical narrative of the 1920s.  The 
disjuncture Bulgakov depicts between historical truth and ideological narrative critiques 
the Bolsheviks’ hypocritical stance toward historical discourse.  Although Stalin and 
other officials proclaimed history to be an essential discipline, only certain lines of 
inquiry were acceptable; expressions of politically inconvenient facts were punished 
swiftly and severely. The prominence of historians in Bulgakov’s work alludes to the 
critical role played by historians in Stalin’s Russia, especially in the 1920s, who were 
deeply engrained in the fabric of the Soviet state and whose works reinforced Bolshevik 
ideology.   
 
The Uses and Abuses of History for Stalin 
History was a highly ideological discipline in Soviet Russia and historians 
routinely reframed narratives of Russian history to align with party politics.  Elaine 
McClarnand MacKinnon contends that during the 1920s and 1930s Russian historians 
saw their field as “a battlefield for revolutionary ideals, the harnessing of Soviet history 
to the political needs of the Stalinist state, the monumental projects mobilizing vast 
numbers of people, the collective writing of history, the merging of scientific methods 
with propaganda, and the creation of a Bolshevized academic culture of specific rituals, 
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language, and practices” (6–7).31  In order to accomplish these goals, Bolshevik 
historians interpreted historical facts in ways that supported party operations, especially 
by writing works that (retroactively) depicted the inevitability of the 1917 Revolution.  
As John Barber notes in Soviet Historians in Crisis, one of the main goals of the field 
was to demonstrate the backwardness of pre-revolutionary Russia and to confirm the 
necessity of the Bolshevik party’s ascent to power (64).  The Bolsheviks, according to 
Katerina Clark in The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual, “began to produce self-
justificatory writings that not only involved immediate polemics with rival factions but 
gave an entire coherent account of Bolshevik history.  They established their legitimacy 
both by merit … and by lines of continuity stretching into the past” (122).   
In demonstrating the legitimacy and inevitability of the party’s rise to power, 
history (more than other disciplines) fused academic study and political ideology, 
functioning both retrospectively and prospectively.  Russian historian M. N. Pokrovskii 
called it “the most political of all the sciences,” and another historian, Isaak Izrailevich 
Mintz, reportedly saw no contradiction between propaganda and scholarship (Barber 
xii; MacKinnon 15).  This connection between history and politics proscribed the 
party’s future: through an historical lens, officials could predict the party’s future path 
as well, thereby asserting some control over future events (Barber 24).  For example, 
MacKinnon writes that Mintz’s scholarship, following Stalin’s Five-Year Plan, 
“dutifully argued that foreign intervention was essentially the main cause of the 
protracted and harsh nature of the Russian Civil War” (15).  Mintz thus gave support to 
Bolshevik worries about Western military intervention in Russia that threatened to 
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subvert “industrialization and collectivization” (15).  Historians believed their 
underlying tasks—“to carry out the revolutionary struggle against bourgeois values, to 
use history to shape consciousness, and to provide heroic examples that showcased the 
triumphant march of Soviet socialism” (MacKinnon 14)—to have critical consequences 
for the present and for future socio-political developments.  The fusion of historical 
narrative and propaganda thus distinguishes the Soviet conception of world-historical 
development from Herderian notions of world-historical development. 
Of course, the conflation of history and propaganda is neither new nor surprising 
in twentieth-century geopolitics, but it was particularly egregious in Soviet Russia given 
that history underwent a dramatic shift from an academic discipline to a political 
practice.32  A clear illustration of this transformation is evident in Josef Stalin’s 
increasing involvement in academic studies.  In 1931, Stalin wrote an infamous letter to 
the academic historical journal Proletarskaya Revolutsiya, protesting the editors’ 
publication of an “anti-party and semi-Trotskyist article” by the historian A. G. Slutsky 
(qtd. in Barber 128).  He argued that Slutsky’s article was irresponsible, even 
treasonous, because of its reliance on archival materials.  In the future, Stalin insisted, 
“political directives, not documentary sources, were to be the primary guides for 
historical scholarship, and that certain areas of historical investigation were not to be 
pursued against the defined interests of the Communist Party” (MacKinnon 16).  
Stalin’s letter deeply impacted the profession, motivating editors of several historical 
journals to evaluate the articles published in past issues and retract any works that could 
be interpreted as anti-party, ensuring that all their content was consistent with Stalin’s 
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political thought.33  Contemporary scholars of Soviet Russia like George Enteen, 
Barber, and Weeks cite this letter as an extraordinary departure from disciplinary 
conventions.  Historians were no longer free to determine the subject matter or findings 
of their work unless it supported party narratives.  In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the 
field of historical studies in Russia was thus ideologically entrenched and used to 
legitimize government initiatives.   
Indeed, Stalin depicted himself as the foremost historian of the era, further 
reinforcing the notion of historians as entrenched ideologues (again, in contradiction to 
Bulgakov’s sidelined critics).  In 1938 Stalin assumed the chief editorial role for The 
History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course, more 
popularly known as the Short Course.  This work was intended to serve as an ultimate 
reference on the Soviet state accessible to all readers, regardless of their educational 
level.  As David Brandenberger and Mikhail V. Zelenov write in “Stalin’s Answer to 
the National Question,” Stalin saw the Short Course as “an accessible, nonscholarly 
approach that would reorganize the annals of the party’s experience along rousing, 
instrumental lines” (860).  Though untrained in copyediting and historical analysis, 
Stalin heavily edited the document to demonstrate the inevitability, and thus legitimacy, 
of the Bolshevik state’s rise to power (Brandenberger and Zelenov 869).  Furthermore, 
Stalin suggested that adhering to this historical narrative could benefit the future of the 
Soviet state.  In this way, as James von Geldern succinctly notes, “history was 
statescraft for Stalin” (325).   
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Of course, the pressure to ideologize historical narrative was not solely imposed 
by the Soviet state, nor was the narrative monolithic.  Many historians connected their 
work to Bolshevist ideology much earlier than its formal instatement by the 
government, according to Barber.  “The need for a party line in history appears to have 
been more strongly felt by historians than by those actually at the head of the party.  
Only late in 1931 did the latter come to the conclusion that it was necessary to apply a 
strict political criterion to the activities of historians” (Barber 120).  Historians thus 
embraced the centrality of their role in the Soviet state, a political motivation distinctly 
different from Bulgakov’s isolated historians.  Additionally, historians did disagree with 
one another, and with the discipline’s relationship to the party, during Stalin’s reign.  
Before Stalin’s 1931 letter, variations were due to standard academic disagreements.34  
After this letter the professional differences did not disappear but the profession did 
become “more uniform and at the same time more docile” (Enteen 168).  Variations in 
historical narrative could also be attributed to Stalin’s mercurial personality.35 As 
Brandenberger and Zelenov note, Stalin repeatedly changed his mind regarding the 
interpretation and significance of specific historical events; historians would scramble 
to produce work, and rewrite previous articles, that conformed to Stalin’s present 
interpretation (875).  In short, while history was an overtly political discipline in Soviet 
Russia, it was not always a monolithic one.36   
Deeper investigation into Bulgakov’s own attitudes shows that his views aligned 
with those of his three historians, rather than those of government officials.  His 
admiration for historical fact, and disdain for its misuse, is most evident in the 
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Yershalaim chapters, where Bulgakov relied on several historical accounts of Jesus’ 
crucifixion—Renan, Drews, Barbusse, and his father’s theological writings.37  
Bulgakov’s historical sources argue that the biblical Jesus did exist.  Through these 
chapters, Bulgakov distinguishes between fact and interpretation, and casts doubt on 
Berlioz’s, and Bolshevik historians’, use of historical narratives.38   
In blending fact and fiction, depicting historians as hermetic figures contrary to 
engaged Russian historians, and showing officials’ reactions against true historical 
narratives, the novel calls into question the veracity of state-approved accounts.  
Bulgakov brings out into the open the ways in which the historical narrative of the 
crucifixion is twisted, negated, and weaponized by party officials like Berlioz, 
suggesting similar misuses of historical interpretation in other official capacities.  But 
this rejection of state-sponsored historical narrative does not suggest Bulgakov’s 
rejection of objective historical truth, contrary to claims by Barratt, Justin Weir, and 
others.39  The fact that the Yershalaim narrative plays such a prominent role in the 
novel, and that it is suggested as the novel’s absolute truth, indicates the possibility of 
objective fact in this world.  Bulgakov undermines specific attitudes toward history, 
rather than all historical narratives, through ironic critique that illuminates this socially 
specific issue.40 
 
Conclusion 
 Like Goethe before him, Bulgakov uses ironic critique to expose a major 
hypocrisy hindering citizens’ understanding of the society in which they live.  While 
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these writers address different cultural contexts, they both employ accessible irony to 
raise major questions about the logics (religious and historical) that governed their lived 
experiences.    
It is important to note that Bulgakov’s ironic critique was widely read as such by 
his contemporaries.  These readers recognized his ironic critique in the novel, finally 
censored and published more than 20 years after Bulgakov’s death.  Bulgakov’s series 
of eight drafts demonstrate a shrouding of explicit critique, muting his invectives, both 
explicit and indirect, to prevent his rebukes from being understood too immediately 
while still preserving many ironic moments.41  As the novel took shape it became less 
pointed, as Henry Elbaum writes in “The Master and Margarita: Text, Context, 
Intertext,” given “the author’s growing dependence on Aesopian language and self-
censorship” (60).42  Perhaps due to his increased dependence on Stalin’s patronage—
who arranged for his installation as a consultant at the Moscow Art Theatre in 1928—
Bulgakov couches his critique in ironic indirection.  Formal censorship also blunted the 
novel’s critiques until it was published in its full form by Possev Verlag in 1969, which 
restored nearly 60 pages cut for the initial publication in Moskova (Rzhevsky 1).43  As 
L. Rzhevsky writes in “Pilate’s Sin: Cryptography in Bulgakov’s Novel, The Master 
and Margarita,” censored passages in the Moskova version (and the first English 
translation based on it, by Mirra Ginsburg) included those about the culture of literary 
production in Moscow and direct references to police surveillance (4–6, 3).  Bulgakov’s 
developing self-censorship, and perhaps more importantly the novel’s official 
censorship, indicate that his critiques were intentional and that his contemporaries 
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recognized the author’s ironic critiques as such.  This novel’s fraught development and 
publication history indicate the accessibility of Bulgakov’s ironic critique. 
Kierkegaard’s injunction against ironic edification—that irony is “not the truth 
but the way”—applies to Bulgakov’s novel as much as it does to Goethe’s epic verse-
drama.  The Master and Margarita does not identify a solution to the contradiction it 
illuminates, and the inconclusive final chapter and epilogue demonstrate the impotence 
of the ironic world-view of Woland and his retinue.44  For example, the work ends 
without meaningful changes in the characters: Curtis suggests that Woland and his 
retinue do not change Moscow (165).  “The comic way in which Koreviev and 
Behemoth assure Woland that [Griboedov House, the administrative building in which 
MASSOLIT has its offices] will be rebuilt [after being destroyed in a fire] in fact leaves 
us in some doubt as to whether the literary establishment really will make use of this 
opportunity to reconstruct their institution in a new and better form” (167).  Clearly, 
Bulgakov does not offer his contemporary reader any solutions about how to fix the 
problems he identifies in Soviet Russia, nor does he pass definitive judgment on any 
stakeholder of the represented organizations.  Rather, as in Kierkegaard, these problems 
“appear to the reader as a gift and a task” to tackle on their own (Hannay 147).  In this 
sense, according to Ewa Thompson, Bulgakov was a moralist, not a sermonist (qtd. in 
Wright, Mikhail Bulgakov: Life and Interpretation 273).   
 Bulgakov’s adaptation of Goethe’s Faust illustrates how irony can be 
understood in translation and circulation as world literature.  Bulgakov employed irony 
in a manner similar to Goethe, using the form of controlled ironic critique but 
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populating it with local context.  The author uses several “clues” to help his readers 
recognize this ironic critique, including the hyperbolic, over-enthusiastic skaz narrator 
and the violation of the ideological norms regarding the discipline of history, that 
facilitate the translation and circulation of irony.  In transculturating the original work, 
Bulgakov demonstrates Faust’s relevance in another culture and highlights the 
intelligibility of irony in circulation.  In these two works, both Goethe and Bulgakov 
foreground the major social issues of their contexts in ways not available through direct 
critique.  In doing so, authors present readers with detailed information about social 
issues in nineteenth-century Germany and twentieth-century Soviet Russia. Ironic 
critiques not only can circulate and be understood as such in works of world literature, 
but they can also facilitate the Herderian goals of world literature to learning about and 
develop respect for other peoples, nations, and literary traditions.   
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Chapter Five 
The “Dubious El Dorado”: 
Illusions of Progress in The Infinite Rehearsal 
 
 If, as Oswald Spengler asserts in The Decline of Western Civilization, Western 
culture shares with the Faust narrative an ethos of striving, it makes sense that writers in 
formerly colonized nations would take up this story in their own works, given the long 
history of Western colonization in the so-called “third world.”  Some prominent 
postcolonial writers foreground this theme in their works—including adaptations by 
Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o in Devil on the Cross, Salman Rushdie in The Satanic Verses, and 
Machado de Assis in Quincas Borba (translated as Philosopher or Dog?), among 
others—to contend with the lingering influence of imperial culture in postcolonial 
nations, to appropriate that narrative, or both to challenge and to transculturate it.  In 
other words, while the previous chapters focused on Western texts, I propose that the 
Faust legend is not restricted to this Western context, but rather that it circulated (in 
part) due to Western countries’ imperialism.  Of course, in making this assertion I 
soften the distinction between postcolonial literature and world literature, two very 
different corpuses.  As Pheng Cheah’s What Is a World? explains, scholars vociferously 
debate whether postcolonial literature should be subsumed under the umbrella term of 
“world literature,” an incorporation that (as Emily Apter alleges) effaces differences 
integral to postcolonial literature.  However, given the definition of world literature with 
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which I am working in this dissertation—that these works circulate and can be 
intelligible beyond their initial contexts of production—I posit (as I did in response to 
Apter in Chapter One) that many works of postcolonial fiction do “fit” within this 
framework.  Regardless of the cause of its circulation, the prevalence of adaptations of 
the Faust myth in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia confirms that the work has 
resonated in colonial, and postcolonial, societies.   
Wilson Harris explicitly adapts Goethe’s Faust in the second novel of his 
Carnival Trilogy, The Infinite Rehearsal (1987) and illustrates how authors alter the 
narrative to address societally and temporally specific circumstances.  Harris—like 
Herder, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Goethe before him—positions literature as a unique 
medium through which to facilitate cross-cultural understanding.  Most importantly for 
the purposes of this chapter, Harris manipulates Goethe’s framework of controlled irony 
to critique postcolonial Guyanese society, in particular Harris’s perception of his 
country’s false belief in its progress in the twentieth century.  In this way Harris’s 
adaptation of Goethe’s work further supports my contention that irony can be 
understood outside of its original historical, cultural, and linguistic milieu.  I begin this 
chapter with an analysis of Harris’s novel The Infinite Rehearsal, focusing on how he 
transculturates Goethe’s controlled irony to target the El Dorado myth in twentieth-
century Guyana and reveals the country’s stalled progress.  After offering this 
interpretation of Harris’s work, I then analyze his description of literary critique as a 
mode of working through socio-historical disjunctures.  In other words, Harris affirms 
Kierkegaard’s assertion that literary irony can illuminate social concerns.  Through the 
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“rehearsal,” or repetition-with-difference, of historical events, Harris suggests that 
literature can help readers and authors alike revisit the errors of the past, imagine 
alternatives, and lay the groundwork for a different, better future.  His adaptation of 
Faust ironically exposes Guyana’s continued reliance on the trope of El Dorado in an 
era of technological progress and, in so doing, demonstrates to his readers that 
postcolonial Guyana is still reliant on colonialist tropes for envisioning an independent 
future.  
 
World Literature and the Cross-Cultural Imagination 
 
 Harris’s work dovetails with Herder’s description of the purpose of world 
literature: in his nonfiction writing, Harris explains that his work is both specific to the 
context in which he is writing and that it incorporates universal elements. One of 
Harris’s foundational philosophical concepts is the universal unconscious, a force 
shared by all cultures yet expressed in contextually specific ways.1  The universal 
unconscious signals the underlying commonality of all cultures in a way that resists the 
incommensurability glorified by Apter, Bhabha, and other deconstructive postcolonial 
theorists.2  Harris describes it as “a creative and re-creative complex that springs from 
the depths of the Human psyche” (“The Psyche of Space and Intuition of Otherness” 6).  
This universal force, as he explains in “The Absent Presence,” involves unpredictable 
resources, is only recognized retrospectively, and can be obscured by basic sense 
perception (88).  As Hena Maes-Jelinek suggests in “‘Latent Cross-Culturalities,’” it is 
a force that is “psychological, metaphysical, and/or religious and even extra-human” 
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(41).3  In other words, the universal unconscious is inherent in all objects and 
individuals and is present in all places and times. Cross-cultural perspectives are 
embedded in literary works despite the author’s volition; the texts include meanings 
other than those intended by the author and it is the job of authors and readers alike to 
identify and draw out such themes.  The author’s role, for Harris, is more like that of a 
detective, one who pursues the text’s “intuitive element” and “perceiv[es] the narrative 
as it revises itself” (“Interview with Wilson Harris” in The Radical Imagination 34).4  
Humans have no control over this intuitive element but Harris proposes that we must 
recognize its presence to more fully comprehend the world.   
 Authors writing under different conditions articulate this universal force in 
different ways; readers of world literature can recognize these articulations as 
expressions of the same spirit with contextually specific alterations.   Recognizing 
parallel expressions of this spirit strengthens readers’ understanding of the universal 
unconscious and appreciation of shared humanity.  For example, Harris identifies 
symbols found in many different cultures that illustrate universal values: as he explains 
in “Merlin and Parsifal: Adversarial Twins,” these symbols include the lamb of God, 
the dove of peace, and Quetzalcoatl, the feathered serpent (Bundy 58, 66; Fazzini 59).  
The commonalities found in the universal unconscious extend to whole literary works 
as well, a point Harris supports by connecting Edgar Allan Poe’s novel Arthur Gordon 
Pym of Nantucket and pre-Columbian masquerade (Bundy 99).5  Harris explicitly 
avoids establishing causal or hierarchical relationships between these works, but rather 
indicates that these inexplicable parallels foster a sense of global interconnection.6  
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Maes-Jelink explains that the reader identifies these connections and perceives 
“linkages between apparently alien images apprehended as rhythms animating different 
ways of being, different spaces and worlds as well as overlapping partial visions,” and 
in this way the universal unconscious is “utterly free from the imperialism of any 
specific culture” (“‘Latent Cross-Culturalities’” 47, 40).7  In identifying these 
connections, according to Nicola Hunte, we “re-position an event beyond its isolated 
frame into a network of significant associations or observations that define the event” 
(Hunte 45).  Examining similar themes in cross-cultural expression can help readers 
develop connecting tissue between seemingly disparate places and times. 
As readers investigate these similarities, they gain a better understanding of the 
forces shaping their expression.  As is the case with analyzing adaptations, paying 
attention to the variations within these similarities throws into relief a given society’s 
defining concerns.  Hunte describes this orientation as “native individuality,” the 
“capacity of cultural texts to develop individual imagistic markers that can be 
revisioned in other/diverse cultural spaces in a manner that suggests a heterogenic basis 
to an understanding of universality” (44).  These iterations of the universal unconscious 
are very different from multiculturalism, which Harris refers to as an assemblage of 
different “ghettoes” that precludes meaningful cross-pollination (Harris in Kutzinski 
21).8  Ultimately, Harris asserts that through analyzing these universally resonating 
themes in their various manifestations, the reader “can be related to things that occurred 
perhaps in an ancient culture, which may assist us to understand ourselves better” 
(Fazzini 59).  While scholars suggest that Harris’s insistence on the interdependence of 
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all cultures is “constitutive of the Caribbean experience and the Caribbean personality,” 
it also shares much with Herder’s vision of world literature as a unifying force (Shaw 
123).9   
 
The Infinite Rehearsal as Postcolonial Adaptation 
 Through his process of adapting works, Harris reinforces these cross-cultural 
connections. The works he adapts—Homer’s Odyssey, Dante’s Commedia, and 
Goethe’s Faust—are typically associated with Western culture, but Harris rejects this 
association because, he insists, each author articulates universal themes.10  He writes in 
“Comedy and Modern Allegory” that:  
Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe are as much the heritage of black 
men and women as of white men and women because the triggers of 
conflicting tradition—whether Dante’s Virgil, Shakespeare’s Caliban or 
Goethe’s Faust—lie in, and need to be re-activated through, the cross-
cultural psyche of humanity, a cross-cultural psyche that bristles with the 
tone and fabric of encounters between so-called savage cultures and so-
called civilised cultures. (137)   
Harris further states in an interview with Alan Riach and Mark Williams that in the 
context of postcolonial literature, adaptation foregrounds the lasting impact of 
colonialism in formerly colonized nations; “activating Third World archetypes” 
simultaneously activates the overlying European skeletons (“Interview with Wilson 
Harris” in The Radical Imagination 40).  Adapting classic works of Western literature 
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not only shows the affinities between formerly antagonistic nations, but also advocates 
for the idea that the West Indies are equal claimants to these canonical works of 
Western literature, by Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe, and others.   
 The Infinite Rehearsal, Harris freely acknowledges, is an adaptation of Goethe’s 
Faust, especially visible in the novel’s focus on Faust’s quest for immortality and his 
obsession with technology.11  As Harris’s text is relatively unknown, a summary of the 
novel in broad strokes will help ground my later claims.  The Infinite Rehearsal follows 
Robin Redbreast Glass in his journey through Old New Forest, widely read as an 
allegory of contemporary Guyana.  The novel does not have a straightforward, 
chronologically unfolding plot but rather bounces among four timelines: 1945, when 
Glass’s mother Alice, still pregnant with him, types the Faust novel her father has 
written (and that Glass later recalls word for word); 1961, when Glass, his mother, his 
aunt Miriam, and others perish in a boating accident; 1985, the “present day” in which 
the narrative begins; and 2025, the year the spectral Glass undertakes his journey up the 
Mountain of Folly.   
Glass begins the narrative on the beach in 1985, where a ghostly immigration 
officer decapitates the ghostly Glass; his journey through Old New Forest and quest in 
the city of Skull begins at the moment of his second death.  Glass muses that “my head 
toppled into the globe. I saw the civilization of Skull and the Mountain of Folly that I 
needed to climb and transcend if I were to arise from the sea” (11).  As Glass prepares 
to embark on this journey to the city of Skull, he recounts his fetal memories of his 
grandfather’s Faust, which he purportedly read as his mother typed it and which he 
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claims to be living out in the present day.  He “succumbs” to Faust’s promise of eternal 
youth in an anticlimactic moment of capitulation—he is “caught in the nexus of like yet 
unlike forces, caught and bedevilled by an age that gestated at the edge of a chasm, the 
chasm of marvels, the chasm of insensible creed in the circus of the machine”—unlike 
the definitive pacts Faust and Margarita make with their diabolical counterparts in 
Goethe’s original text and Bulgakov’s adaptation (43, 23).   
The narrative then shifts to the spectral Glass’s arrival in Skull in the year 2025, 
when Emma—his cousin, childhood playmate, and the future Archbishop of 
Canterbury—informs him that he and his cousin Peter must ascend the Mountain of 
Folly to save the doomed people of Skull from the perils threatening the city, including 
the increasing role of “simulated immortality” and the “coming space programmes” 
(63).  The cousins ascend the Mountain of Folly to Faust’s surgery office, which proves 
to be the diabolical doctor’s trap to seduce them with the promises of technology, but 
they escape by following the “true seam in the wave of the rock” into the heart of the 
mountain.  In the heart of the mountain they meet Billionaire Death and learn the pitiful 
equivalences Death earns from each human life.  Eventually Glass descends from the 
mountain with the knowledge that “[t]rue survival costs dear … True survival should 
measure the price we have begun to pay the Beast in the garden of life as we gambol 
with it, dance with it, and exploit it to our apparent heart’s content” (79).  The narrative 
ends with Glass heading back into the sea in acceptance of his watery death in 1961.  
Interspersed in this plot development are reflections on the similar deprivations of 
capitalism and communism, the horrors of the atom bomb, and Glass’s childhood.   
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Harris adapts the Faust story to address the realities of life in late twentieth-
century Guyana in several ways, beginning with the character archetypes themselves. 
Harris describes Glass as an “immortal Faustian youth” (Bundy 253).  Like Goethe’s 
titular character, Glass embarks on a quest for deeper knowledge and is tempted by the 
novel’s diabolical figure.  Both figures are relatively passive in the narrative’s plot 
development: just as Faust only seduces Gretchen because of Mephistopheles’ 
machinations, so too does Glass seek out Faust on the Mountain of Folly only at 
Emma’s prompting.  Additionally, both are avaricious, despite Glass’s attempts to 
disavow the vice; Paget Henry proposes that Glass is “partially caught in a nexus that 
was produced by his Faustian identifications with accumulating wealth” 
(“Intrasubjectivity in the philosophy of Wilson Harris” 218).  For example, Glass 
introduces himself as a “pork-knocker,” the colloquial term for a native Guyanese 
person who ventures alone into the jungle to prospect for gold, and is willing to 
negotiate with Faust the alchemist. Of course, Glass is a protagonist very different from 
Goethe’s Faust, especially given Glass’s posthumous wanderings and constant 
grappling with lingering colonial influences in Old New Forest; these alterations 
emphasize the novel’s uniquely West Indian qualities, leading Henry to describe Glass 
as “not the Faust of Marlowe or Goethe, but a re-visioning of this mythic figure through 
Harris’s Caribbean eyes” (“Intrasubjectivity in the philosophy of Wilson Harris” 210).  
In The Infinite Rehearsal Glass is the ambiguous Guyanese version of Faust, defined by 
his quest for immortality and riches, as well as his constant striving for a sense of 
identity. 
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Faust (also referred to as Doctor Faustus in a nod to Marlowe’s and Thomas 
Mann’s iterations of the Faust myth) plays the role of the diabolical tempter.  Noted 
Harris interpreter Hena Maes-Jelinek explains that Harris’s Faust acts as Glass’s guide 
in the novel, most notably in Faust’s encouragement to Glass and Peter to climb the 
mountain (“‘Ulyssean Carnival’” 48).  This Faust, like Goethe’s Mephistopheles, 
tempts Glass with whatever resources are available—Harris’s Faust disguises himself in 
the trappings of democracy, the Church, the humanities, and the university to persuade 
Glass to capitulate to Faust’s temptation (Bundy 255).  Faust’s mastery over alchemy, 
technological progress, and immortality signal that he is Harris’s version of a 
Mephistophelean figure.12  He is not plagued with the earthly uncertainties as is 
Goethe’s Faust but rather purports to have all the answers to human questions.  He is 
decidedly a twentieth-century tempter: he leads a band in the sacred wood, which 
evokes the 1948 sugar strike in Guyana (62; “‘Immanent Substance’” 66); his 
profession as a doctor “relates to Faust’s alchemy” in the modern era (63); and he 
enjoins Glass to put his “faith in material progress” which he equates with technological 
development (22).   Harris thus demonstrates the different guises a Mephistophelean 
tempter can take in the contemporary era. 
Given the complexity of Harris’s prose and his references to other Faust 
legends, scholars have debated whether The Infinite Rehearsal is more an adaptation of 
Christopher Marlowe’s work than Goethe’s.  While Gianluca Delfino and Michael 
Mitchell propose that Harris’s characters are Marlovian, I contend that Glass and Faust 
are Goethean characters because, unlike in Marlowe’s drama, both pairs are morally 
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complex.13  In contrast to Marlowe’s dualistic morality, both Goethe and Harris depict 
their characters in an ambiguous light, often blurring the boundaries between good and 
evil.  In typical Harrisian fashion, the author extends and exaggerates these themes.  As 
Maes-Jelinek notes in “The Wisdom of Uncertainty: ‘Re-Visionary Strategies’ in 
Wilson Harris’s ‘The Infinite Rehearsal,’” Harris intensifies Goethe’s ambivalence to 
the point that Glass cannot agree to a formal pact with Faust because there is no clear 
differentiation between good and evil in The Infinite Rehearsal (159).14  Moreover, like 
Goethe, Harris highlights the historical context in which he is writing—in this novel, 
the post-World War II, postcolonial era.15  He does so through passing references to 
Hiroshima and Chernobyl, but also by extending the 1948 sugar strike in the world of 
the novel to the modern day, as well as deploring the prominence of cheap technology 
and pointing out the false distinction between communism and capitalism in the late 
twentieth century.16  According to C. L. R. James, these historical references are 
uniquely Guyanese, given the nation’s visible relics of the past, in contrast with the 
effacement of history in Jamaica and Barbados; this strategy supports the notion that 
Harris adapts Goethe’s historically focused structure to his own socio-cultural context 
(172).  While Harris interleaves several literary references within the novel’s larger 
structure, I propose that he primarily engages with Goethe’s epic verse-drama, given 
both texts’ character archetypes, their complex morality, and their foregrounding of 
historical context.17   
 Most importantly, Harris deploys Kierkegaardian ironic critique, a fact that has 
largely gone unnoticed by his commentators.  While Harris discusses “irony” in his 
157 
 
 
critical writings, he often does so in a way that connects it to literary and philosophical 
paradox.  In other words, Harris’s own work reinforces the misperception of irony as 
paradox central to so many twentieth- and twenty-first-century literary critics, which 
hinders appreciation of his ironic critique as social engagement.  In “Quetzalcoatl and 
the Smoking Mirror (Reflections on Originality and Tradition)” Harris articulates this 
view of irony when he writes: “to conquer Death involves us in a cruel irony, it involves 
us in crusades, in inquisitions that burn men’s bodies, kill heretics and infidels, in order 
to save their souls” (19).18  Irony here is not saying the opposite of what the author 
means, but rather refers to uniting opposites in a paradoxical situation, as humans do 
when they commit acts of violence in the name of salvation.   
Harris’s critics unsurprisingly echo this conflation of irony and paradox.  Maes-
Jelinek writes of The Infinite Rehearsal that the “central irony here is the distinction 
between illusions or simulations of immortality, and, as we shall see, true survival in 
‘Infinity’s chain’” (“The Wisdom of Uncertainty” 162), and contends that creativity 
necessarily involves the “ironic” juxtaposition of opposites (The Labyrinth of 
Universality 297).19  While many critics debate whether Harris’s paradoxical unions 
produce new objects or prompts an endless vacillation between two poles, they persist 
in identifying Harris’s opposing forces as ironic.20 Although some critics have 
explained Harris’s stance as one of postmodernism or existentialism, he rejects both 
labels.21 He rejects the idea that art is a game, a perspective he largely associates with 
postmodernism, and expresses a hopeful view for the future, almost in religious terms, 
that distinguishes his work from existentialism.22  I do not deny that Harris’s work is 
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replete with paradoxes—indeed, I would even agree that paradox is one of the 
predominant strategies of his fictional and nonfictional works.   
However, I contend that in addition to these paradoxes Harris incorporates 
moments of controlled ironic critique in his work, especially in The Infinite Rehearsal.  
This slim novel is arguably the most historically situated, and most overtly political 
engaged, in Harris’s oeuvre.  Harris incorporates controlled irony to critique the El 
Dorado narrative still prevalent in postcolonial nations and literary traditions. 
 
Mining the Numinous Seam: Persistent El Dorados 
 
Although Krishna Ray Lewis describes the tone of The Infinite Rehearsal as a 
“desperate harangue” in certain places, I argue that Harris also includes moments of wry 
ironic critique, signaled by a scene paralleling the myth of El Dorado (Lewis 84).  
Through this scene Harris demonstrates to his readers the threat such myths pose to a 
postcolonial society, suggesting that it is dangerous to be seduced by the fantastic story 
of a journey into the country’s interior that yields great treasures and profound insight.  
While he does not explicitly offer this critique in the text, the scene where Peter and 
Glass follow the seam in the Mountain of Folly exposes the persistence of false El 
Dorado myths, in the postcolonial context.  These myths reinforce imperialist narratives 
that riches and profound truths are accessible only to those who venture deep into the 
heart of the “unexplored” country; moreover, their persistence in postcolonial Guyana’s 
then-rapidly growing gold mining sector, Harris suggests, constricts possibilities for the 
country’s meaningful growth.   
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Harris evokes the myth of El Dorado at the climax of the Faust storyline, at once 
showing it as an alternative to diabolical temptation and simultaneously revealing its 
hollowness.  The journey into the center of the mountain begins with the cousins’ 
escape from false salvation.  Faust tempts Peter (disguised as Glass) to ascend the 
ladder to his surgery, enticing him with the promise of technological advancement.  
Faust calls to Peter: “‘Come, come, Robin,’ [Faust] said to Peter, ‘I’m on your side, 
believe me.  We’re making the world safe for mankind.  I’m up here to receive you.  
You’ve hesitated long enough.  Seize the glory rope and climb into heaven’” (65).  
Glass, hiding behind Peter, is skeptical of Faust’s “irreverence [and] self-mocking 
humor, for which the comedian of the machine was universally famous” (65).   His 
unease in the situation prompts Glass to remember that “we [Peter, Emma, and Glass] 
had been empowered in our nursery rhymes to weigh the doors and windows of heaven, 
to knock on them and seek assurances of the nature and the meaning of value” (66).   
Glass realizes that the window from which Faust is leaning is a false heaven, 
one that is “an enchainment of the mind if not an extension of the soul.  A political 
parable of mind and soul born of childhood remembered visions in an age of dangerous 
superpowers professing good intention out of cunning self-interest, the good life out of 
expedient design” (66–67).  Glass wants to resist Faust’s temptation and instead 
consciously assess the “nature and meaning of value” Faust offers in his window.  To 
prevent his cousin from capitulating to this false salvation, Glass warns Peter to “swing 
away from the rope or the cross [exploding rocket] to the true seam in the wave of the 
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rock” (66).  In this way, Glass helps Peter to escape Faust’s false heaven at the precise 
moment that Peter climbs the ladder to join Faust in his surgery.  
Harris uses the imagery of the seam in the rock to ironically critique the myth of 
El Dorado.  The notion of the “journey into the center” is an imperialist trope clearly 
articulated in, for example, Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness; this trope hinges on the 
notion that an “untouched” country (unexplored by Westerners, in other words) can 
hold immense wealth and convey profound truths to brave explorers willing to 
undertake the dangerous search.  An example of this imperialist narrative more relevant 
to Harris’s context is Sir Walter Raleigh’s account of his voyage to El Dorado in his 
(in)famous 1596 work The Discoverie of the Large, Rich and Bewtifvl Empire of 
Gviana.  In describing the Spanish explorer Juan Martinez’s discovery of the city of 
Manoa, which Martinez then rechristens El Dorado, Raleigh explains that on a journey 
to Guyana, Martinez was rescued by a group of local people who, according to Raleigh, 
“having not at any time seen any Christian nor any man of that colour, … carried 
Martinez … to the great city of Manoa, the seat and residence of Inga the emperor.” Of 
course, it is nothing new to observe that venturing into the country’s geographical 
center—the “great white spots on the map,” in Conrad’s language—offers Europeans 
the chance to “discover” unknown riches.  
Peter and Glass “discover” the path to their salvation in a fortuitous way: as they 
are being tempted by Faust, Glass suddenly thinks of the “true seam or true line that 
Peter and [he] needed to understand in [their] ascent and [their] overcoming of the 
Mountain of Folly” (66).  Their discovery of the path away from temptation, and to the 
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center of the country, parallels but is not commensurate with that of many El Dorado 
stories, especially given that Glass’s and Peter’s desperation contrasts with the bravery 
of historical questers.  Moreover, Harris describes Glass’s discovery of the path to 
illumination as one born out of the necessity to avoid Faust’s false promises, which 
contrasts with the El Dorado explorers’ single-minded search for gold.   
While their journey is a dangerous one, Glass follows the country’s natural 
resources, in the Mountain of Folly, both to escape Faust’s false heaven and to find a 
more profound, valuable truth. In an ironic inversion of the motif of the journey to the 
center, in The Infinite Rehearsal Peter’s and Glass’s journey into the heart of the 
Mountain of Folly leads the explorers to a reverse, deflated El Dorado.  Harris uses this 
trope ironically to expose our expectations of the outcome of the “journey into the 
interior.”  Connecting Glass’s and Peter’s journey through the mountain to Raleigh’s 
story of the discovery of El Dorado, Harris indirectly illuminates our absurd 
expectations about what secrets are hidden in the country’s untouched geographical 
features.  The destination of Glass’s and Peter’s journey is very different from that of 
Martinez—they do not find the riches Raleigh describes in El Dorado.  Harris violates 
readers’ expectations about what these characters should see in the seam in the rock, an 
ironic inversion in the OED’s third sense.  Rather, the seam leads the characters to “a 
glimmering window in the Mountain of Folly, like a flag one sticks on the moon 
beneath a black sky, and a white imaginary sea [that] spelt our approach to a ward in 
space from which Billionaire Death inspected the cosmos” (67).  This imagery—that of 
the flag on the moon, the black sky, and white sea—evokes the space race in the mid-
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twentieth century.  Harris links Raleigh’s quest for gold with the moon landing, 
suggesting that the space race repeats imperialist missions of exploration and conquest.  
Through this inversion of readers’ expectations, Harris ironically critiques the ever-
expanding imperialist lust for discovery; the discovery of one type of riches does not 
satisfy the imperialist but rather leads to an unending chain for further conquest.  He 
draws readers’ attention to the limits of the fetishization of the “untouched” landscape.      
Billionaire Death, the figure Glass and Peter find in the seam in the rock, also 
contradicts readers’ expectations about the cost of imperialist expeditions.  In 
contradiction to Raleigh’s profession of his bravery, nobility, and benevolence, and the 
ostensible benefits for both his crew and the nation of Guyana, the figure at the heart of 
the imperialist exploration in the novel is singularly focused on profit.  Billionaire 
Death, a figure Glass describes as embodying “love’s death wish” (67), explains the 
cheapness of human life in the literal sense of weighing two quantities against one 
another on scales.  For example, Death describes a young Jamaican girl’s life as a 
“pittance,” coldly calculating its monetary value: “Say five hundred dollars for the loss 
of crops … Twenty dollars for each hillside stone.  A stone has fossil value in geologic 
space.  A score of stones.  Twenty by twenty.  Four hundred dollars.  Five plus four.  
Nine hundred dollars.  Make it a round sum for a child’s life—a thousand dollars” (69).  
The pessimistic scene the characters encounter in the heart of the Mountain of Folly 
sharply contrast the El Dorado myth, in which persevering adventurers are rewarded by 
stumbling upon the City of Gold in the heart of the interior.  In contrast to the material 
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gain and spiritual fulfillment of many El Dorado narratives, Harris exposes the empty 
penny-pinching at the heart of such a venture.   
Harris ironically critiques the El Dorado myth through the imagery of the seam 
in the face of the rock by leaning on, and then subverting, the tropes of the “journey into 
the interior.”  The seam in the novel is, geographically speaking, similar to the gold 
deposits present in Guyana’s rock formations.  In Guyana, gold prospecting is typically 
associated with alluvial prospecting, the process of extracting gold from loosened pieces 
of rock and stone using high-pressure water to separate the gold from the rest of the 
materials; “pork-knocking” refers to independent alluvial prospecting missions.23  
However, and more importantly for the purposes of this novel, Guyana’s mountains 
have long been known to contain gold-enriched veins.  Harris’s description of this 
“lifeline” as a “seam” running along and inside the Mountain of Folly mirrors these 
natural deposits in the country’s cliffsides.  Even as early as Raleigh’s Discoverie, 
explorers recognized that Guyana’s mountains contained valuable gold and mineral 
veins.  Raleigh writes about the first time he extracted gold from the face of a cliff.  The 
gold was visible to the explorers as a line running through the rock:  
Near unto one of the rivers I found of the said white spar or flint a very 
great ledge or bank, which I endeavoured to break by all means I could, 
because there appeared on the outside some small grains of gold; but 
finding no means to work the same upon the upper part, seeking the sides 
and circuit of the said rock, I found a clift in the same, from whence with 
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daggers, and with the head of an axe, we got out some small quantity 
thereof. 
“Clift,” an archaic variation of “cleft,” refers to a fissure in the ledge; to put Raleigh’s 
words differently, the gold ran through this fissure like a vein.  In this way, the break in 
the face of the rock parallels the geography of the Mountain of Folly.  As they escape 
Faust’s surgery, Peter and Glass follow a cleft similar to the one described by Raleigh, 
and Glass explains that they “gained the seam or divide in the wave of rock” (66, 67).  
Later, Glass later remarks that they “pursued the seam … in our ascent through and 
above the Mountain of Folly.  Through and above!  Within and without!” (73)  This 
language suggests a cleft running vertically along the side of a mountain: it is the 
interior of the mountain that has been exposed (within and without) and following it 
takes voyagers both through the mountain and to the peak.   Moreover, the idea that 
following this cleft will lead to their salvation parallels Raleigh’s sentiments.  While 
Peter and Glass hope to escape Faust’s temptation, Raleigh’s band of explorers hope to 
follow the cleft (and the resources it contains) to economic “salvation” and add to the 
exploration’s legitimacy.   
The parallels extend beyond merely following the seam: both Raleigh’s mission 
and Peter’s and Glass’s journey up the Mountain of Folly lead the explorers to 
unimaginable resources.  These resources differ drastically, of course—in The Infinite 
Rehearsal Glass and Peter find profound truths about the nature of the world, whereas 
the El Dorado exploration extracts and exploits valuable material resources and local 
peoples.  However, both narratives share the idea that following the cleft rewards the 
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explorer with information and resources that cannot be obtained in the “real” world.  At 
the heart of the seam in the Mountain of Folly is, as Peter tells Glass, “Infinity’s chain.  
That that chain remains unbroken despite everything is our slender passion and hope of 
the transformation of injustice that we inflict on ourselves and upon others” (71).  As 
Peter explains, the seam offers the travelers access to the fragile, unbroken hope 
inaccessible in everyday life, perhaps similar to the naturally occurring resource with 
which Raleigh was obsessed—in 1596 the gold deposits in Guyana’s mountains were 
not yet exploited by European invaders, and the legend of these untapped resources 
fueled explorers’ lust for riches.  Of course, the novel’s hopes for transformation differ 
dramatically from the violent exploitation of Guyana’s people and resources by Raleigh 
and his crew; however, both the novel and the historical account express hope that an 
extraordinary resource, found in the country’s natural resources, would transform the 
seekers’ lives.  
The process of mining the seam, both literally (historically) and figuratively (in 
the novel), is dangerous as well.  After emerging from the Mountain of Folly, Peter 
reflects on the allure and perils of pursuing this seam: “The machinations of Faust.  
Beware of the Glass that may mesmerize you. And yet in another light immortality is 
the comedy of a changeless romance between true, inner flesh and true, outer spirit” 
(71).  Peter suggests that the seam, much like Faust’s influence, is alluring but that the 
mission must be carefully undertaken as the treasure found in the seam represents 
possibility and danger in equal measure, in a manner that parallels, in some senses, the 
allure of gold to the European invader-explorers in Guyana.  For the El Dorado 
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explorers, including Raleigh, the allure of gold is dangerous in its all-consuming nature, 
and the process of traversing the path poses real threats from the natural world, native 
inhabitants, and their own psyches.  In their colonial voyage Raleigh’s men become ill, 
traverse the water during a rough storm, and even disappear into the jungle.  While the 
seam provides important resources to the explorers, both in the novel and in Raleigh’s 
account, the process of accessing those resources imperils the seekers, physically and 
spiritually. 
Harris makes this parallel recognizable as an ironic critique in several ways.  
First, and perhaps most obvious, is his use of fantastical elements, particularly his 
characters’ unreality.  For example, Glass is not a conquistador or explorer but rather a 
ghostly apparition bounding between timelines; after they descend the mountain, Peter 
reveals that he, too, is dead.  He asks Glass: “How could I be here ascending the 
Mountain of Folly, how endure its riddles in the heart of a dying age, except I had died 
to the machinations of Skull?” (70)  Moreover, rather than finding gold at the heart of 
the mountain Peter and Glass meet Billionaire Death, a representation of humanity’s 
devaluation of life, in a moment of socially piercing irony.  These otherworldly 
characters demonstrate the narrative’s unreality and Harris thus invites readers to 
recognize the ludicrousness of expecting to find treasure at the heart of the journey into 
the interior.  We, as readers, are left to question the function of such otherworldly 
characters and forces in the novel.   
Additionally, the fact that Harris rehashes this outdated trope also suggests that 
readers should be skeptical of the continued legitimacy of imperialist tropes in the 
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postcolonial era.  He particularly questions the El Dorado myth that the country is an 
untouched wilderness waiting to be plundered by Western explorers uniquely equipped 
to access its resources.  This narrative has long been exposed as an improbable story 
used to justify imperialistic texts like Raleigh’s, an exposure that unfolds in many 
postcolonial texts, including Harris’s The Palace of the Peacock (1960).  The 
reappearance of this outmoded myth in a postcolonial text, then, is a jarring one that 
does not align with Harris’s nonfiction works on the purpose of postcolonial literature.   
This El Dorado-like discovery also does not “fit” a narrative of postcolonial 
independence, especially in Guyana, where Forbes Burnham’s ruling party, the People’s 
National Congress (PNC), articulated its mission to establish the newly independent 
country as a modern socialist state in the 1970s and 1980s.  Burnham’s goal was 
anchored by a program to “feed, clothe, and house the nation.”24  Such modern, 
progressive programs directly contradict the archaic El Dorado storyline; through his 
novel Harris highlights the disjuncture between persistent imperialistic tropes with the 
realities of life in postcolonial Guyana.  He resurrects this trope to remind us to think 
critically about the application of such imperialistic narratives in the twentieth century.  
In this way, by upending readers’ expectations about what the seam represents—by 
writing an account of Glass’s and Peter’s journey that parallels the imperial discovery 
of gold deposits in veins in the sides of Guyana’s mountains and then subverting the 
outcome of the El Dorado narrative—Harris implies to his readers the hollowness of the 
tropes of exploration and discovery of profound truth in the interior of the country 
central to Western narratives about the West Indies.   
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Harris’s ironic inversion of readers’ expectations also exposes the hypocrisies of 
Guyana’s burgeoning gold mining industry in the late 1980s, during which Harris was 
writing this novel.  After gaining independence from Britain in 1966, the PNC 
nationalized the country’s major industries, including mining; however, under pressures 
both external and internal (chiefly due to the collapse of these state-governed industries) 
in the 1980s the government altered course and invited foreign and private companies to 
invest in Guyanese mining operations.25  Government officials particularly heralded 
gold mining as a solution to solve the country’s economic woes.  As Lomarsh 
Roopnarine explains in “Wounding Guyana: Gold Mining and Environmental 
Degradation,” the Guyanese government “returned to the global economy in the mid-
1980s.  The administration opened Guyana’s interior to foreign and local miners to help 
generate foreign trade, invigorate a cash-starved economy, and begin to deal with 
running trade and budget deficits” (84).26  Guyanese officials tied hopes for economic 
revitalization directly to increased gold mining, both by domestic and foreign 
companies; according to Marcus Colchester, Jean La Rose, and Kid James’s Mining and 
Amerindians in Guyana, initiatives for large-scale hard-rock mining were funded by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund during this decade.  Foreign 
investment in Guyana’s gold mining industry led to a boom that began in earnest in the 
mid-1990s and lasted through the early 2000s.  While the El Dorado myth has long been 
recognized as a limited vision of West Indian countries, Guyana’s economic policies in 
the mid-1980s drew on these myths to stabilize the country’s economy.   
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In drawing a parallel between Glass’s hopes for salvation through the seam in 
the rock and the increased attention to hard-rock gold mining as a panacea for the 
Guyanese economy, Harris reveals the troubling ways in which the Guyanese 
government continued to rely on outmoded tropes of El Dorado to encourage foreign 
investment.  In depicting the culmination of Glass’s posthumous adventure as the 
journey into and up the seam in the Mountain of Folly, through which endeavor he 
learns the hollowness of human existence, Harris raises questions about the 
appropriateness of the El Dorado myth in contemporary Guyanese politics.  If such a 
narrative is dangerous, offering not opportunities for redemption but rather revealing the 
factors that limit human life, as explained by Billionaire Death, the author suggests that 
mining for Guyana’s gold deposits will not save the country’s economy.   
Harris’s ironic critique, elliptically exposing the improbability of salvation in 
Guyana’s gold mining industry, is ethical because it demonstrates what Harris perceives 
to be the stagnation of postcolonial Guyanese society in its continued reliance on 
imperialist narratives in the era of independence.  By stretching Glass’s journey up and 
through the Mountain of Folly, in and through the seam, to the utmost and then 
revealing it to be hollow at its core, he challenges readers’ assumptions that such 
journeys into the interior will yield great riches, insight, or both.  The author also 
exposes the ways in which the El Dorado myth gets played out in contemporary 
postcolonial nations, especially given the PNC’s proposal to shore up the national 
economy by inviting foreign companies to mine for gold.  Although Harris wrote the 
novel relatively early in Guyana’s late twentieth-century gold boom, he identifies how 
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government officials heralded gold mining as the country’s way to economic solvency, 
much as Glass and Peter follow the seam in the mountain to escape Faust and find their 
way back to safety.   
That is not to say that Harris’s vision is a pessimistic one.  His notion of the 
infinite rehearsal is, on the contrary, optimistic as it establishes the necessary conditions 
for social change.  Harris contends that fictional works depict historical events with 
slight deviations from the ways they happened.  This strategy is more than artistic 
license—it is the author’s way of challenging the perception that history is immutable 
and that the present situation is inevitable.  As Dominique Dubois remarks in “Wilson 
Harris’s ‘Infinite Rehearsal’ or the Imaginative Reconstruction of History,” “[t]he only 
way out [of the negative effects of colonization] is to imaginatively relive the events of 
the troubled history so as to unlock those polarities [between colonizer and colonized]” 
and “the imaginative dialogue it initiates [helps] revitalise our modern, guilt-ridden and 
polarised world” (40, 37).27  This strategy is especially important in the Caribbean 
postcolonial context, claim Henry, Maes-Jelinek, and Jeannine Murray-Román.28  
Harris’s ironic critique of the El Dorado myth in The Infinite Rehearsal acts as a way 
for readers to recognize the poverty of imperialist-era narratives and rather engage with 
the realities of life in twentieth-century Guyana.  It encourages us not to be complacent 
with the recurring narrative tropes of imperialist history but rather to seek a different 
truth.   
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The Possibilities of the Infinite Rehearsal 
As a postcolonial adaptation of Faust, Harris’s The Infinite Rehearsal uses the 
basic framework of Goethe’s story but incorporates culturally specific details to address 
his own context of postcolonial Guyana.  Additionally, Harris uses Goethe’s framework 
of controlled ironic critique; like Bulgakov, Harris maintains the structure of Goethe’s 
critique but targets a different, and more relevant, socio-historical disjuncture.  This 
adaptation demonstrates two things: first, that ironic critique is intelligible in 
translation; and second, that Harris recognizes controlled irony’s capacity for social 
engagement.  Again, I propose that Harris’s use of controlled irony, in the 
Kierkegaardian sense, does not diminish his emphasis on contradiction and paradox in 
his work, or even within The Infinite Rehearsal.  Rather, he deploys these moments of 
controlled irony to demonstrate the persistence of these outmoded myths and challenge 
his readers not merely to recognize them but also to consider how such narratives 
constrain expectations for the postcolonial Guyanese economy.   
  Harris not only reemphasizes the ludicrousness of the El Dorado myth in 1980s 
Guyana, he also insists that the myth is constructed and therefore can be altered by 
individuals’ actions.  Of course, again like Kierkegaard’s ironist, Harris does not offer 
us a more realistic alternative, nor does he suggest how we might change our attitudes 
about the El Dorado myth.  Pointing out the fallacy of this myth, showing its potential 
to be altered, and inviting our participation in envisioning a new history (and therefore a 
new present) is sufficient for Harris.  Literature’s infinite rehearsals of history, and 
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especially the repetition of difference, can help readers recognize the need for social 
change and begin to envision those transformations.   
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Conclusion 
The Importance of Being Ironic: 
Indirect Critique and Technologies of Circulation 
 
 Literary irony is not only alive and well, but also it can be an ethical perspective, 
a necessary precondition for socio-historical change, and a device integral to the 
circulation of world literary texts.  While the controlled ironists discussed above—
Kierkegaard, Goethe, Bulgakov, and Harris—all offer an ethical vision of indirect 
critique, they by no means suggest that literary critiques are sufficient in and of 
themselves.  These writers challenge readers to engage more deeply with their socio-
historical contexts, to begin to realign what the society’s values profess to be with what 
they are, and in so doing to restart the process of world-historical development.  These 
assessments of reality are vital as works circulate beyond their contexts of production, 
inviting readers to identify similar disjunctures in their own societies, and establishing 
an ethos of intercultural, cross-temporal connection.   
Irony, far from being unintelligible or elitist, is an ethical perspective and a 
fundamental yet under-recognized device in works of world literature.  Ironic texts 
circulating in the global marketplace, and supplemented by scholarly apparatuses, can 
fulfill Herder’s threefold goal that world literary works inform readers in other places 
and times of the unique cultural concerns to which authors responded, illuminate social 
issues analogous between the author’s socio-historical context and that of the reader, 
and foster a sense of unity that does not efface cultural particularities.  Attending to the 
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device offers a different lens through which to constellate comparative studies of world 
literary texts, enriching our understanding of which works can circulate in this “world 
republic of letters,” to use Pascale Casanova’s phrase, and of which devices facilitate 
cross-cultural intelligibility.  In short: controlled irony is, and has been, an essential 
device in works of world literature from the earliest Western articulations of the concept 
by Herder and Goethe.   
Recent works of world literature affirm irony as a central device in circulating 
works.  In the last decade, three texts that have won the Man Booker Prize—Arvind 
Adiga’s The White Tiger, Paul Beatty’s The Sellout, and George Saunder’s Lincoln in 
the Bardo—are acerbically ironic.1  While all three were written in English, they are 
also all culturally and historically specific: Beatty’s novel excoriates the (largely) 
American practice of redlining and Adiga’s exposes the cost of unchecked ambition.  
Compounded with the socially engaged irony of other novelists, including Salman 
Rushdie, J. M. Coetzee, and Eka Kurniawan, such prominent ironic novels consecrate 
the device’s prominence in, and value to, world literary texts, to use another of 
Casanova’s terms.    
The twenty-first century poses a problem of scale to scholars of world literature.  
As an increasing number of writers across the globe have access to technologies of 
publication, both formal (book publishers) and informal (social media), more works are 
circulating across cultural and linguistic boundaries than ever before.  Tellingly, many 
of the works circulating in digital spaces also foreground culturally and linguistically 
specific ironic critiques.  Video clips, social media posts, and memes have gone “viral” 
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and circulated beyond their original contexts; moreover, the ironic critiques offered in 
these digital artifacts have been understood in these target cultures.  The viral video clip 
“America First—The Netherlands Second” is an excellent example of this popularity 
and intelligibility: the Dutch late-night comedian Arjen Lubach offers an introduction to 
his country in “Trump-speak” to convince the then-President-elect of the benefits of 
continuing diplomatic ties between the two countries.  This video inspired many 
adaptations filmed by comedians in other countries, including Switzerland, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Australia, and Namibia, demonstrating the accessibility of irony 
in translation.  While globalization has flattened cultural differences in many respects, 
ironic critiques circulating on digital media offer an opportunity to highlight, and 
recognize, the source culture’s unique identity.  Controlled ironic critique is not only 
central to world literature’s past, but also demonstrates the possibilities of a world 
orientation of English literary studies in the future. 
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Notes 
 
Introduction: 
 
1  See Graydon Carter qtd. in Seth Mnookin, “In Disaster’s Aftermath, Once-Cocky Media Culture Disses 
the Age of Irony”; Roger Rosenblatt, “The Age of Irony Comes to an End”; Jedidiah Purdy, For Common 
Things: Irony, Trust, and Commitment in America Today; David Foster Wallace, “E Unibus Pluram: 
Television and U.S. Fiction”; Dave Eggers, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius; Christy 
Wampole, “How to Live Without Irony”; Darryl Pickney and Joan Didion, “Obama: In the Irony-Free 
Zone”; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity; Peter Sloterdijk, 
Critique of Cynical Reason; Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia; Alexandra Petri, “‘Hamilton’ and the end of irony”; and Dylan Jones, “How social media 
(finally) killed irony.”   
2 Studies of irony’s definition and historical development are exhaustive and include: Joseph A. Dane, 
The Critical Mythology of Irony; Dilwyn Knox, Ironia: Medieval and Renaissance Ideas on Irony; 
Morton Gurewitch, The Ironic Temper and the Comic Imagination; G. G. Sedgewick, Of Irony: 
Especially in Drama; Norman Knox, The Word Irony and Its Context, 1500–1755; J. A. K. Thomson, 
Irony: An Historical Introduction; Candace Lang, Irony/Humor: Critical Paradigms; Katharina Barbe, 
Irony in Context; Claire Colebrook, Irony; Gary J. Handwerk, Irony and Ethics in Narrative: From 
Schlegel to Lacan; D. C. Muecke, Irony and the Ironic; and, of course, Wayne C. Booth’s A Rhetoric of 
Irony, among others.  For an overview of different approaches to irony in literary criticism, see John Evan 
Seery, Political Returns: Irony in Politics and Theory from Plato to the Antinuclear Movement.   
3 See, for example, Jennifer Bajorek, Counterfeit Capital: Poetic Labor and Revolutionary Irony 4; Ross 
Chambers, Room for Maneuver: Reading (the) Oppositional (in) Narrative xvi, 1; Seery, Political 
Returns 170; and Angelique Haugerud, No Billionaire Left Behind: Satirical Activism in America 31–32. 
4 See also Andrew Opitz, “Impassioned Satire and Militant Irony: An Investigation into the Evolving 
Politics of Satire.”   
5 Matthew Arnold makes a similar point in Essays in Criticism. 
6 See David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern 
Russian National Identity, 1931–1956.   
 
Chapter One: 
 
1 See also Joseph Dane, A Critical Mythology of Irony (149).   
2 See Gerald Graff’s 1974 article “What Was New Criticism? Literary Interpretation and Scientific 
Objectivity,” Ian Hunter’s “The History of Theory,” René Wellek’s “The New Criticism: Pro and 
Contra,” and Paul A. Bové’s Destructive Poetics: Heidegger and Modern American Poetry.  Both Graff 
and Wellek aim to show in their articles that these critiques of New Criticism are misguided, particularly 
charges of the methodology’s empiricism.   
3 See also his remarks about New Criticism in “The Rhetoric of Blindness” and “Hypogram and 
Inscription.” 
4 These scholars include, but are not limited to, William J. Spurlin (in his introduction to The New 
Criticism and Contemporary Theory), William E. Cain’s essay “Deconstruction in America,” Jonathan 
Arac’s “Repetition and Exclusion: Coleridge and New Criticism Reconsidered,” Geoffrey Hartman’s 
Beyond Formalism, Gerald Graff’s Literature Against Itself, and Frank Lentricchia’s After the New 
Criticism.  For a further discussion on the ties between New Formalism and ostensibly anti-formalist 
approaches, particularly New Historicism, see Susan Wolfson’s “Reading for Form.”   
5 While postcolonial theory and world literature are two distinctly different literary theories, I will defend 
the decision to combine them together in the third section of this chapter. 
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6 It is important to note that Anglo-American formalists were hardly the first literary critics to emphasize 
the importance of irony in “good” literature.  Many of the theorists cited in this chapter frequently 
discussed Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria as an influential work for their understanding of irony.  
Coleridge’s understanding of literature itself was strongly influenced by German Romanticism, notably 
the works of Friedrich Schlegel.  Other formalist critics, including Randall Jarrell, highlight the 
similarities between literary modernism, New Criticism, and German Romanticism, which “holds in 
solution contradictory tendencies” (“The End of the Line” 215).  Indeed, the phrase “permanent 
parabasis” used in the chapter title and invoked frequently by subsequent generations of literary critics is 
taken from Schlegel.  For more information on the relationship between Coleridge and German Romantic 
irony, see Anne K. Mellor, English Romantic Irony; David Simpson, Irony and Authority in Romantic 
Poetry; D. C. Muecke, The Compass of Irony; and Kathleen Wheeler, Sources, Processes and Methods in 
Coleridge’s ‘Biographia Literaria.’  Of course, this view of the relationship between Coleridge and 
German Romanticism is contested by René Wellek in Confrontations: Studies in the Intellectual and 
Literary Relations Between Germany, England, and the United States in the Nineteenth Century.   
7 Although Northrop Frye was an archetypal critic, he shared some views embraced by the New Critics. 
8 Claire Colebrook also asserts that irony allows for paradoxes to exist in the same place and time (54). 
9 This difference reflects divergent philosophies about the organization of the world.  Richards’ 
understanding of poetry’s equilibrium of opposed impulses does not necessarily require, or result in, an 
understanding of the world as a unified whole but instead sees every element balanced by its opposite.   
10 Welleck and Warren also reject psycho-biographical readings in The Theory of Literature.   
11 Empson cautions that irony is a device that differs dramatically depending on the reader’s context and 
theoretical allegiance(s) and emphasizes its function on the sentence, rather than structural, level of a 
work (xiii).   
12 In “The Road of Excess” Northrup Frye suggests that “[i]rony presents a human conflict which, unlike 
a comedy, a romance, or even a tragedy, is unsatisfactory and incomplete unless we see in it a 
significance beyond itself, something typical of the human situation as a whole.  What that significance 
is, irony does not say … Irony preserves the seriousness of literature by demanding an expanded 
perspective on the action it presents, but it preserves the integrity of literature by not limiting or 
prescribing for that perspective” (14). 
13 Similarly, in Literary Criticism: A Short History, Brooks and Wimsatt define irony in close relation to 
paradox and metaphor: it is “a cognitive principle which shades off through paradox into the general 
principle of metaphor and metaphoric structure—the tension which is always present when words are 
used in vitally new ways” (747).   
14 See also Mark Currie’s examination of Frank Kermode’s understanding of the relationship between 
peripeteia and irony in The Unexpected: Narrative Temporality and the Philosophy of Surprise.  Currie 
proposes that if irony is the reversal of expectation, peripeteia is irony playing out in time (The 
Unexpected 139).  Similarly, Kermode proposes in The Sense of an Ending that not only is peripeteia 
important to a narrative, the way in which it is utilized reveals the author’s commitment to representing 
reality: “The more daring the peripeteia, the more we may feel that the work respects our sense of reality” 
(18). 
15 Empson bluntly states in his introduction to Seven Types of Ambiguity that all good poetry is supposed 
to be ambiguous (xv).  Brooks and Warren perpetuate this notion in Understanding Fiction when they 
inform teachers that ironical ambivalence is the key to interesting literature (xix).  Similarly, in The Sense 
of an Ending Frank Kermode posits that peripeteia (the temporalization of irony through narrative) is 
present in “every story of the least structural sophistication” (18).  Conversely, Ransom proposes in The 
New Criticism that irony and tragedy are not required for good poetry, or in all poems.  When irony is 
present, it should be a “feature in the gross effect of the poem” as a structural, rather than textual, element 
(101). 
16 For example, Burke points to the “doctrines of ‘emancipation’” as one key contradiction: “It was under 
the aegis of ‘emancipation’ that the commercial state arose and conquered the feudal state—yet this same 
stressing or emphasis threatens to endanger the commercialists’ hegemony itself, once they become 
thoroughly entrenched in their privileges” (246).   
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17 Later in the essay de Man puts the matter in terms of “reading,” saying that the New Critics 
(particularly Richards and Empson), and the French poststructuralists influenced by them (especially 
Riffaterre), are uninterested in the reader’s intervention into a text (33).   
18 This “radical relativism” helps to avoid the “vertige, a dizziness of the mind caught in an infinite 
regression” (10).  In this sense de Man’s understanding of the indeterminacy of meaning differs 
significantly from Booth’s unstable or infinite ironies.  However, he does not suggest that it is possible to 
create dialectically synthetic readings from these relativistic ambiguities.   
19 In an interview with Stefano Rosso, included in The Resistance to Theory, de Man notes that his 
approach is particularly important to understanding the differences between his version of deconstruction 
and Derrida’s, whose theory emphasizes (in de Man’s understanding) that a text is deconstructed by a 
“philosophical intervention from outside of the text” (118).   
20 While a multiplicity of meanings can arise in the process of linguistic translation, Derrida contends that 
malleable unity is more characteristic of translating a concept into philosophical ideas (72).   
21 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin contend in The Empire Writes Back that “Jameson 
provides post-colonial critics seeking to develop Fanon’s analysis of Manichean duality with the 
necessary model of a reflexive relationship between a social process and a text, a model which 
emphasizes that a text’s relationship with ‘the historical subtext’ is an active one.  It is the text which 
transforms the historical subtext which it draws up into itself and this transformation constitutes what 
Jameson characterizes as the ‘symbolic act’ of the narrative” (169–170).   
22 In using this term Apter imports Barbara Cassin’s term from Vocabulaire européen des philosophies: 
Dictionnaire des intraduisibles and Apter’s own translation as The Dictionary of Untranslatables. 
23 Cassin claims that the Dictionnaire “is a pluralist and comparative work in its non-enclosing gesture” 
(Against World Literature 119), emphasizing the plurality and multiplicity of the endeavor.  However, 
elsewhere in her monograph Apter critiques what she calls comparative literature’s “bulimic” drive, its 
attempt to unify disparate literatures within one discipline (Against World Literature 3).  I would argue 
that Apter’s translation of the Dictionnaire is similar to the inclusivity she critiques in comparative 
literature. 
24 Similarly, in Death of a Discipline Spivak argues that comparative literature, and world literature 
specifically, are paradoxical fields of study because they are both hegemonic and create the condition for 
their own destruction in subsequent approaches to literature.  In other words, comparative literature 
pushes a unified world view but makes possible an interruption both permanent and from-below “of a 
Comparative Literature to come” (p. 16 n 21).   
25 At its most culturally sensitive, world literature is “a pluralist critical practice of comparison that 
massages neoliberalism” (177).   
26 As David Ferris notes in his article “Indiscipline,” David Damrosch’s definition of world literature as 
an intensive endeavor—the intensive reading of a few select texts—is paradoxical in its presupposition 
that intensive readings of a select group of texts offers an “extensive experience of the world” (86).  I do 
not agree with Ferris’ analysis of Damrosch—nowhere does Damrosch say that world literature offers an 
“extensive” understanding of the world, but of the world the text represents.  Damrosch rejects the idea 
that works of world literature are, or should serve as, representations of the culture as a whole and can 
thus be interpreted as a substitute for complete knowledge of the socio-historical context being described 
in a text.  Rather, What Is World Literature? posits that any claim to universal knowledge, or attempt at 
creating a comprehensive canon, is problematic if not impossible.  Studying patterns of literary 
dissemination can offer a new understanding about how and why literature circulates between given 
contexts can offer some insight into how world literature functions and why, but does not claim to offer 
any “extensive knowledge” of a body of texts. 
 
 
Chapter Two: 
 
1 These readings are especially prominent in discussions of Kierkegaard in literary theory; Walter 
Kaufmann’s Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre is an influential text that links Kierkegaard to 
Nietzsche and existentialist thought more broadly. 
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2 This active engagement on both sides echoes Linda Hutcheon’s assertion that irony “happens”: it 
requires engagement on both sides and does not exist statically or independently of interpersonal 
interactions.  
3 See Adorno’s Minima Moralia, for example.  Moreover, in Rabelais and His World Bakhtin contends 
that irony and carnivalesque humor act as an “escape valve,” a venue to critique the established social 
order without upending it.   
4 To grossly simplify this long section of the text: Kierkegaard finds Xenophon’s depiction of Socrates 
too focused on his immediate qualities (13) and Plato’s view too positively productive (15).  Only 
Aristophanes’ depiction of Socrates in The Clouds recognizes that Socrates’ power was a negative one, 
which was uniquely capable of revealing individuals’ foibles and revealing gaps between phenomenon 
and essence.  For more information on the Kierkegaard’s use of Socrates see Tony Aagaard Olesen, 
“Kierkegaard’s Socratic Hermeneutic in The Concept of Irony”; Martin Andic, “Clouds of Irony”; and 
Ziolkowski, “From Clouds to Corsair: Kierkegaard, Aristophanes, and the Problem of Socrates.” 
5 Kierkegaard defines irony piecemeal in several sections: “Introduction,” “Observations for Orientation,” 
“The World-Historical Validity of Irony, the Irony of Socrates,” and “Irony as a Controlled Element, the 
Truth of Irony,” a total of 37 pages out of the dissertation’s 329.  Walter Kaufmann is particularly critical 
of Kierkegaard’s prose, contending that its difficulty makes it prone to misunderstanding.  In From 
Shakespeare to Existentialism he complains that Kierkegaard’s style is “aggravating,” full of “epic 
digressions and … philosophic acrobatics, dancing on the tightrope between seriousness and satire” 
(202).  Kaufmann, unsurprisingly, contends that Kierkegaard’s dissertation should be read ironically, as 
that is the only way to explain the opaque prose.     
6 Andrew J. Burgess isolates and explains each characteristic in his article “The Upbuilding in the Irony 
of Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony.”  While I disagree with Burgess’s conclusion about 
Kierkegaardian irony—he reads it as a tool for moral edification—I found useful his definition of the 
device.  
7 All quotes from The Concept of Irony are from the Hong translation, the standard in English-language 
Kierkegaard studies.   
8 For Kierkegaard, the ironist’s role is bestowed upon him and cannot be assumed by volition alone.  
Hannay notes: “That the world is a task assigned to us, and not something established in poetic 
representation, continues to be a motif of [Kierkegaard’s] thought” (143).  
9 This focus would explain the long tradition in Kierkegaard studies that argues that The Concept of Irony 
is more about the ironist’s psychological state, rather than about irony’s social uses.  Some influential 
works that illustrate this approach include Kresten Nordentoft, Kierkegaard’s Psychology; Leonardi F. 
Lisi, Marginal Modernity; Gregor Malantschuk, Kierkegaard’s Thought; and K. Brian Soderquist, The 
Isolated Self: Truth and Untruth in Søren Kierkegaard’s On the Concept of Irony.   
10 Of course, the reader may miss these clues, as anyone who has taught this essay to a room of college 
freshman can attest.   
11 Romantic irony generally, and Fichtean irony in particular, according to Kierkegaard, was not 
interested in the individual’s ethical process of discovering the correspondence between actuality and 
Ideality on his own, but instead focused on the newly created mythical actuality that had as little validity 
as the previous actuality: “But this infinity of thought in Fichte is, like all Fichte’s infinity (his ethical 
infinity is ceaseless striving for the sake of this striving itself; his esthetic infinity is ceaseless producing 
for the sake of this producing itself; God’s infinity is ceaseless development for the sake of the 
development itself), negative infinity, an infinity in which there is no finitude, an infinity in which there 
is no finitude, an infinity without any content.  When Fichte infinitized the I in this way, he advanced an 
idealism beside which any actuality turned pale, an acosmism in which his idealism became actuality 
even though it was Docetism.  In Fichte, thought was infinitized, subjectivity became the infinite, 
absolute negativity, the infinite tension and urge” (273).  In other words, then, Romantic irony is more 
focused on the creation of an alternative actuality that is, in truth, an Ideality.  This substitution is no 
better than a false actuality because it requires individuals in society to accept the myths being put 
forward about their own actuality, rather than doing any work themselves to determine the correct 
relationship.   
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12 This negation of a particular actuality is not a hostility or undermining of all realities, a standpoint 
Kierkegaard rejected in Romantic irony. 
13 Kierkegaard notes irony is only relevant for specific socio-historical contexts.  Kierkegaard illustrates 
this claim with two examples: the time of Socrates and the Sophists and his own era.  
14 While irony is required only in certain eras, Kierkegaard notes there is some element of this ironic 
process in the evolution of all historical actualities: “To a certain degree, every world-historical turning 
point must have this formation also, and it certainly would not be without historical interest to track this 
formation through world history.  Without engaging in this, I shall merely cite as examples taken from the 
period closest to the Reformation, Cardanus, Campanella, and Bruno” (261). That being said, the role of 
irony in specific historical actualities is, as Kierkegaard notes, more critical than in others.  
15 Similarly, Edward F. Mooney suggests that Socratic questioning and infinite negation eliminates false 
knowledge and (eventually) makes way for Christianity (5).   
16 Kierkegaard posits that Socrates is the example par excellence of such ironic figures. In short, Socrates 
was a “divine missionary … As for the continual temptation to attribute something more to him, this is 
due to the failure to see that world-historical individualities are great precisely because their entire lives 
belong to the world and they, as it were, have nothing for themselves” (237). 
17 As Kierkegaard notes, the tension between phenomenon and essence must be resolved in order for “the 
world historical process [to take] place.  The given actuality at a certain time is the actuality valid for the 
generation and the individuals in that generation, and yet, if there is a reluctance to say that the process is 
over, this actuality must be displaced by another actuality” (260).   
18 Hegel is a deeply unpopular figure in contemporary literary theory, especially because scholars charge 
that his discussions of philosophical system-thinking and totality are Eurocentric, deterministic, and 
conservative.  For detailed and nuanced defenses of Hegel’s thought, as well as incisive dismantlings of 
arguments against Hegel, see Brennan’s chapter “Hegel and the Critique of Colonialism” in Borrowed 
Light, Susan Buck-Morss’ Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History, and Jon Stewart’s edited collection The 
Hegel Myths and Legends.   
19 The world-historical individual, for Kierkegaard, assumes a great deal of importance in facilitating this 
process of the development of world spirit.  This process of development does not occur spontaneously 
but requires a “prophetic individual” as a “sacrifice,” someone who “spies the new in the distance, in dim 
and undefined contours” (260).  In other words, the world-historical individual is (partly) responsible for 
ushering in the new historical actuality as the next stage in the progression of world spirit. 
20 See especially Hannay, Kierkegaard: A Biography 139. It is important to note that during this era there 
were more types of literature entering into Denmark than ever before—Kierkegaard discusses Andersen’s 
fairy tales, Goethe’s works, and translations of “Aladdin” and One Thousand and One Nights in his 
journals.   As such Kierkegaard had a fairly good understanding of what literature could accomplished for 
the reading public, however limited that public might be.   
21 Here Kierkegaard is playing on John 14:6: “Jesus said to him, ‘I am the way, the truth, and the life.  No 
one comes to the father except through me.’”  NRSV.   
22 Henri Lefebvre echoes this position in Critique of Everyday Life, when he notes that irony can be a 
moment in the critique of everyday life but it cannot be the final stage (16, 194).   
23 Kirmmse does note that Kierkegaard’s politics became increasingly radical after 1848, the year King 
Frederick VII signed the constitution into law “on which date Denmark became a constitutional 
monarchy with universal (male) suffrage” (70).  Of course, these events occurred long after he had 
written his magister dissertation. 
24 Kirmmse explains that in Golden Age Denmark only the educated elite had access to poetry and novels, 
and most peasants (3/4 of the total population) would have only had access to the family Bible, religious 
tracts, almanacs, and a hymnal (77). 
25 There have been many ideas put forth about why the ironic hypothesis is so prevalent in Kierkegaard 
studies, especially in the twentieth century.  First is Kierkegaard’s opaque writing style—his prose resists 
easy comprehension, so on one level it makes sense that Kierkegaard could be parodying the overly 
convoluted style of the Danish Hegelians at the time.  Compounding his difficult writing style was his 
status as an outsider and anti-institutional positions, especially vis-à-vis the Danish Lutheran church 
(Kirmmse 3), which further distanced his relationship to “traditional” or earnest scholarship.  Habib 
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Malik also posits that the peripherality of Denmark and the Danish language led to an uneasy reception 
and interpretation of all Kierkegaard’s work, especially given the fact that his journals were published 
posthumously, and The Concept of Irony was only translated into German in 1929 and into English in 
1966.  Stewart notes that many early scholars of Kierkegaard’s thought—including N. H. Søe, Søren 
Holm, Niels Thulstrup, Gregor Malantschuk, and Jens Himmelstrup—positioned Kierkegaard and Hegel 
as antagonists.  This positioning, while false (Stewart charges that they did not understand Hegelian 
dialectics), was particularly influential because Thulstrup and Malantschuk taught many scholars of the 
next generation.  Finally, Kierkegaard’s repeated insistence that his works were more like poetry than 
traditional scholarship (Hannay, Kierkegaard x; Malik 3) further primed readers to expect aesthetic, 
rather than earnest, arguments.    
26 Other scholars arguing for the ironic hypothesis include Kevin Newmark, Gregor Malantschuk, Merold 
Westphal (who proposes that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are “spiritual contemporaries” [43]), Winfield E. 
Nagley, Lee Capel, Pierre Mesnard, Louis Mackey, Linda Hutcheon, Candace D. Lang, Charles I. 
Glicksberg, Steven Shakespeare, Sylviane Agacinski, Michael Strawser, Martin Andic, George Pattison, 
Peter Fenres, David D. Possen, Joel Rasmussen, and Henning Fenger.  Dissecting all arguments in favor 
of the ironic hypothesis is beyond the scope of the chapter; as such, I will analyze the themes common to 
all these arguments.   
27 Other scholars arguing for a serious reading of the dissertation include Walsh, Mark C. Taylor, Sophia 
Scopetea, Anthony Rudd, Kirmmse, Ernst Bojesen (Kierkegaard’s Greek teacher), and Harald Hoffding, 
who complains that The Concept of Irony is so Hegelian it is worthless (qtd. in Stewart, Kierkegaard’s 
Relations to Hegel Reconsidered 134).   
28 While Stewart’s research about Kierkegaard’s academic and personal life is compelling, some of 
Stewart’s evidence in support of an unironic reading of the dissertation is anecdotal at best.  For example, 
Stewart notes that many philosophers during Kierkegaard’s time went through “stages” in which they 
adopted particular viewpoints that they later rejected during another stage, so it was likely that 
Kierkegaard did so as well.  This line of analysis is fairly common in Kierkegaard scholarship—Mark C. 
Taylor argues in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and Self that there were 
significant changes in Kierkegaard’s writings throughout his life, especially regarding the concepts of 
faith and suffering (24).  Paul A. Bové’s article “The Penitentiary of Reflection: Soren Kierkegaard and 
Critical Activity” similarly posits that Kierkegaard’s thought occurred in stages and that terms were used 
differently during these phases (29).  The “bandwagon” argument is not one I find especially convincing 
given the fact that it does not analyze Kierkegaard’s work.  That being said, many of Kierkegaard’s 
contemporaries spoke about Kierkegaard’s “Hegelian period,” including Sibbern (quoted in Johansen, 
Reminiscences of Soren Kierkegaard, in Widenmann 85).  Conversely, other scholars—including Malik, 
Taylor, K. Brian Söderquist, and even Stewart himself in other writings—show that the Hegelian 
themes/tones of The Concept of Irony persist in his later pseudonymous works as well, including From 
the Papers of One Still Living, “Seducer’s Diary,” and writings by Judge William (Malik 8; Taylor 68 
footnote 81, 176).  Regardless of whether Hegelian themes are earnestly present in Kierkegaard’s later 
works, there is a strong argument to be made in favor of a serious reading of Kierkegaard’s use of 
Hegelian ideas in The Concept of Irony.   
29 In Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel Reconsidered, Stewart analyzes the makeup of Kierkegaard’s 
examination committee, notably finding that Martensen, the most well-known Hegelian at Kierkegaard’s 
university, was not a part of the committee until April of 1841, mere months before Kierkegaard 
completed his defense, and therefore that it was unlikely that Kierkegaard composed his text ironically to 
appeal to the Hegelian committee member.  While Sibbern, Kierkegaard’s dissertation advisor, is 
typically depicted as an unabashed Hegelian his position was more complicated, as Robert J. Widenmann 
notes.  Sibbern attacked Danish Hegelians in an article in 1837, which suggests that Kierkegaard was not 
likely to be writing in a Hegelian tone to appease his advisor (76).  Kirmmse further notes that 
Kierkegaard’s committee members were unhappy with The Concept of Irony because it was pushed 
through the faculty very quickly, a process largely engineered by Sibbern.  This fast progression casts 
doubt on the ironic thesis because if it was written in an ironically Hegelian vein, Kirmmse suggests, it 
would not have needed to be pushed through so quickly (“Socrates in the Fast Lane” 64–67).  
Additionally, the claim that Kierkegaard wrote in Danish to facilitate punning is unlikely, given the 
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precedents for Danish-language dissertations and Kierkegaard’s facility in Latin.  This argument is 
articulated in Kevin Newmark’s article “Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: The Space of Translation” (in 
which Newmark analyzes the double meaning of the word Ophaevelser, which means both “sublation” 
and “to make a fuss over,” which Newmark sees in the context of “much ado about nothing” and sublates 
the concept of sublation and links Aufhebung’s earnestness to Ophaeveleser’s mindlessness [220]) and his 
book Irony on Occasion (in which he posits that the “double mode” [dobbelt Maade] of gift (gave) and 
task (Opgave) reveals the free play of linguistic irony [63]).  However, as Kirmmse shows in his article 
“Socrates in the Fast Lane: Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony on the University’s Velocifère.  
Documents, Context, Commentary, and Interpretation,” before Kierkegaard there were three students at 
the University of Copenhagen (Hammerich and Adler, both cited by Kierkegaard in his application, and 
Martensen, not cited) who also applied for permission from the king to compose their dissertations in 
Danish.  Kierkegaard’s request was not wholly unusual and does not necessarily signify a desire to pun 
(56, 54, 59). 
30 If Kierkegaard objects to Hegelian philosophy explicitly, he does so by critiquing the Danish Hegelians 
and not Hegel’s work.  As Hannay, Stewart, and Fenger propose, much of Kierkegaard’s knowledge of 
Hegelian philosophy was “filtered” through works by Danish Hegelians writing in Copenhagen in the 
mid-nineteenth century.  Heiberg and Martensen were especially prominent figures in this scene, and 
Kierkegaard expressed a great deal of frustration with both thinkers later in his works.   
31 The long discussion of Romantic irony in The Concept of Irony, for example, is consistent with Hegel’s 
critique of irony in Aesthetics.  In the Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics Hegel writes of Schlegel, 
Fichte, and Schilling: “this skill in living an ironical artist life apprehends itself as a God-like geniality, 
for which every possible thing is a mere dead creature, to which the free creator, knowing himself to be 
wholly unattached, feels in no way bound, seeing that he can annihilate as well as create it. … This is the 
universal import of the genial God-like irony, as that concentration of the I into itself for which all bonds 
are broken, and which will only endure to live in the bliss of self-enjoyment.  This irony was the 
invention of Herr Fried. von Schlegel, and many followed him in prating about it then, or are prating of it 
afresh just now” (§LXXXIX).  Kierkegaard, as Stewart observes, follows Hegel’s commentary on 
Romantic irony “without criticism or variation” (“Hegel” 124). 
32 Kierkegaard’s understanding of Socrates as a world-historical individual has ethical overtones; and, as 
James W. Hulse shows in The Reputation of Socrates: The Afterlife of a Gadfly, eighteenth century 
German philosophy—by Hamann, Herder, and Kant, among others—commonly analyzed Socrates as an 
ethical figure (123).  
33 Kierkegaard describes it as a force that is both “unconscious, the external, that decides; yet it is also 
something subjective.  The daimon is not Socrates himself, nor his opinion, nor his conviction, but it is 
something unconscious; Socrates is impelled” (CI 164). 
34 As Hannay suggests, The Concept of Irony is his attempt to reverse Hegelian dialectics; rather than 
starting dialectical development with the possible, he wants to show what it might look like starting with 
actuality and seeing the possible within it (135).   
35 This claim is analyzed in depth in Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel Reconsidered 132–181.   
36 In his essay “The Four Genealogies of ‘World Literature’” Jérôme David traces four argumentative 
strains of Weltliteratur from Goethe to the 1990s: philological (dependent on literature circulating in 
translation), critical (a culturally specific articulation of universal values and aesthetics), pedagogical (the 
idea that nations can learn about each other through literary works), and methodological (an examination 
of “the type of revitalization their conceptual tools would need in order to make [Weltliteratur] possible” 
[22]).  However, David’s genealogies are not as easily separated as the article might suggest, as the 
philological and pedagogical models rely on the same idea of circulating literatures in translation.   
37 In Against World Literature Apter proposes that the journal World Literature Today, edited by Djelal 
Kadir from 1991–97, encouraged the development of the field, and cites Casanova’s monograph and 
Moretti’s essay “Conjectures on World Literature” (2000) as the “opening salvos” of the reinvigoration of 
world literary theory (Apter 1). 
38 For a response to the n + 1 article, see Gloria Fisk’s essay “‘Against World Literature’: The Debate in 
Retrospect.”  Owen modifies his position somewhat in the later essay “Stepping Forward and Back: 
Issues and Possibilities for ‘World’ Poetry.”   
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39 Franco Moretti’s writings on world literature and distant reading have attempted to define world 
literature as a methodology, rather than as a corpus of texts.  Moretti’s proposal that surveying and 
analyzing all secondary literature written by linguistic or area specialists about their “own” literature, and 
analyzing these studies with computer-assisted models (including spatial, genetic, and quantitative) can 
offer a broader picture of literary trends and circulation.  Moretti, Graphs, Maps, Trees; “Conjectures” 
and “Further Conjectures”; Distant Reading; Atlas of the European Novel.  Pascale Casanova’s work The 
World Republic of Letters represents the center-periphery debate; in this text she traces the way which 
books written “elsewhere” (especially in the postcolonial periphery) are selected and distributed in the 
center, and to whom.  (Of course, Casanova’s argument that Paris operates at the heart of all literary 
centers and “consecrates” the transmission has been a contentious one; see, for example, Christopher 
Prendergast’s critique of Casanova in New Left Review and Debating World Literature.)  Many scholars 
subscribe to the view of world literature as a mode of circulation, including Goethe, Erich Auerbach, Fritz 
Stritch, David Damrosch, Alexander Beecroft, John Pizer, and others.  The rest of this chapter will 
examine this strain in depth, especially as articulated in Herderian philosophy.   
40 Herder’s position, and the one to which I hold in this chapter, differs from arguments that some books 
are explicitly written for the global marketplace, a position explained in depth by Goethe, Rebecca 
Walkowitz in Born Translated, and Brennan in Salman Rushdie and the Third World. 
41 Several scholars eloquently refute these positions, including Nicholas Robinette, Sankar Muthu, John 
K. Noyes, and Casanova. 
42 Auerbach explains his understanding of Herder in “Vico and Herder.”  
43 Herderian world-historical development is often cited as the “scapegoat” of reactions against such 
notions.  Scholars arguing that this idea is teleological and racist, including Mufti, allege that Herder casts 
previous nations in a negative light, depicting peoples as unenlightened and valuable insofar only as they 
are the predecessors of contemporary European nations (Mufti 64).  Similarly, in German Orientalism in 
the Age of Empire Suzanne Marchand claims that even Herder’s anti-imperialist writings have overtones 
of “imperialist hubris” (49).  However, this chapter argues that Mufti and Marchand misread Herder by 
not acknowledging the dialectic of national specificity and collective belonging. 
44 Herder explains that the process of historical development is cumulative, requiring a “ladder” of 
development.  He writes: “The Egyptian without Oriental childhood would not be an Egyptian, the Greek 
without Egyptian school-diligence not a Greek—precisely their hate shows development, progress, steps 
of the ladder!” (Philosophical Writings 281).  Mufti points to this idea of cumulative development as a 
clear indication of Herder’s teleological world view in Forget English! (64)  However, Herder writes 
elsewhere that his breakdown of the stages of development into the ages of human life should not be 
understood as a moral judgment.   
45 This quality comes to fruition in and through everyday actions, including “in keeping with his estate, in 
raising his children, observing his duties, by means of example, work, institution, and teaching” (On 
World History 106).   
46 As he writes in This Too a Philosophy of History, it is necessary to examine both language and content 
to comprehend a nation “according to its intrinsic nature and aims, its pastimes and mores, and especially 
as the instrument of the historical process” (Philosophical Writings 308).  In making this argument I build 
on work by Muthu, Hans Adler, Wulf Koepke, and others.  For debates on the title of this essay see Mufti 
and Forster. 
47 Similarly, Muthu explains that as humans are able to influence climate and change the natural world, 
they thereby change language and their own national character (245).   
48 As Gregory Moore succinctly notes in his introduction to Herder’s Selected Writing on Aesthetics, “art 
activates the totality of an organism; it is produced by the cooperation of our sensuous, imaginative, and 
intellectual faculties, by our interactions with the world around us, and so an analysis of art will 
inevitably shed light on the complexities of human nature and experience” (3).  
49 Auerbach notes that Herder sees all literature (and “customs, art, [and] language”) as “emanations and 
expressions of” the national spirit (Time, History, Literature 14). 
50 Herder proposes that literature, and poetry specifically, have a strong affective component not present 
in other genres.  A few paragraphs later he argues that poetry is more than a reflection of the world in 
which it was produced; the poet’s artistry also enables that same view of the nation to be imprinted, so to 
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speak, upon the reader.  He suggests that “a poet could never want to be merely a painter.  He is an artist 
by virtue of impressive speech that paints the depicted object onto a spiritual, moral, that is infinite 
ground, into the personality, into the soul” (8).  Poets, and writers more generally speaking, have a 
visceral impact upon their readers.  Forster also writes in his introduction to Philosophical Writings that 
reading literature “exposes us [readers] to them [the “people’s mind”] at their moral best … so that there 
are benefits of moral edification to be gleaned here.  Second, he has cosmopolitan and egalitarian moral 
motives for such study: because literature, visual art, etc. make us acquainted with different peoples, at 
different social levels, including lower ones, and at their most sympathetic, it promises to enhance our 
sympathies for different peoples at different social levels …” (Philosophical Writings xxviii).  
51 Linguistic heterogeneity is the only type of diversity that cannot be withstood in national boundaries, 
according to Muthu (249). 
52 For example, in the essay “On the Change of Taste” (1776) Herder writes that aesthetic preferences 
change drastically between historical eras: “Could it be that what a nation at one time considers good, 
fair, useful, pleasant, true it considers at another time bad, ugly, useless, unpleasant, false?—And yet this 
happens! … This skepticism should almost put us off trusting our own taste and sensation” 
(Philosophical Writings 256).   
53 Muthu suggests: “Herder contends that universal claims about the truth or falsehood of ideas in the 
political sphere establishes a mode of thinking that makes difficult, if not impossible, the task of 
determining judiciously which practices and institutions ought to be reformed and in what manner” (216).   
54 Failing to respect and evaluate other cultures’ knowledge is grossly hubristic: “Vain, therefore, is the 
boast of the European upstart who deems himself superior to the other parts of the world in what he is 
wont to call his enlightenment and his arts and sciences, claiming all the inventions of his continent his 
own just because he was born amidst the confluence of these inventions and traditions” (Herder on Social 
and Political Culture 315).   
55 As Muthu notes, understanding the nation is not equivalent to sanctioning all its ideas and practices.  
The critic must “set aside facile judgment in favor of more subtle and complicated accounts, which, 
Herder insists, does not require legitimating every facet of the object under study” (Muthu 217).   
56 Learning about and from other nations is not an organic process; it involves many fits and starts.  
Learning, assimilation, and enlightenment can only take place in specific historical circumstances.  
Muthu explains that an individual’s enculturation by other nations and past eras, assimilation of their 
ideas, and transformation of his own nation is only effective “when the social conditions happen to be 
ready for reform” (220).  These social conditions, while dependent on the learning process, are also 
impacted by chance and juxtapositions, and sometimes occur as unintended consequences of other 
actions.  While the learning process is necessary for historical development, it does not follow that all 
learning is synonymous with development.    
57 This historical progression is nothing but “a work of fate—the result of a thousand cooperating causes 
of the whole element in which they live, so to speak” (Philosophical Writings 320). 
58 Furthermore, he emphasizes that Europeans do not necessarily have a superior intellect to their 
predecessors because the ready availability of inventions has made Europeans’ lives significantly easier: 
“the easy access to inventions has to some extent blunted the European’s inventiveness” (Herder on 
Social and Political Culture 316).   
59 Muthu explains this sentiment clearly in Enlightenment Against Empire when he writes: “Herder’s 
arguments often target the arrogance and parochialism of those who judge other times and places in light 
of a present age that all too often is assumed to be a pinnacle of wisdom and virtue” (213).  Herder’s 
solution was an awareness of own the reader’s own finitude and of the contingencies of all societies.  See 
also Philosophical Writings 248.   
60 This view of historical development has ethical overtones because of the possibilities it affords 
colonized, enslaved, and oppressed nations: “The more we Europeans invent means and tools to 
subjugate, to deceive, and to plunder you other parts of the world … Perhaps it will one day be precisely 
your turn to triumph!” (This Too a Philosophy of History; Philosophical Writings 352).  This argument 
prefigures Hegel’s master-slave dialectic and Marx’s Communist Manifesto.  He clearly argues that 
historical development does not exist to benefit European nations, but posits that, like the developments 
in the ancient world that were assimilated by subsequent nations, advancements made by nineteenth 
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century Europeans could reverse the contemporary world-power order. In his introduction to 
Philosophical Writings Forster writes that “Hegel’s philosophy turns out to be an elaborate systematic 
extension of Herderian ideas (especially concerning God, the mind, and history) …” (Philosophical 
Writings vii).   
61 In this sense, historical development and the refinement of culture are not unequivocally beneficial; 
some advances are detrimental to human beings.  For example, in Ideas on a Philosophy of History of 
Mankind he writes that the creation of large cities in advanced societies creates negative effects like 
overcrowding, explaining that “irreparable” social changes occur due to the “sociability and easy 
intercourse between the sexes,” and proposing that “[f]reedom, sociability, equality as they are now 
sprouting up everywhere—they have caused harm and will cause harm in a thousand misuses” (Herder 
on Social and Political Culture 316, 349, 350).  Additionally, in This Too a Philosophy of History he 
caustically notes: “we admittedly also have the advantage of being capable ‘of precisely that exhausted, 
short-sighted, all-despising, solely self-satisifed, nothing-achieving, and, precisely in its inefficacy, 
consoling philosophy.’  Orientals, Greeks, and Romans were not capable of it” (Philosophical Writings 
333).   
62 Koepke explains that “in the case of the Germans, he advocated a literature that would help to 
overcome the disorientation, fragmentation, and alienation in their society and in their daily lives and 
create a nation worthy of the name” (Adler 231). 
63 However, it can operate the opposite way, beginning with “Ansatzphänomen that releases the 
recognition and formulation of the general problem” (14).  Auerbach also acknowledges that there are 
times in which multiple points of departure are necessary, but holds that all points must “[converge] on a 
central intention” (15).   
64 They argue that there are too many variables for translation to be considered a neutral practice: “First, 
and very obviously: translation does not happen in a vacuum, but in a continuum; it is not an isolated act, 
it is part of an ongoing process of intercultural transfer. Moreover, translation is a highly manipulative 
activity that involves all kinds of stages in that process of transfer across linguistic and cultural 
boundaries. Translation is not an innocent, transparent activity but is highly charged with significance at 
every stage; it rarely, if ever, involves a relationship of equality between texts, authors or systems” (2).  
Furthermore, Mufti connects philology in general, and intercultural translation specifically, to William 
Jones and the development of Orientalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Mufti contends 
that, given this lineage, reading a work in translation perpetuates this system of Orientalism even as it 
may disavow it. 
65 Benjamin provides a compelling illustration to explain how this harmonious relationship operates: 
“Fragments of a vessel that are to be glued together must match one another in the smallest details, 
although they need not be like one another.  In the same way a translation, instead of imitating the sense 
of the original, must lovingly and in detail incorporate the individual’s way of meaning, thus making both 
the original and the translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are part 
of a vessel” (260). 
66  Of course, given the many requirements of a “good” translation it follows that there are bad 
translations, and that there are works that are not translatable along these lines.  As Benjamin writes in 
“The Task of the Translator,” “translatability must be an essential feature of certain works” and not all 
works are equally translatable (254, 262).  He further notes “For to some degree, all great texts contain 
their potential translations between the lines; this is true above all of sacred writings” (“Task of the 
Translator” 263).  This idea, though, is articulated most forcefully in Damrosch’s What Is World 
Literature?  He contends that not all literature gains in translation, but those that do are examples of 
world literature.  A “gain in translation” is possible when “stylistic losses [are] offset by an expansion in 
depth as they increase their range, as is the case with such widely disparate works as The Epic of 
Gilgamesh and Dictionary of the Khazars” (289).   
67 In The World Republic of Letters Casanova deems this process one of littérisation and consecration (in 
other words, the making legitimate of those languages previously deemed inferior, a consecration that 
moves beyond the one work being evaluated and extending to many others written in the same source 
language).  Casanova also acknowledges the ambivalences of translation: “Translation therefore stands 
revealed as an ambiguous enterprise as well: on the one hand, it is a means of obtaining official entry to 
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the republic of letters; and, on the other, it is a way of systematically imposing the categories of the center 
upon works from the periphery, even of unilaterally deciding the meaning of such works” (154). 
68 Damrosch sneers at this rejection in his review published in Comparative Literature Studies.  He 
particularly criticizes her rejection of translation which he sees as more of an engagement with Derrida 
than an earnest engagement with translation theory.   
69 This translational context can change the culture/era in which the work of world literature is consumed: 
“Translation projects can effect a change in a domestic representation of a foreign culture, not simply 
when they revise the canons of the most influential constituency, but when another constituency in a 
different social situation produces and responds to the translations” (Venuti 73).   
70 See Damrosch, What Is World Literature? 290 and 295.  Damrosch is especially interested in the 
context of pedagogy and suggests that students should be led to “cultural context, via corollary readings 
and through collaborative student explorations of websites and print resources” (290).   
71 As Walter Benjamin writes in his dialogue “Translation—For and Against,” “Let us not deceive 
ourselves: translation is, above all, a technique.  And as such, why should it not be combined with other 
techniques?  I’m thinking primarily of the technique of the commentary … And just because the 
difference in linguistic situation was acknowledged, the translation could become effective, a component 
of its own world.  All the same, to apply this technique to poetic texts seems to me highly problematic” 
(250). 
 
Chapter Three: 
 
1 Heinrich Heine famously called Goethe “der große Heide,” “the great heathen,” in a letter to Karl 
August von Varnhagen in 1827.  Quoted in Elisabeth Krimmer 99. 
2 Many scholars argue about the genre of the work.  Some see it as an epic, including Franco Moretti, 
Modern Epic; John Geary, Goethe’s Faust; and Arnd Bohm, Goethe’s Faust and the European Epic.  For 
contrasting perspectives see Jane K. Brown, Goethe’s Faust (tragedy); Inez Hedges, Framing Faust 
(myth); Georg Lukács, Goethe and His Age (drama with epic moments; 235–37).   
3 Contrary to Ellis Shookman’s assertion in “Goethe’s Baccalaureus and the concept of romantic irony in 
Faust.” 
4 Further supporting this claim, that Kierkegaard sees Goethean irony as an ethical tool to support 
dialectical development, is the fact that Goethe was often associated with Hegelian philosophy in 
nineteenth century Denmark.  As Jon Stewart and Katalin Nun write in “Goethe: A German Classic 
through the Filter of the Danish Golden Age,” Kierkegaard made a connection between Goethe and Hegel 
because Heiberg did as well in the journal Kjøbenhavns flyvende post, in which Heiberg writes that 
Goethe’s poetry embodies Hegel’s speculative philosophy (Stewart and Nun 56).  While Kierkegaard had 
a notable about-face, a reaction against Goethe later in his career, Stewart and Nun propose that this swift 
change is due to Kierkegaard’s negative reaction toward Heiberg’s negative reviews of Either/Or and 
Repetition (Stewart and Nun 81). 
5 See Ulrich Gaier, “Dialektik der Vorstellungsarten als Prinzip in Goethes Faust,” and Martin Esslin, 
“Goethe’s Faust: Pre-Modern, Post-Modern, Proto-Postmodern,” both in Interpreting Goethe’s Faust 
Today.  Also see Shookman, “Goethe’s Baccalaureus and the concept of romantic irony in Faust.”  In 
Goethe’s Theory of Poetry Bennett proposes that the work rejects the idea that there is nothing outside of 
consciousness by continually calling the reader to self-reflection, and in doing so restores the idea that 
there is nothing outside of consciousness (28). 
6 Bennett suggests that irony is a “verbal imitatio Christi that clothes itself as it were in the flesh, in the 
idiom of its ‘Mitwelt’ (77), instead of seeking absolute enjoyment of the divine, and this mode of 
speaking, this verbal ‘Irren’ in which truth is present only as ‘ein Fünkchen’ that the hearer must for 
himself nurse into flame, is the only means by which truth can truly be spoken in the first place” 
(“Vorspiel auf dem Theater” 445).  Similarly, in his dissertation Aesthetic Liberalism and Literary 
Autonomy in the Kunstperiode, Sean M. McIntyre argues that irony’s creation of an artistic perspective is 
ethical because it does not attempt to authentically represent reality; these attempts at realistic writings 
are utopia and mendacious.   
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7 Other works similarly focus on Part II, rather than Part I.  See Martin Swales and Erika Swales, Reading 
Goethe: A Critical Introduction to the Literary Work; Jane K. Brown, Faust: Theater of the World; Henry 
Hatfield, Aesthetic Paganism in German Literature: From Winckelmann to the Death of Goethe; Hans-
Jürgen Schings, “Magicians of modernity: Cagliostro and Saint-Simon in Goethe’s Faust II”; and Martin 
Swales, “Goethe’s Faust and the Drama of European Modernity.” Hans Christoph Biswanger proposes 
the critique of capitalism in Money and Magic: A Critique of the Modern Economy in the Light of 
Goethe’s Faust.  Studies of Goethe’s engagement with imperialism include Stuart Atkins, “The 
Evaluation of Romanticism in Goethe’s Faust” in Essays on Goethe, and John K. Noyes, “Goethe on 
Cosmopolitanism and Colonialism: Bildung and the Dialectic of Critical Mobility.”  Scholars writing on 
technology include Jeffrey Barnouw, “Faust and the Ethos of Technology”; Bruce J. MacLennan, 
“Homunculus’ Quest for a Body”; and Astrida Orle Tantillo, Goethe’s Modernisms. 
8 Brown further notes that conservatives weren’t impressed by Goethe’s writings, especially Faust, given 
the licentious subject matter including sensuality, divorce, adultery, and blasphemy (Faust: Theater of the 
World 14).  Given the complicated reactions to Goethe’s literary output, we can see support for Boyle’s 
assertion that Goethe’s work takes a middle path, navigating the boundaries between official and 
marginal, establishment and opposition, and public and private (39). 
9 Brown, “Faust,” in The Cambridge Companion to Goethe, 84–100; Nicholas Saul, “Goethe the writer 
and literary history,” in The Cambridge Companion to Goethe, 23–41; and Krimmer, “Then Say What 
Your Religion Is: Goethe, Religion, and Faust,” in Religion, Reason, and Culture in the Age of Goethe, 
99–119.  See also Franco Moretti, Modern Epic, and Kenneth D. Weisinger, The Classical Façade: A 
Neoclassical Reading of Goethe’s Classicism.  Weisinger writes: Goethe “shows the fragmentation of the 
modern world through an imitation of the ancient form, but in so doing he does not reestablish the 
classical sense of wholeness for the modern age, but simply reveals all the more clearly the fragmentation 
and disunity perceived in his own world” (22).  Goethe also mutes his critique by framing it in a historical 
context, an argument Lukács articulates in Goethe and his Age.  Brown supports his reading in Faust: 
Theater of the World, explaining that the work is Goethe’s attempt to explore the dialectical relationship 
between subject and object, parodying earlier styles to do so (6).  This thesis is robustly critiqued by 
Harold Jantz in Goethe’s Faust as a Renaissance Man: Parallels and Prototypes, in which he argues that 
Goethe’s focus is the Renaissance, not the Reformation.  See also Inez Hedges on Lukács in Framing 
Faust.   
10 Durrani, Faust and the Bible, pp. 81 and 88; Brown, “Faust” in The Cambridge Companion to Goethe, 
85.  Furthermore, Durrani writes in Faust and the Bible that throughout Part I Goethe includes references 
to Song of Solomon throughout Part I, especially in scenes including Gretchen (109), and Boyle proposes 
that the Prologue in Heaven is a “serenely humorous theological framework” for the entire play (537).  
For an overview of the discussions of religious themes in Faust up to 1977, see Osman Durrani, “Biblical 
Borrowings in Goethe’s Faust: A Historical Survey of Their Interpretation.”  Moreover, in 
“Nichtchristliche ‘Offenbarung’: Goethe, Lavater und die biblische Apokalypse,” Wolf-Daniel Hartwich 
traces the way Goethe borrows Lavater’s descriptions of eschatology and apocalypse in Wilhelm Meister 
and Faust II.   
11 See Chapter Two, above, for my comments about why I disagree with this decision to call Goethe the 
originator of the idea of world literature.   
12 Redner, In the Beginning was the Deed.  Lorna Fitzsimmons, “Introduction: Magian Mnemotechny” in 
Goethe’s Faust and Cultural Memory.”   
13 See John Lyden, Film as Religion, and Hedges, Framing Faust: Twentieth-Century Cultural Struggles.  
Hedges’ chapter six, “Oneiric Fausts: Repression and Liberation in the Cold War Era,” centers on the 
“deal with the devil” trope in film noir (pp. 156–185).   
14 Karl Eibl, “Zur Bedeutung der Wette im ‘Faust,’” Brown, Goethe’s Faust: The German Tragedy, Harry 
Steinhauer, “Faust’s Pact with the Devil,” and J. M. van der Laan, Seeking Meaning for Goethe’s Faust 
(especially chapter three).  However, as Janice Elizabeth Hansen notes in her dissertation “Redeeming 
Faustus: Tracing the pacts of Mariken and Faust from the 1500s to the present,” the “pact with the devil” 
theme considerably predates the Faust legend.   
15 Of course, Goethe may have drawn from several sources in this scene; many scholars especially note 
the correspondences between Goethe’s work and Paradise Lost.  See Mason 267; Angus James Nicholls, 
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Goethe’s Concept of the Daemonic 118; J. H. Tisch, “Milton and the German Mind in the Eighteenth 
Century”; and D. Hawkes, The Faust Myth: Religion and the Rise of Representation 144.  
16 There is an interesting argument to be made about the fact that Faust conducts the translation three 
times, paralleling Peter’s threefold denial of Jesus in the crucifixion story.   
17 He asserts that only by turning to the “supernatural world” (Uberirdische schätzen) can humans 
“overwhelm” their own frustration with their limited perspective (ll. 1216, 1214).  Faust then muses, “I 
would for once like to determine— / Because I am sincerely perplexed— / How the sacred original text / 
Could be translated into my beloved German” (ll. 1220–1223). 
18 Many scholars have noted that the choice of the gospel of John is significant.  As Durrani notes in 
Faust and the Bible, John is the only New Testament book to discuss creation; moreover, the gospel of 
John is traditionally associated with white magic and in the chapbooks Faustus is forbidden to read it 
(58).   
19 “Geschrieben steht: ‘Im Anfang war das Wort!’ / Hier stock ich schon!  Wer hilft mir weiter fort? / Ich 
kann das Wort so hoch unmöglich schätzen, / Ich muß es anders übersetzen, / Wen ich vom Geiste recht 
erleuchtet bin.  Geschrieben steht: Im Anfant war der Sinn.” Kaufmann’s translation preserves the 
rhyming couplets of Goethe’s German lines—an intentional, and effective, strategy, as I explain below. 
20 “Bedenke wohl die erste Zeile, / Daß deine Feder sich nicht übereile! / Ist es der Sinn, der alles wirkt 
und schafft? / Es sollte stehn: Im Anfang war die Kraft! / Doch, auch indem ich dieses niederschreibe, / 
Schon warnt mich was, daß ich dabei nicht bleibe. / Mir hilft der Geist, auf einmal seh ich Rat / Und 
schreibe getrost: Im Anfang war die Tat!” 
21 Brown proposes that the sequence of the translation scene parallels Faust’s moods in “Night” (Faust: 
Theater of the World 38; Goethe’s Faust: The German Tragedy 66).  She explains that the translation 
paradoxically brings Faust back into the “worldly world”: “As Faust invokes divinity in ever more 
explicit terms in these two scenes, he is also pulled back into the physical world with increasing vigor.  
He is caught in the neoplatonic dialectic of world and spirit” (Faust: Theater of the World 39).  Redner 
argues that Faust’s connection between creation and action is indicative of Goethe’s knowledge of 
eighteenth-century German philology and his close acquaintances with Hamman, Herder, and Humboldt.  
See also E. M. Butler’s The Fortunes of Faust in which he posits the translation was influenced not by 
Christianity but by “traditional rituals” (37).  Conversely, Alan Corkhill reads this scene as a critique of 
German Romantic intuition (in Fitzsimmons 17–36).  Even further afield, Bruce J. MacLennan proposes 
that the translation scene anticipates artificial intelligence, especially computational models, in which 
“the potential computation is actualized in specific behavior to achieve some end: word, interpretation, 
power, action” (183).   
22 Moretti, Modern Epic 24; Bishop, “Introduction: Reading Faust Today” xxiv. 
23 In Goethe’s Faust Stuart Atkins suggests that Faust is not concerned with either Jesus or logos; rather, 
Faust’s emphasis on “doing” is “the visible demonstration of man’s godlike powers,” showing how the 
poet acts as a second maker after God (40, 50).  Redner also posits that Goethe connects word and action 
not in the understanding of God’s creation but of the power of words to shape lived experience.  
According to Redner, Goethe’s emphasis on “act” is a “creation ex nihilo analogous to God’s original act 
of creation; it is in that act itself understood as continuing forever, and so maintaining creation in constant 
Becoming” (81).   
24 John 1:1: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.”  
Genesis 1:1: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth …”  In Goethe’s Faust as a 
Renaissance Man Jantz finds support for his argument by connecting Faust’s translation with Heraclitus’ 
analysis of logos to include “cosmic law,” arguing that Faust’s progression is a “simple, natural 
description of the magical process, beginning with the ‘word,’ which is valid because it is a symbol for 
the ‘meaning lying behind it’ … which gives the magus power over the forces of nature” (114, 115).  
However, in returning to Heraclitus Jantz ignores Goethe’s interest and engagement with his 
contemporary religious context, and in so doing misses the ironic thrust of the passage.   
25 These scholars include Luz-María Linder, Atkins, Weisinger, and Geary.  Weisinger calls the 
translation a “perversion of scripture” (32).  While Linder ultimately reads the scene as an ironic critique 
of Sturm und Drang rationalism (147), Weisinger understands the ironic critique as an exploration of the 
accessibility of intellectualism in Germany in the eighteenth century (57, 61). 
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26 Liselotte Dieckmann points out that during and after this scene the Bible is only quoted blasphemously 
(44). 
27 “Geschrieben steht,” “es sollte stehn,” and“und schreibe getrost,” respectively. 
28 In this way, as Erich Heller writes in “Faust’s Damnation,” this scene blurs the line between religion 
and black magic, “the abysmal craft bringing forth the machinery of fabrication and destruction that 
passes for understanding” (37).  Linder similarly argues that Faust’s translation is linguistic, not sacred, 
and that the scene demonstrates the dangers of decontextualization (149).   
29 “Wir sind gewohnt, daß die Menschen verhöhnen, / Was sie nicht verstehn, / Daß sie vor dem Guten 
und Schönen, / Das ihnen oft beschwerlich ist, murren” (ll. 1205-1208).   
30 Dieckmann writes, “very often we can read Goethe’s true intention from the meter or rhyme scheme 
and we must certainly never disregard it” (36).   
31 David Chisholm writes in Goethe’s Knittelvers that Goethe typically writes in free Knittelvers which 
omits syllable counting but preserves four-stress lines, rhyming couplets, incorporates “an indeterminate 
number of unstressed syllables” (19), and is consistent with satirical material.   
32 Boyle, Goethe volume 1 142–143.   
33 In his essay “‘Schwankende Gestalten’: virtuality in Goethe’s Faust” Ulrich Gaier posits that Goethe 
uses different kinds of verse to signal social distinctions.  “Margaret’s naïve Knittel-verse differs greatly 
from Faust’s high-tension use of the metre” (Schulte 66).  See also Chisholm 24.   
34 See also Michael Heymel, “Die Bibel mit Geschmack und Vergnügen lesen: Bahrt als Bibelausleger” 
in Carl Friedrich Bahrdt (1740–1792): 227–257.   
35 “Dass ich, um dem Leser verständlich zu warden, zuweilen einen Gedanken eingeschobene habe, der 
zwar nicht geradezu in den gerichischen Worten liegt, den aber der Schriftsteller mitgedact hat, oder den 
wenigstens die Parallele autorisiert.” 
36 “Wo bey dem einfachen Wort schlecterdings der wahre Gedanke verlohren gieng;” “Daß ich um eben 
der Ursachen willen Sprüchwörter mit Sprüchwörten vertauscht habe.”  He uses Matthew 23:15 as an 
example.   
37 Bahrdt’s contemporaries (Köster and Johann Miller) objected to his translation of the gospel of John, 
especially in his conflation of God and logos, as it denied the divinity of Christ (Sheehan 141). 
38 Satire is “militant irony,” in Frye’s phrase, as noted in the Introduction above. 
39 “Der Logus, war schon bey dem Entstehen dieser Welt.” 
40 Indeed, as Boyle writes in his extensive biography of Goethe, as an eighteenth century intellectual 
Faust “might be a mid-century Deist imposing a rational sense on Scripture, like Bahrdt or his Tübingen 
disciple, Diez” (763).  Boyle, however, believes that Fichte is a better parallel, as does Cyrus Hamlin in 
“Goethe’s Faust and the Philosophers” (Companion).   
41 See also Tillmann 66-76 for a detailed explanation of how Goethe satirizes Bahrdt’s translation. 
Gerhard Sauder’s “Goethe’s ‘Prolog zu den neuesten Offenbarungen Gottes’” also explores Goethe’s 
adaptation of Bahrdt’s work.   
42 Paul Carus, The Open Court, essay “Goethe and Criticism.” “Da kam mir ein Einfall von ohngefähr, / 
So redt’ ich wenn ich Christus war” (III). 
43 Carus, “Goethe and Criticism.”  “Daß ichs euch kürzlich sagen thu. / Es ist mit eurer Schriften Art / Mit 
euren Falten und eurem Bart, / Wie mit den alten Thaiern schwer, / Das silber sein geprobet sehr / Und 
gelten dennoch jezt nicht mehr” (V–VI).   
44 Carus, the translator of Goethe’s satirical sketch and editor of The Open Court, argues that in this work 
Goethe argues more in defense of Luther’s translation than in opposition to Bahrdt’s adaptation. 
45 Lukács reads the Gretchen storyline as a critique of “degenerate feudalism,” a common theme in 
Enlightenment-era literature (Goethe and His Age 218).  Similarly, as Tantillo argues in Goethe’s 
Modernisms, Faust is a proto-capitalist character (22); Gretchen’s exploitation and death are thus to be 
read as an indictment of capitalist logic.   
46 “Mißhör mich nicht, du holdes Angesicht! /  War darf ihn nennen?  / Und wer bekennen: Ich glaub 
ihn? /  Wer empfinden / Und sich unterwinden / Zu sagen: ich glaub ihn nicht?” 
47 “Erfüll davon dein Herz, so groß es ist, / Und wenn du ganz in dem Gefühle selig bist, / Nenn es dann, 
wie du willst, / Nenn’s Glück! Herz! Liebe! Gott! / Ich habe keinen Namen / Dafür!  Gefühl ist alles; / 
Name ist Schall und Rauch, / Umnebelnd Himmelsglut.” 
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48 Brown proposes that “feeling is all” is Faust’s assertion of his own subjectivity (Goethe’s Allegories of 
Identity 82).  Wilkinson sees this scene as a reflection of the “Sturm und Drang impatience with mere 
words” (237).   
49 Atkins proposes that Faust is earnestly trying to avoid condemning himself with Gretchen, since Faust 
“recognizes the importance of orthodoxy for one basically so convention-bound as Margarethe” (84).  
50 Mephisto enjoins Faust to convince Gretchen of his interest using whatever means necessary: “Is this 
the first time in your life that you / Have testified what is not true? / Of God and all the world, and every 
single part / Of man and all that stirs inside his head and heart / You gave your definitions with power and 
finesse, / With brazen cheek and haughty breath” (ll. 3041–3046).  Mephisto asks Faust to confirm that he 
will deceive Gretchen, to which Faust responds “With all my heart” (3055).   
51 “Nun sag, wie hast du’s mit der Religion?” (l. 3415), “Glaubst du an Gott?” (l. 3426), and “So glaubst 
du nicht?” (ll. 3431). 
52 Robertson in Companion (ed. Bishop).   
53 For a brief overview of this debate, see Peter James Yoder, “Rendered ‘Odious’ as Pietists: Anton 
Wilhelm Böhme’s Conception of Pietism and the Possibilities of Prototype Theory” in The Pietist 
Impulse in Christianity. 
54 Douglas H. Shantz, An Introduction to German Pietism: Protestant Renewal at the Dawn of Modern 
Europe.  The seminal text on German Pietism is F. Ernest Stoffler, German Pietism During the 
Eighteenth Century. For a thorough history of Pietism see the series Geschichte der Pietismus, published 
by Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht between 1993–2004. Other scholarly overviews of Pietism include Dale W. 
Brown, Understanding Pietism and Roger E. Olson and Christian T. Collins Winn, Reclaiming Pietism: 
Retrieving an Evangelical Tradition. 
55 In The Religion of the Heart, Ted A. Campbell notes that many different sects emphasized feeling 
rather than, or at the expense of, intellect; many different traditions were represented, including offshoots 
of Catholicism (Jansenism and Quietism), British Calvinism, Puritanism, and “Eastern Christian Piety 
and Hasidic Judaism.”  
56 The “Confessions” section of Wilhelm Meister is especially notable, and forms the basis of Daniel J. 
Farrelly’s monograph Goethe and inner harmony: A study of the ‘schöne Seele’ in the Apprenticeship of 
Wilhelm Meister (Irish UP, 1973).  Other studies taking up the relationship between Goethe’s writings 
and Pietist thought include Goethe und der Pietismus, “Goethe’s Werther und Gottfried Arnolds Kirchen- 
und Ketzerhistorie”, “J. C. Lavater and Goethe” (Atkins), “Nichtchristliche ‘Offenbarung’” (Hartwich).  
Albrecht Schöne, in Goethes Farbentheologie, argues that Goethe’s writings on the theory of color were 
influenced by Arnold’s mystical writings, and Tantillo writes that Goethe incorporates Pietistic theology 
in The Sorrows of Young Werther, especially in its exploration of confessional narrative, rejection of 
grammar and formal religious language, and celebration of emotion and the “less educated” (79, 115).   
57 Fraulein Klettenberg is often named as the reason for Goethe’s rejection of religious dogma and 
embrace of the ideas of “feeling” in religion (Gray 48).  For more on Goethe’s rejection of Pietism, 
specifically, see H. B. Nisbet, “Religion and philosophy” in The Cambridge Companion to Goethe 219–
231.   
58 Possible sources might include Philip Jakob Spener, Pia Desideria; Gottfried Arnold’s Unparteiische 
Kirchen- und Ketzer-historie; Johann Arndt, True Christianity; Johann Bernhardt Basedow, Praktische 
Philosophie; and Johann Caspar Lavater, Aussichten in die Ewigkeit.   
59 Wilkinson notes that Faust’s speech also echoes the writings of Gregory of Nyssa, a key church figure 
for the Pietist tradition that predates it by several centuries.   
60 Kierkegaard’s father, Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard, was a Herrnhut Pietist. 
61 A brief note about Zinzendorf’s biography: like Bahrdt, Zinzendorf was branded a heretic and fled 
Germany for Pennsylvania, where he established a strong Moravian conventicle.   
62 “If I speak in the tongues of mortals and of angels, but do not have love, I am a noisy gong or a 
clanging cymbal” (1 Cor 13:1).   
63 See A Short catechism for some congregations of Jesus of the Reformed religion in Pennsylvania, who 
keep to the ancient Synod of Bern; agreeable to the doctrine of the Moravian Church, and Katherine M. 
Faull, “Faith and Imagination: Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf’s Anti-Enlightenment Philosophy of 
Self.” 
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64 Pietistic emphasis on Innerlichkeit was, in the twentieth century, seen as a precondition of Nazism—the 
connections between Pietism and the Prussian state emphasized obeisance to authoritarian regimes, so 
goes this line of thinking.  However, the idea of Innerlichkeit is much more nuanced than simple devotion 
(Van Horn Melton 308).   
65 Faull understands this distinction as an alternative to Enlightenment/Cartesian ideas of the self as 
fundamentally intellectualistic (33, 48).   
66 See Faull, “Faith and Imagination: Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf’s Anti-Enlightenment Philosophy 
of Self.”   
67 See Jantz, The Form of Faust 34; Brown, Goethe’s Faust: The German Tragedy 100.   
68 Conversely, Osman Durrani argues in Faust and the Bible, Gretchen’s religious beliefs are only 
cemented after her “fall;” Durrani proposes that her early actions are predominately for show (showing 
off her jewelry in church) and as such she is only superficially Christian (103).  Furthermore, Brown 
notes in Faust: Theater of the World that Margarete’s first choice for salvation is Faust’s love; God is her 
fallback choice (66).  Where Durrani sees this as Gretchen’s failing and impiety, Brown reads Gretchen’s 
commitment to Faust as an embodiment of constancy, to serve as the antithesis to Faust’s striving (66).     
69 For information on translating figurative language, see Diri I. Teilanyo, “Figurative Language in 
Translation: A Study of J. P. Clark’s The Ozidi Saga,” Christian Burgers et al., “HIP: A Method for 
Linguistic Hyperbole Identification in Discourse,” and Burgers, Margot van Mulken and Peter Jan 
Schellens, “The use of co-textual irony markers in written discourse.”   
70 For more information about Spanish translations see Stefan Beyer, “Goethean Rhymes and Rhythms in 
Verse Translations of Faust Into Spanish;” on Romanian, Sean Cotter, “The Soviet Translation: 
Romanian Literary Translators after World War Two;” and on Japanese, See John Timothy Wixted, 
“Mori Ōgai: Translation Transforming the Word/World.”  This translation is discussed in Katharina 
Keim’s “Contemporary African and Brazilian Adaptations of Goethe’s Faust in Postcolonial Context” in 
International Faust Studies: Adaptation, Reception, Translation 244–258. 
71 This point is ubiquitous in analyses of world literature, both for and against; see “World lite” from n + 
1, Venuti’s The Scandals of Translation and Translator’s Invisibility, and Apter’s Against World 
Literature for some key examples.   
72 See Mufti, Forget English! 
73 See Spivak’s Death of a Discipline and Venuti’s Translator’s Invisibility for articulations in favor of 
this argument. 
74  In the final chapter of What Is World Literature? entitled “World Enough and Time.” 
 
Chapter Four: 
 
1 Hutcheon finds a similar parallel with Dawkins’ meme theory; like genes, texts must adapt to survive in 
a new context.  Examining the differences between the source and target texts make visible this process 
of transformation and suggests some reasons for these alterations: “Stories do get retold in different ways 
in new material and cultural environments; like genes, they adapt to those new environments by virtue of 
mutation—in their ‘offspring’ or their adaptations.  And the fittest do more than survive; they flourish” 
(32). 
2 As I noted in Chapter Two, in order for irony to be “translatable” translators often alter it to suit the 
target language and culture.  Irony in translation is thus already a form of adaptation.  For more on this 
idea, see Marta Mateo’s influential article “The Translation of Irony.”  
3 Readings of The Master and Margarita as a political allegory include Elena N. Mahlow, Bulgakov’s 
The Master and Margarita: The Text as Cipher; Anton Kovac, “The Problem of Good and Evil in 
Bulgakov’s Novel The Master and Margarita”; D. G. B. Piper, “An Approach to The Master and 
Margarita”; L. Rzhevsky, “Pilate’s Sin: Cryptography in Bulgakov’s Novel, The Master and Margarita”; 
Judith M. Mills, “Of dreams, devils, irrationality and The Master and Margarita” in Russian Literature 
and Psychoanalysis, ed. Daniel Rancour-Laferriere; and Cristina Vatulescu, Police Aesthetics: Literature, 
Film, and the Secret Police in Soviet Times.  For a survey of each of these approaches, see Barratt, 78–
101. 
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4 The primary outline of this development comes from Marietta Chudakova, “The Master and Margarita: 
The Development of a Novel.”  See also Donald M. Fiene, “A Comparison of the Soviet and Possev 
Editions of The Master and Margarita, With a Note on Interpretation of the Novel”; Laura D. Weeks, 
“What I Have Written, I Have Written” in The Master and Margarita: A Critical Companion ed. Laura D. 
Weeks; Henry Elbaum, “The Evolution of The Master and Margarita: Text, Context, Intertext;” and 
Andrew Barratt, Between Two Worlds: A Critical Introduction to The Master and Margarita. 
5 Bulgakov likely read Faust in translation as, according to J. A. E. Curtis, he had a “smattering” of 
German and “did not, admittedly, own many works written in foreign languages” (Bulgakov’s Last 
Decade 24). 
6 Barratt 274; Ursula Reidel-Schrewe, “Key and Tripod in Mikhail Bulgakov’s Master and Margarita” 
274; Ellendea Proffer, “On The Master and Margarita” 545; Edythe C. Haber, “The Mythic Structure of 
Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita” 392; Weeks “What I Have Written, I Have Written” 37; A. C. 
Wright, “Satan in Moscow: An Approach to Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita” 1162; Val Boland, 
“Theme and Coherence in Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita” 430; Amy de la Cour, “An 
Interpretation of the Occult Symbolism in Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita” 18; Lesley 
Milne, The Master and Margarita: A Comedy of Victory 5.   
7 For a full list of the parallels between the two works, see Elisabeth Stenbock-Fermor, “Bulgakov’s The 
Master and Margarita and Goethe’s Faust.”   
8 See also Gary Rosenshield, “The Master and Margarita and the Poetics of Aporia” (199 fn. 35).  Wright 
argues, in “Mikhail Bulgakov’s Developing World View,” that the epigraph demonstrates the authors’ 
similar world-views; like Goethe’s decision to save Faust at the end of Part II, Woland’s acknowledgment 
of his benevolent actions (however unintentional) reflects Bulgakov’s “metaphysical optimism” (161).  
9 Many scholars puzzle over the alteration of the name from Voland to Woland.  See, for example, Barratt 
136; Reidel-Schrewe 213; Wright, “Satan in Moscow” 1163; and Vladimir Tumanov, “Diabolus ex 
Machina: Bulgakov’s Modernist Devil” 52.  
10 On the similarities between Woland and Mephisto, see Stenbock-Fermor 311.  For parallels between 
the Master and Faust, see Henry Hatfield, “The Walpurgis Night: Theme and Variations” 70; Haber, “The 
Mythic Structure of Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita”; and Bolen.  Barratt contends that although 
Margarita has some Faustian characteristics she is not a direct parallel (275).   Haber also insists that 
while Margarita plays a Faustian role in the novel her motivations are more similar to Gretchen’s: both 
are motivated by love for the male protagonists (394).   
11 The close association between poodles and hippopotami also come through in both texts; in Goethe’s 
work, the black poodle transforms into a hippo before taking the form of Mephisto, and in Bulgakov’s 
novel the feline henchman, Behemoth, shares a name with the Russian word for “hippopotamus” 
(begemot; Stenbock-Fermor 312). 
12 Proffer suggests that because he is an ironic tempter, rather than a nefarious corruptor, Woland more 
closely emulates Marlowe’s Mephistopheles, “a tormented figure who carries his suffering with him … 
Woland maintains a certain regal distance—his retinue of demonic characters treats him like a Master, 
and Margarita herself is awed by him and his power.  The Mephistopheles of Faust, however, is a worldly 
tempter who seems more human than hellish” (545). Haber suggests that “with regard to the devil, The 
Master and Margarita is Faust turned upside down.  In Goethe’s work the hero is seeking for ever higher 
levels of existence, while the devil attempts to annihilate life … In Bulgakov’s world, on the contrary, 
mankind is dominated by life-denying forces, while the devil, in putting these forces into disarray, is 
reasserting life” (389, 390).   
13 See also Mills 315.   
14 Bruce A. Beatie and Phyllis W. Powell, “Story and Symbol: Notes Toward a Structural Analysis of 
Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita.”  They also suggest that both novels incorporate similarly 
nonlinear depictions of time (223).  Hatfield’s “The Walpurgis Night: Theme and Variations” also 
enumerates the similarities between the two profane ceremonies, especially the authors’ penchants for 
presenting impossible elements in a straightforward manner (69).  Hatfield concludes, though, that 
Bulgakov’s version is more pessimistic, satirical, and political than is Goethe’s Walpurgis Night (69).   
15 In Between Two Worlds, Barratt argues that the Master is a failed Faust, however, because he stops 
striving while incarcerated and in Dr. Stanislavsky’s sanitorium (274).  Reidel-Schrewe similarly 
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proposes that “the Master is neither the main character in the traditional sense, nor does he conform to the 
idea of a Faust or a hero” (274).  For a different perspective, Stenbock-Fermor suggests that Koroviev is 
the Faust figure in Bulgakov’s novel, which occurs after Faust’s death in which he is condemned to serve 
Mephistopheles forever (312).  Sources that enumerate the differences between Woland and Mephisto 
include Haber, “The Mythic Structure of The Master and Margarita”; Proffer, “The Master and 
Margarita” and “On The Master and Margarita”; Rosenshield, “The Master and Margarita and the 
Poetics of Aporia: A Polemical Article”; T. R. N. Edwards, Three Russian writers and the irrational: 
Zamyatin, Pil’nyak, and Bulgakov; Hatfield; and Stenbock-Fermor.  Stenbock-Fermor suggests that 
Frieda, the woman Margarita meets at the Ball, is the closer parallel to Gretchen given the fact that both 
characters commit infanticide (313).   
16 Florenskii’s treatise: Beatie and Powell, “Bulgakov, Dante, and Relativity”; B. V. Sokolov, “The 
Sources for Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita.”  Drews and Barbusse: Haber, “The Mythic 
Structure of Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita” and Elbaum.   Tacitus: Stephanie West, “Tacitean 
Sidelights on The Master and Margarita.”   His father’s theological writings: Haber, “The Lamp with the 
Green Shade: Mikhail Bulgakov and his Father.”  Other possible sources include Briusov’s poem 
“Memento Mori” and his novel The Fiery Angel (Cretu), the Bible, Old and New Testaments (Weeks, 
“Hebraic Antecedents in The Master and Margarita” and Wright, “Satan in Moscow” and “Christ 
Interrogated”); the Ukranian puppet theater tradition of vertep (Longinović), and fairy tales (Hoisington).  
Curtis also identifies sources for Woland’s imagery, including Orlov’s A History of Man’s Relations with 
the Devil and the Brokgauz-Efron Encyclopaedia (Bulgakov’s Last Decade 171).   
17 Proffer highlights the overall effect of these changes: “Unlike Goethe, Bulgakov cannot accept the 
injustices as simply part of some vague philosophical whole.  In The Master and Margarita, as opposed 
to Faust, it matters what choice people make: they are punished for wrong ones” (“On The Master and 
Margarita” 557). 
18 Edward E. Ericson argues that the work is a parody of religion in “The Satanic Incarnation: Parody in 
Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita.”  Kevin Moss puts the work in the context of censorship and 
attempts to avoid being apprehended by the police in “Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita: Masking 
the Supernatural and the Secret Police.” In masking the sentence subject, Bulgakov paradoxically 
highlights that which is unsaid. Moss argues that this use of agentless sentences would have been 
recognizable to Bulgakov’s audience as a reference to the secret police without actually invoking 
individuals’ or agencies’ names.  Stenbock-Fermor notes that this use of Aesopian language was quite 
common in nineteenth century Russian satirical works (309). See also Elbaum for a discussion of 
Bulgakov’s use of Aesopian language as self-censorship.   
19 Arguments that Bulgakov critiques Socialist Realism include: Mark Amusin, “‘Your Novel Has Some 
More Surprises in Store for You’ (The Specificity of the Fantastic in The Master and Margarita)”; 
Edwards, Three Russian writers and the irrational: Zamyatin, Pil’nyak, and Bulgakov; Riitta H. Pittman, 
The Writer’s Divided Self in Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita; West; Barratt, Between Two Worlds; 
Kristina Belyk, “The Master and Margarita: Deconstructing Social Realism”; and Tumanov.  For those 
critics who allege Bulgakov critiques rationality: Pittman writes that “Bulgakov points out the limits to 
reason and acknowledges “irrational fact” (42).  Woland and retinue support irrational fact, “promote a 
more common-sense, rational attitude to life than that to which the superstitious citizens adhere,” and 
reveal the truth of evil (44).  West similarly suggests that “Bulgakov’s main targets [are] the ‘certainties’ 
of the materialist world-view and the increasing regimentation of artistic life, to which the eponymous 
Master of the title … falls victim” (“Tacitean Sidelights” 475).  See also Justin Weir, The Author as 
Hero: Self and Tradition in Bulgakov, Pasternak, and Nabokov and Longinović.  The position that 
Bulgakov critiques the Soviet state supported by a number of scholars.  For example, Weeks insists that 
the novel is a “polemical response to the prevailing Marxist-Leninist version of history” (“What I Have 
Written, I Have Written” 47). She echoes this point in “In Defense of the Homeless”: while it may seem 
to mock socialist realist literary form, Weeks insists that the main critique is of “the version of history 
found in Stalinist literature” (51).  “We cannot be absolutely certain that Bulgakov consciously parodied 
the state-mandated literature of his day, but the close structural affinity with the Socialist Realist novel, 
the date of composition … and above all the opening debate … suggest that he was consciously engaging 
in polemics and that the arena in which he chose to throw down the gauntlet was history” (52).  Weir 
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suggests that The Master and Margarita is an “attack on the hegemony of degraded reason in Soviet 
society” (13).   
20 Some scholars propose that while the Yershalaim narrative is broken up into three parts, they should all 
be understood as iterations of the same narrative by the same storyteller; different scholarly accounts 
attribute this narrative to each of the three characters, individually). 
21 The name “Berlioz” also connects The Master and Margarita to the Faust legend: Hector Berlioz’s 
opera La damnation de Faust.  However, Bulgakov was more intrigued by Charles Gounod’s opera 
Faust, according to Proffer (Bulgakov: Life and Work 556). 
22 Vida Taranovski Johnson, “The Thematic Function of the Narrator in The Master and Margarita.”  See 
also Jessica E. Merrill, “The Stalinist Subject and Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita.”   
23 In the beginning of “There Were Doings at Griboedov’s,” the chapter that introduces the Moscow 
literary apparatus, the skaz narrator muses about the provenance of the Griboedov House, the location of 
the writers’ offices: “The house was called ‘The House of Griboedov’ on the grounds that it was alleged 
to have once belonged to an aunt of the writer Alexander Sergeevich Griboedov.  No whether it did or did 
not belong to her, we do not exactly know.  On recollection, it even seems that Griboedov never had any 
such house-owning aunt … However, devil knows, maybe he did, it’s of no importance” (55).    
24 Critics who see the Yershalaim section as objective truth include Curtis (164) and Fanger (qtd. in 
Barratt 176).  Mills disagrees, reading the Yershalaim sections rather as Ivan’s irrational dream (307).    
25 Margarita is the only non-historian with knowledge of, and faith in, the historical events as depicted in 
the narrative, even though her knowledge is indirect, accessible to her through the Master’s novel and not 
through her own visions. 
26 Woland insists to Bezdomny and Berlioz that he (Woland) is the only specialist in the world about the 
tenth-century necromancer Gerbert of Aurillac (18), which is the ostensible reason for his arrival in 
Moscow.  Later in the narrative we find out that the Master was a historian working in a Moscow 
museum before he quit (after winning the lottery) to write his novel on Pontius Pilate (138).  At the end of 
the novel we learn that Ivan Nikolaevich Ponryev (who cast off his poetic nom de plume Bezdomny) is 
now a professor at the Institute of History and Philosophy (393), following the erudition of the Master 
whom he met in the sanitorium. 
27 For Bulgakov’s reference to Gerbert of Aurillac, see Laszlo Tikos, “Some Notes on the Significance of 
Gerbert Aurillac in Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita.”   
28 Longinović creates a parallel between Woland and Marx (both German historians haunting the 
Muscovites) and notes that Woland is a deus ex machina who helps Margarita “liberate the Master from 
the collective delusion of the official ideology of materialism” (40). 
29 Notably, this occupation was part of the Master’s character from the earliest drafts of the novel: Milne 
suggests in A Comedy of Victory that in the first redaction the protagonist, then called Fesya, was “a 
historian of the middle ages” (4). 
30 As Weeks notes in “What I Have Written, I Have Written,” Ivan is so far removed from daily life, 
which she terms “history” with a lower-case h, in order to write the text that will become The Master and 
Margarita, the grand scale of capital-h History: “Another way of viewing Ivan’s final position is that he 
retreats from history to be the chronicler of History” (60).  Mills and Pittman agree that the whole novel 
is Ivan’s work (although Mills contends it is his dream in the sanitorium, and Pittman that Ivan’s 
schizophrenia constructs the whole thing).  However, Susan Amert and Proffer (in “The Master and 
Margarita: Genre and Motif”) contend that the whole work is the Master’s novel, given the parallel 
between the stated last lines of the Master’s novel and the concluding sentence of the epilogue. 
Vatulescu, conversely, argues that the novel is Bulgakov’s parody of a polyphonic police file on a 
suspicious subject.   
31 Elaine McClarnand MacKinnon, “Writing History for Stalin: Isaak Izrailevich Mints and the Istoriia 
grazhdanskoi voiny.”  
32 Sheila Fitzpatrick notes that RAPP, the proletarian literary association, functioned much in the same 
way during the 1920s and 1930s.  Fitzpatrick, “Cultural Revolution as Class War,” in Fitzpatrick 8–40.   
33 Barber notes, however, that Stalin’s argument is historically inaccurate (130).   
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34 George Enteen traces these competing strains of scholarship between 1928 and 1931 in his article 
“Marxist Historians During the Cultural Revolution: A Case Study of Professional In-fighting” in 
Fitzpatrick 154–168.   
35 MacKinnon 18 and 25.  
36 See also von Geldern 328.  
37 See Haber, “The Lamp with the Green Shade: Mikhail Bulgakov and His Father.”  
38 Elbaum, “The Evolution of The Master and Margarita’: Text, Context, Intertext”; Haber, “The Mythic 
Bulgakov: The Master and Margarita and Arthur Drews’s The Christ Myth”; and Barratt, Between Two 
Worlds.   
39 Barratt argues that Bulgakov’s is a proto-postmodern novel in which “the novelist always took 
precedence over the historian.  What mattered most to him was that the story of Pilate should convince 
the reader rhetorically of its truth value” (197).  Similarly, Weir proposes that the novel “undermin[es] 
rational subjectivity” and is “a fairly common modernist attack on Enlightenment rationality … The tale 
of Woland’s visit to Moscow plays satirically on the tyranny of degraded reason in Soviet society and 
makes a comic subtext of Cartesian (and, of course, Marxist) epistemology” (5), Richard Pope insists that 
ambiguity and plurisignificance is the key to understanding the novel (16), C. E. Pearce argues that the 
multiple perspectives on one event, offered by the skaz narrator, make impossible any claims to absolute 
truth, and Yuri Prizel suggests that the novel offers a surrealistic depiction of reality in the unity of 
dreams and reality (109, 110).   
40 As Proffer notes in her biography of Bulgakov, the Yershalaim sections of the novel were the most 
stable, and least changed, throughout the eight drafts (Bulgakov 637).   
41 Illona Urquhart argues in “Diabolical Evasion of the Censor in Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and 
Margarita” that this work, like other censored texts, both resists and is shaped by censorship.   
42 Laura Weeks also observes in “What I Have Written, I Have Written” that Bulgakov removed 
wordplay, earthy humor, and slapstick comedy in successive drafts, notably eliminating the acronym 
“OBSCHCHPIS (which could perhaps be rendered as COMMURINE or MASSPISS)” (Weeks 15).   
43 See also Fiene, “A Comparison of the Soviet and Possev Editions of The Master and Margarita, With a 
Note on Interpretation of the Novel.”  The editors of the 1973 Soviet edition were the first to consult 
Bulgakov’s earlier drafts, notebooks, and archived materials (332).   
44 Curtis does note, in Bulgakov’s Last Decade, that in earlier drafts the novel ended in apocalypse, 
including the total destruction of Moscow (175).  Bulgakov’s decision to leave the ending ambiguous 
demonstrates his rejection of any edifying message to the text.   
 
Chapter Five: 
 
1 While many scholars have noted the connections between Wilson Harris’s “universal unconscious” and 
C. G. Jung’s “collective unconscious,” Harris rejects the claim that he was directly influenced by Jung in 
an interview with Alan Riach (Radical Imagination 62). For more on the similarities and differences of 
these two concepts, see Gianluca Delfino, Time, History, and Philosophy in the Works of Wilson Harris 
87-119. 
2 Riach examines this concept in detail in “The Presence of Actual Angels.” 
3 On the non-material nature of Wilson Harris’s universal unconscious, see also Vera M. Kutzinski, “The 
Composition of Reality: A Conversation with Wilson Harris,” especially 23.   
4 Harris has written extensively on this notion of writer-as-detective: see “Art and Criticism” in Tradition, 
the Writer and Society 7; “The Fabric of the Imagination” 61–73; “Literacy and the Imagination—A 
Talk” 80; “The Unfinished Genesis of the Imagination” 248; “Comedy and Modern Allegory: A Personal 
View” 127; and Harris and Kerry Johnson, “Interview with Wilson Harris” 87–90.  A. J. M. Bundy 
identifies this process as one akin to dream books coming to the author, interestingly suggesting a parallel 
to Kierkegaard’s Either/Or (4).  Bundy, “Introduction” to Selected Essays of Wilson Harris: The 
Unfinished Genesis of the Imagination. 
5 See also Bundy, “Introduction” to Selected Essays of Wilson Harris: The Unfinished Genesis of the 
Imagination, 12. 
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6 In “Comedy and Modern Allegory: A Personal View” he describes these cultural similarities as a 
theatrical process of “understudying” (138).   
7 See also Robert Bennett, “Tradition and the Marginalized Talent: Reading Wilson Harris’s Carnival as 
a Postcolonial Revision of Dante’s Commedia.” 
8 See also Clevis Headley, “Wilson Harris and Postmodernism: Beyond Cultural Incommensurability” 
46–47, and Maes-Jelinek, “‘Latent Cross-Culturalities’: Wilson Harris’s and Wole Soyinka’s Creative 
Alternative to Theory” 45, on the differences between multiculturalism and cross-culturalism. 
9 For other scholars writing on this notion as a uniquely Caribbean one, see Michael Niblett, “Strange 
Correspondences: Late Capitalism and Late Style in the work of Wilson Harris and John Berger”; Maes-
Jelinek, “Europe and post-colonial creativity: a metaphysical cross-culturalism”; Paget Henry, Caliban’s 
Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy 92; and Lorna M. Burns, “Creolization and the 
Collective Unconscious: Locating the Originality of Art in Wilson Harris’ Jonestown, The Mask of the 
Beggar and The Ghost of Memory” 3. 
10 Harris adapts these texts in The Palace of the Peacock, Carnival, and The Infinite Rehearsal, 
respectively. 
11 See especially Harris, “The Unfinished Genesis of the Imagination” 248–260.  Secondary scholarship 
acknowledging this adaptation include Maes-Jelinek, “Europe and post-colonial creativity: a 
metaphysical cross-culturalism”; Michael Mitchell, Hidden Mutualities: Faustian Themes from Gnostic 
Origins to the Postcolonial 273–312; Niblett, “The Unfinished Body: Narrative, politics, and global 
community in Wilson Harris’s The Infinite Rehearsal”; and Bennett, “Tradition and the Marginalized 
Talent: Reading Wilson Harris’s Carnival as a Postcolonial Revision of Dante’s Commedia.” 
12 See Henry, “Intrasubjectivity in the philosophy of Wilson Harris”; Maes-Jelinek, “‘Immanent 
Substance’: Reflections on the Creative Process in Wilson Harris’s The Infinite Rehearsal” 66; Niblett, 
“The Unfinished Body: Narrative, politics, and global community in Wilson Harris’s The Infinite 
Rehearsal” 24; Johnson, “Translations of Gender, Pain, and Space: Wilson Harris’s The Carnival 
Trilogy” 132, 136; and Delfino, Time, History, and Philosophy in the Works of Wilson Harris 99.   
13 Delfino, Time, History, and Philosophy in the Works of Wilson Harris 97; Mitchell, “The Seignory of 
Faust: Gnostic Scenery in The Infinite Rehearsal” 175.   
14 Mitchell also notes that Harris’s Faust figure does not sell his soul (“Seignory of Faust” 176).   
15 Such a strategy is important, according to Bennett in “Tradition and the Marginalized Talent,” because 
it rejects Harold Bloom’s claim that revisions of a story are not dependent on the context in which they 
were written (5). 
16 For more information on the historical references embedded in the text, see Krishna Ray Lewis, “‘The 
Infinite Rehearsal’ and Pastoral Revision” 83; Maes-Jelinek, “‘Immanent Substance’: Reflections on the 
Creative Process in Wilson Harris’s The Infinite Rehearsal” 48; Niblett, “Strange Correspondences: Late 
Capitalism and Late Style in the work of Wilson Harris and John Berger” 176; and Niblett, “The 
Unfinished Body: Narrative, politics, and global community in Wilson Harris’s The Infinite Rehearsal” 
24. 
17 For example, Lewis identifies references to Dido and Aeneas in the shipwreck, and Hamlet’s father in 
the Ghost (85); Maes-Jelinek focuses on the sacred wood as a “source of terror and regeneration for both 
Dante and T.S. Eliot” (“‘Immanent Substance’”64); and Karen Cornelis notes allusions to Sir Walter 
Raleigh’s History of the World and Donne’s poem “The Relic” (180, 184).  Maes-Jelinek concludes that 
the work is multi-textual (“‘Ulyssean Carnival’” 53).  
18 He includes similar statements in “‘Benito Cereno’” (Selected Essays of Wilson Harris: The Unfinished 
Genesis of the Imagination 123–133); “Tradition and the West Indian Novel” 143; “Comedy and Modern 
Allegory: A Personal View” (A Shaping of Connections 127–140); and “The Quest for Form” 23.   
19 See also Kutzinski, “The Composition of Reality: A Conversation with Wilson Harris” 29, and Burns 
and Knepper, “Revisionary ‘-scapes’ of globality in the works of Wilson Harris” 129.   
20 Critics who see Harris’s view as an endless cycling between opposed poles include Gregory Shaw, “Art 
and Dialectic in the Work of Wilson Harris” 125; Burns, “Creolization and the Collective Unconscious: 
Locating the Originality of Art in Wilson Harris’ Jonestown, The Mask of the Beggar and The Ghost of 
Memory” and “Philosophy of the imagination: time, immanence, and the events that wound us in Wilson 
Harris’s Jonestown.”  Bundy, contrastingly, argues that a new product—a synthesis—is produced in this 
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process of negotiation (“Preface: Cross-Cultural Community and the Womb of Space” in Selected Essays 
of Wilson Harris: The Unfinished Genesis of the Imagination, 73).   
21 Harris has rejected realism, both in total and component parts, numerous times, as have his 
commentators.  He especially rejects the validity of linear time and fixed concepts, and realism’s 
connection to imperialism.  See, for example, Harris and Charles H. Rowell, “An Interview with Wilson 
Harris;” Harris, “The Absent Presence: The Caribbean, Central and South America,” “Tradition and the 
West Indian Novel,” “Interview with Wilson Harris,” “Originality and Tradition” 125, and “Merlin and 
Parsifal: Adversarial Twins” 65; Henry, Caliban’s Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy 91, 
“Framing the Political: Self and Politics in Wilson Harris” 85, “Wilson Harris and Caribbean 
Philosophical Anthropology” 127, and “Intrasubjectivity in the philosophy of Wilson Harris” 213; Maes-
Jelinek, “‘Immanent Substance’: Reflections on the Creative Process in Wilson Harris’s The Infinite 
Rehearsal,” 68–69 and The Labyrinth of Universality: Wilson Harris’s Visionary Art of Fiction; James, 
“On Wilson Harris” in Spheres of Existence: Selected Writings 168; Nouri Gana, “Donne Undone: The 
Journey of Psychic Re-integration in Wilson Harris’s ‘Palace of the Peacock’” 158; Mary Lou Emery, 
“Limbo Rock: Wilson Harris and the Arts of Memory;” Gemma Robinson, “The reality of trespass: 
Wilson Harris and an impossible poetics of the Americas” 134; and Jeannine Murray-Román, “Rereading 
the Diminutive: Caribbean Chaos Theory in Antonio Benítez-Rojo, Edouard Glissant, and Wilson Harris” 
24. 
22 Critics who have tried to establish Harris as a postmodernist include Aldon L. Nielsen, “Hieroglyphics 
of Space: Wilson Harris in ‘The Waiting Room’”; Slemon, “‘Carnival’ and the Canon” 70; Burns, 
“Philosophy of the imagination: time, immanence, and the events that wound us in Wilson Harris’s 
Jonestown”; Headley, “Wilson Harris and Postmodernism: Beyond Cultural Incommensurability”; and 
Sam Durrant, Postcolonial Narrative and the Work of Mourning: J. M. Coetzee, Wilson Harris, and Toni 
Morrison 53–78.  Harris’s rejections of this label include: Monica Possi, “A Conversation with Wilson 
Harris” 264; Johnson, “Interview with Wilson Harris” 92; Harris, “Interview with Wilson Harris” in The 
Radical Imagination: Lectures and Talks 58, “Literacy and the Imagination—A Talk” 86.  See also 
Maes-Jelinek, “‘Latent Cross-Culturalities’: Wilson Harris’s and Wole Soyinka’s Creative Alternative to 
Theory” 42, “Ambivalent Clio: J.M. Coetzee’s In The Heart of the Country and Wilson Harris’s 
Carnival” 96, “Carnival of Fiction: Creative Masks of Recent Caribbean Writing,” and “‘Numinous 
Proportions’: Wilson Harris’s Alternative to All ‘Posts’”; and Louis Simon, “The Politics of Complex 
Faith: Wilson Harris’s Resurrection at Sorrow Hill.”  Some critics find the allegation that Harris’s 
fragmentation make him a postmodernist to belie a Western prejudice, including: Henry, Caliban’s 
Reason; Maes-Jelinek, “Europe and post-colonial creativity: a metaphysical cross-culturalism”; and Ian 
Adam, “Marginality and the Tradition: Earle Birney and Wilson Harris.”  These texts note that in addition 
to predating postmodernism, Harris’s fragmentation reflects the fragmentation of Caribbean society due 
to the lingering impacts of imperialism.   
23 For information on the process of alluvial and hard-rock mining in Guyana, see Sukrishnalall Pasha, 
Mark D. Wenner, and Dillon Clarke, “Toward the Greening of the Gold Mining Sector of Guyana: 
Transition Issues and Challenges.” 
24 For more information on the development of the postcolonial Guyanese state see Dennis Conway, 
“Misguided Directions, Mismanaged Models, or Missed Paths?” in Globalization and Neoliberalism: The 
Caribbean Context 29–50. 
25 See also Marcus Colchester, “Guyana: fragile frontier” 41–44.   
26 Lomarsh Roopnarine, “Wounding Guyana: Gold Mining and Environmental Degradation.” 
27 See also Slemon, “Post-Colonial Allegory and the Transformation of History” 159; and Paul Sharrad, 
“The Art of Memory and the Liberation of History: Wilson Harris’s Witnessing of Time” 104. 
28 Murray-Román, “Rereading the Diminutive.”  Other critics note that Harris’s repetition-with-difference 
makes possible palimpsestic perspectives on the same event; see Harris, “Interview with Wilson Harris” 
133 and “Quetzalcoatl and the Smoking Mirror (Reflections on Originality and Tradition)” 13; Lewis, 
“‘The Infinite Rehearsal’ and Pastoral Revision” 87; Peter Hitchcock, The Long Space: Transnationalism 
and Postcolonial Form 88; Kutzinski, “New Personalities: Race, Sexuality, and Gender in Wilson 
Harris’s Recent Fiction” 72; Louis Chude-Sokei, “Wilson Harris: An Ontological Promiscuity”; Mitchell, 
“The Seignory of Faust: Gnostic Scenery in The Infinite Rehearsal”; Kutzinski, “Realism and 
198 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Reversibility in Wilson Harris’s Carnival”; Niblett, “The Unfinished Body: Narrative, politics, and global 
community in Wilson Harris’s The Infinite Rehearsal”; Burns and Knepper, “Revisionary ‘-scapes’ of 
globality in the works of Wilson Harris” 128; and Maes-Jelinek, “Ambivalent Clio” 89.  Such multiple 
perspectives resist the notion of an attainable view of the whole; for more information, see Maes-Jelinek, 
“Ambivalent Clio” 95, “Another Future for Post-Colonial Studies?: Wilson Harris’ Post-Colonial 
Philosophy and the ‘Savage Mind’” 4, and “‘Immanent Substance’: Reflections on the Creative Process 
in Wilson Harris’s The Infinite Rehearsal”; Shaw, “Art and Dialectic in the Work of Wilson Harris;” 
Henry, Caliban’s Reason 103 and “Wilson Harris and Caribbean Philosophical Anthropology”; and 
Burns, “Creolization and the Collective Unconscious: Locating the Originality of Art in Wilson Harris’ 
Jonestown, The Mask of the Beggar and The Ghost of Memory.” 
 
Conclusion: 
   
1 Of course, the politics of prize-winning complicate this assertion.  IBM reported in 2018 that the Man 
Booker Prize is biased toward books with male protagonists, and only 14 Nobel Prize for Literature 
winners are women.  The editors of n + 1 note that publication and prize-winning have homogenized the 
books that do, and can, circulate to different cultures, especially in books that fetishize past disaster: “In 
the absence of political prospects, writers have produced backward-glancing narratives of trauma … 
World Lit trauma thematics mar the work of a number of acclaimed Jewish novelists, with characters 
discovering the source of everything in the Holocaust.”  Additionally, as James English asserts in The 
Economy of Prestige: Prizes, Awards, and the Circulation of Cultural Value, the organizations that award 
these prizes both recognize and shape literary style; recognizing one writer’s unique prose leads to a 
valorization of similar techniques (in English’s case, that of ambiguity) in other works as well.  See also 
Graham Huggin, “Prizing ‘Otherness’: A Short History of the Booker” for a discussion of the way the 
Booker shapes literary taste and reinforces its own understandings of literary value.     
Works Cited 
Abrams, M. H., and Geoffrey Galt Harpham.  A Glossary of Literary Terms, 8th ed.  
Thompson Wadsworth, 2005.   
Adler, Hans, and Wulf Koepke, eds.  A Companion to the Works of Johann Gottfried 
Herder.  Camden House, 2009.   
Adam, Ian. “Marginality and the Tradition: Earle Birney and Wilson Harris.”  Journal 
of Commonwealth Literature 24.1 (1989): 88–102. 
Adorno, Theodor.  Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life.  Trans. E. F. N. 
Jephcott.  Verso, 2004.     
Agacinski, Sylviane.  Aparté: Conceptions and Deaths of Søren Kiekegaard.  Trans. 
and introd. Kevin Newmark.  Florida State UP, 1988. 
Amert, Susan.  “The Dialectics of Closure in Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita.”  
The Russian Review 61 (2002): 599–617. 
Amusin, Mark.  “‘Your Novel Has Some More Surprises in Store for You’ (The 
Specificity of the Fantastic in The Master and Margarita).”  Russian Social 
Science Review 47.4 (2006): 62–73. 
Anderson, Benedict.  Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism.  Rev. ed. Verso, 2006. 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony.  “Cosmopolitan Patriots.”  Critical Inquiry 23.3, Front 
Lines/Border Posts (Spring 1997): 617–639.   
Apter, Emily.  The Translation Zone: A New Comparative Literature.  Princeton UP, 
2005.   
———.  Against World Literature: On the Politics of Untranslatability. Verso, 2013. 
Arac, Jonathan.  “Repetition and Exclusion: Coleridge and New Criticism 
Reconsidered.”  boundary 2 8.1, “The Problems of Reading in Contemporary 
American Criticism: A Symposium” (Autumn 1979): 261–274. 
Arnold, Matthew.  Essays in Criticism, 3rd ed.  Macmillan and Co., 1875. 
Asad, Talal.  “The Concept of Cultural Translation in British Social Anthropology.”  
Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography.  Ed. James Clifford 
and George E. Marcus.  U of California P, 1986.  141-64. 
Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin.  The Empire Writes Back: Theory and 
Practice in Post-colonial Literatures.  2nd ed.  Routledge, 2002.  
Assis, Machado de.  Philosopher or Dog?  Trans. Clotilde Wilson.  The Noonday Press, 
1992.   
Atkins, Stuart.  Goethe’s Faust: A Literary Analysis.  Harvard UP, 1958.   
———.  Essays on Goethe.  Ed. Jane K. Brown and Thomas P. Saine.  Camden House, 
1995.   
Auerbach, Erich.  “Philology and Weltliteratur.”  Trans. Maire and Edward Said.  The 
Centennial Review 13.1 (Winter 1969): 1–17.   
———.  Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature.  50th 
Anniversary edition.  Trans. Willard R. Trask.  Princeton UP, 2003.   
———.  Time, History, and Literature: Selected Essays of Erich Auerbach.  Ed. James 
I. Porter, trans. Jane O. Newman.  Princeton UP, 2014.   
200 
 
 
Bahrdt, Carl Friedrich.  Den neuesten Offenbarungen Gottes in Briefen und 
Erzählungen.  Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1773.  Digitized by the Universitäts- 
und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt. 
Bajorek, Jennifer.  Counterfeit Capital: Poetic Labor and Revolutionary Irony.  
Stanford UP, 2009.   
Barbe, Katharina. Irony in Context. John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1995.   
Barber, John.  Soviet Historians in Crisis, 1928–1932.  Holmes & Meier Publishers, 
Inc., 1981.  
Barnard, F. M.  Herder’s Social and Political Thought: From Enlightenment to 
Nationalism.  Clarendon Press, 1965.   
Barratt, Andrew.  Between Two Worlds: A Critical Introduction to The Master and 
Margarita.  Clarendon Press, 1987.   
Bassnett, Susan, and Harish Trivedi.  “Introduction: of colonies, cannibals and 
vernaculars.”  Post-colonial translation: theory & practice.  Ed. Susan Bassnett 
and Harish Trivedi.  Routledge, 1999.   
Beatie, Bruce A., and Phyllis W. Powell.  “Story and Symbol: Notes Toward a 
Structural Analysis of Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita.”  Russian 
Literature Triquarterly 15 (1978): 219–238. 
———. “Bulgakov, Dante, and Relativity.”  Canadian-American Slavic Studies 15.2–3 
(Summer–Fall 1981): 250–270. 
Beecroft, Alexander.  An Ecology of World Literature: From Antiquity to the Present 
Day.  Verso, 2015. 
Belenkiy, Ari.  “Master and Margarita: A Literary Autobiography?”  Literature and 
Theology 20.2 (June 2006): 126–139.   
Belyk, Kristina.  “The Master and Margarita: Deconstructing Social Realism.”  
http://www.masterandmargarita.eu.  Accessed March 24, 2019.   
Benjamin, Walter.  “The Task of the Translator.”  Selected Writings, Volume 1: 1913–
1926.  Ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings.  The Belknap Press of 
Harvard UP, 1996.  253–263.   
———.  “Translation: For and Against.”  Selected Writings, Volume 3: 1935–1938.  
Ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings.  The Belknap Press of Harvard 
UP, 2002.  249–252. 
Bennett, Benjamin.  “Vorspiel auf dem Theater”: The Ironic Basis of Goethe’s Faust.” 
The German Quarterly 49.4 (November 1976): 438–455.  
———.  Goethe’s Theory of Poetry: Faust and the Regeneration of Language.  Cornell 
UP, 1986. 
———. Beyond Theory: Eighteenth-Century German Literature and the Poetics of 
Irony.  Cornell UP, 1993.   
Bennett, Robert.  “Tradition and the Marginalized Talent: Reading Wilson Harris’s 
Carnival as a Postcolonial Revision of Dante’s Commedia.”  Journal of 
Commonwealth and Postcolonial Studies 6.1 (Spring 1999): 4–29. 
Bethea, David M.  The Shape of Apocalypse in Modern Russian Fiction.  Princeton UP, 
1989. 
201 
 
 
Beyer, Stefan. “Goethean Rhymes and Rhythms in Verse Translations of Faust Into 
Spanish” MonTI 5trans, 2013. 
Bhabha, Homi.  The Location of Culture.  Routledge, 1994. 
———. “Unsatisfied: Notes on Vernacular Cosmopolitanism.”  Text and Nation: 
Cross-Disciplinary Essays on Cultural and National Identities.  Ed. Laura 
Garcia-Moreno and Peter C. Pfeiffer. Columbia UP, 1996.   
Biswanger, Hans Christoph.  Money and Magic: A Critique of the Modern Economy in 
the Light of Goethe’s Faust.  Trans. J. E. Harrison.  U of Chicago P, 1994. 
Blackmur, R. P.  The Lion and the Honeycomb: Essays in Solicitude and Critique.  
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955. 
———.  “A Psychologist Looks at Poetry.” VQR 11.4 (1935).  
https://www.vqronline.org/essay/psychologist-looks-poetry.  Accessed March 
21, 2019.   
Blanshard, Brand.  Reason and Belief.  Yale UP, 1975.   
Bohm, Arnd.  Goethe’s Faust and the European Epic: Forgetting the Future.  Camden 
House, 2007.   
Boland, Val.  “Theme and Coherence in Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita.”  The 
Slavic East European Journal 15.4 (Winter 1972): 427–437. 
Booth, Wayne C.  A Rhetoric of Irony.  U of Chicago P, 1974. 
Bové, Paul A.  Destructive Poetics: Heidegger and Modern American Poetry.  
Columbia UP, 1980. 
Boyle, Nicholas.  Goethe: The Poet and the Age, Volumes I and II.  Clarendon P, 2000. 
Brandenberger, David.  National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation 
of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956.  Harvard UP, 2002.   
Brandenberger, David, and Mikhail V. Zelenov.  “Stalin’s Answer to the National 
Question: A Case Study on the Editing of the 1938 Short Course.”  Slavic 
Review 73.4 (Winter 2014): 859–880.   
Brennan, Timothy.  Salman Rushdie and the Third World: Myths of the Nation.  St. 
Martin’s Press, Inc., 1989.   
———.  “The case against irony.”  The Journal of Commonwealth Literature 49.3 
(2014): 379–394.   
———.  Borrowed Light: Vico, Hegel, and the Colonies.  Stanford UP, 2014.   
Brinkmann, Richard.  “Goethe’s ‘Werther’ und Gottfried Arnolds ‘Kirchen- und 
Ketzerhistorie.’”  Versuche zu Goethe.  Fetschrift für Erich Heller.  Lothar 
Stiehm Verlag, 1976.   
Brooks, Cleanth.  The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry.  Harcourt, 
Brace & World, 1947. 
———.  “Irony as a Principle of Structure.”  Literary Opinion in America: Essays 
Illustrating the Status, Methods, and Problems of Criticism in the United States 
in the Twentieth Century.  Ed. Morton Zabel.  Rev. ed.  Harper, 1951. 729–41. 
Brooks, Cleanth, and Robert Penn Warren.  Understanding Fiction.  2nd ed.  Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1959. 
Brown, Dale W. Understanding Pietism.  William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1978. 
202 
 
 
Brown, Jane K.  Goethe’s Faust: The German Tragedy.  Cornell UP, 1986.   
———.  Faust: Theater of the World.  Twayne Publishers, 1992.   
———.  Goethe’s Allegories of Identity.  U of Pennsylvania P, 2014.   
Brown, Jane K., et al., eds.  Interpreting Goethe’s Faust Today.  Camden House, 1994.   
Buck-Morss, Susan. Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History.  U of Pittsburgh P, 2009.   
Bulgakov, Mikhail.  The Master and Margarita.  Trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa 
Volokhonsky.  Penguin Books, 1997.   
Burgers, Christian et. al. “HIP: A Method for Linguistic Hyperbole Identification in 
Discourse.” Metaphor and Symbol 31.3 (2016): 163–178. 
Burgers, Christian, Margot van Mulken, and Peter Jan Schellens. “The use of co-textual 
irony markers in written discourse.”  Humor 26.1 (2013): 45–68.   
Burke, Kenneth.  The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action.  2nd ed.  
Louisiana State UP, 1967.  
Burns, Lorna M.  “Creolization and the Collective Unconscious: Locating the 
Originality of Art in Wilson Harris’ Jonestown, The Mask of the Beggar and The 
Ghost of Memory.”  Postcolonial Text 4.2 (2008). 
———.  “Philosophy of the imagination: time, immanence, and the events that wound 
us in Wilson Harris’s Jonestown.”  Journal of Postcolonial Writing 49.2 (2013): 
174–186. 
Burns, Lorna, and Wendy Knepper.  “Revisionary ‘-scapes’ of globality in the works of 
Wilson Harris.”  Journal of Postcolonial Writing 49.2 (2013): 127–132. 
Butler, E. M.  The Fortunes of Faust.  Cambridge UP, 1979. 
Butler, Judith.  Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.  Routledge, 
1990. 
Cain, William E.  “Deconstruction in America: The Recent Literary Criticism of J. 
Hillis Miller.” College English 41.4 (December 1979): 367–382. 
Campbell, Ted A. The Religion of the Heart: A Study of European Religious Life in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.  U of South Carolina P, 1991. 
Caribbean Countries Mining and Mineral Industry Handbook, Volume 1: Strategic 
Information and Regulations.  International Business Publications, 2015.  226–
258. 
Carus, Paul.  “Goethe and Criticism.”  The Open Court.  301–305.   
Casanova, Pascale.  The World Republic of Letters.  Trans. M. B. DeBevoise.  Harvard 
UP, 2004.   
Cassin, Barbara, and Emily Apter.  Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical 
Lexicon.  Trans. Steven Rendall.  Princeton UP, 2014. 
Cervantes, Miguel de.  Don Quixote.  Trans. Samuel Putnam.  The Modern Library, 
1998.   
Chakrabarty, Dipesh.  Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference.  Princeton UP, 2000.   
Chambers, Ross.  Room for Maneuver: Reading (the) Oppositional (in) Narrative.  The 
U of Chicago P, 1991. 
Cheah, Pheng.  What is a World? On Postcolonial Literature as World Literature.  
Duke UP, 2016.  
203 
 
 
Chekhov, Anton.  Three sisters: A drama in four acts.  Trans. Michael Frayn.  Methuen, 
1983. 
Chisholm, David.  Goethe’s Knittelvers: A Prosodic Analysis.  Bouvier Verlag Herbert 
Grundmann, 1975.  
———.  “Daniel Call’s Schocker: German Knittelvers in the late twentieth century.”  
Studia Metrica et Poetica 4.2 (2017): 7–30.   
Chudakova, Marietta.  “The Master and Margarita: The Development of a Novel.”  
Trans. Phyllis Powell.  Russian Literature Triquarterly 15 (1978): 177–209.   
Chude-Sokei, Louis.  “Wilson Harris: An Ontological Promiscuity.”  ASAP Journal.  
August 6, 2018.  http://asapjournal.com/wilson-harris-an-ontological-
promiscuity-louis-chude-sokei/.  Accessed March 24, 2019.   
Clark, Robert T.  Herder: His Life and Thought.  U of California P, 1955.   
Clark, Katerina.  The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual.  2nd ed.  U of Chicago P, 1985.   
Coetzee, J. M.  Foe.  Penguin Books, 1987.   
Colebrook, Claire.  Irony.  Routledge, 2004. 
Colchester, Marcus. “Guyana: fragile frontier.”  Race & Class 38.4 (1997): 33–56. 
Colchester, Marcus, Jean La Rose, and Kid James.  Mining and Amerindians in 
Guyana: Final Report of the APA/NSI project on ‘Exploring Indigenous 
Perspective on Consultation and Engagement within the Mining Sector in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.’ The North-South Institute, 2002. 
Conway, Dennis.  “Misguided Directions, Mismanaged Models, or Missed Paths?”  
Globalization and Neoliberalism: The Caribbean Context. Ed. Thomas Klak. 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998.  29–50 
Cornelis, Karen.  “When Graves are Broke Up Again: ‘Relics’ of John Donne’s Poetry 
in The Carnival Trilogy: Wilson Harris Reopens the Grave of History.”  Journal 
of Caribbean Literatures 2:1, 2, 3: 179–186. 
Cotter, Sean.  “The Soviet Translation: Romanian Literary Translators after World War 
Two.” Meta 53.4 (December 2008): 841–859. 
Cour, Amy de la.  “An Interpretation of the Occult Symbolism in Mikhail Bulgakov’s 
The Master and Margarita.”  Slavonica 11.2: 179–188. 
Cretu, Andrei.  “‘Memento Mori’: A Hypothesis on the Genesis of Bulgakov’s The 
Master and Margarita.”  The Slavic and East European Journal 54.3 (2010): 
434–452. 
Currie, Mark.  The Unexpected: Narrative Temporality and the Philosophy of Surprise.  
Edinburgh UP, 2013. 
Curtis, J. A. E. Bulgakov’s Last Decade: The Writer as Hero.  Cambridge UP, 1987.   
D’Haen, Theo, David Damrosch, and Djelal Kadir, eds.  The Routledge Companion to 
World Literature.  Routledge, 2011.   
Damrosch, David.  What Is World Literature ?  Princeton UP, 2003.   
———.  “Review: Against World Literature: On the Politics of Untranslatability by 
Emily Apter.”  Comparative Literature Studies 51.3 (2014): 504–508.   
Damrosch, David, Natalie Melas, and Mbongiseni Buthelezi, eds.  The Princeton 
Sourcebook in Comparative Literature : From the Enlightenment to the Global 
Present.  Princeton UP, 2009. 
204 
 
 
Dane, Joseph.  A Critical Mythology of Irony.  The U of Georgia P, 2011.   
David, Jérôme.  “The Four Genealogies of ‘World Literature.’” Approaches to World 
Literature.  Ed. Joachim Küpper.  Akademie Verlag, 2013. 
Davis, Garrick, ed.  Praising it New: The Best of the New Criticism.  Swallow Press / 
Ohio UP, 2008. 
De Man, Paul.  Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary 
Criticism. Oxford UP, 1971. 
———.  Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism.  
Introd. Wlad Godzich.  2nd ed.  U of Minnesota P, 1983.   
———.  The Resistance to Theory.  U of Minnesota P, 1986.   
———.  Aesthetic Ideology.  Ed. and introd. Andrzej Warminski.  U of Minnesota P, 
1996. 
Defoe, Daniel.  Robinson Crusoe.  Oxford UP, 2007.   
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari.  Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.  U of 
Minnesota P, 1983. 
Delfino, Gianluca.  Time, History, and Philosophy in the Works of Wilson Harris.  2nd 
rev. and exp. edition.  ibidem-Verlag, 2016. 
Derrida, Jacques.  Dissemination.  Trans. and introd. Barbara Johnson.  The U of 
Chicago P, 1981. 
———. Aporias.  Trans. Thomas Dutoit.  Stanford UP, 1993.   
———.  Of Grammatology. 40th anniversary ed.  Trans. and introd. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak.  Johns Hopkins UP, 2016.   
Dieckmann, Liselotte.  Goethe’s Faust: A Critical Reading.  Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972.   
Dubois, Dominique.  “Wilson Harris’s ‘Infinite Rehearsal’ or the Imaginative 
Reconstruction of History.”  Commonwealth 21.1 (Fall 1998): 37–45.   
Durrani, Osman.  “Biblical Borrowings in Goethe’s Faust: A Historical Survey of Their 
Interpretation.”  The Modern Language Review 72.4 (1977): 829–844. 
———.  Faust and the Bible: A Study of Goethe’s Use of Scriptural Allusions and 
Chrstian Religious Motifs in Faust I and II.  Peter Lang, 1977. 
Durrant, Sam.  Postcolonial Narrative and the Work of Mourning: J. M. Coetzee, 
Wilson Harris, and Toni Morrison.  State U of New York P, 2004. 
Eckermann, Johann Peter.  Conversations of Goethe.  Trans. John Oxenford.  Ed. J. K. 
Moorhead.  Da Capo Press, 1998.   
Edwards, T. R. N. Three Russian writers and the irrational: Zamyatin, Pil’nyak, and 
Bulgakov.  Cambridge UP, 1982. 
Eggers, Dave.  A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius.  Vintage Books, 2001. 
Eibl, Karl. “Zur Bedeutung der Wette im ‘Faust.’” Goethe Jahrbuch (1999): 271–280. 
Elbaum, Henry.  “The Evolution of The Master and Margarita: Text, Context, 
Intertext.”  Canadian Slavonic Papers 37.1 (1995): 59–87.   
Emery, Mary Lou.  “Limbo Rock: Wilson Harris and the Arts of Memory.”  Callaloo 
18.1, Wilson Harris: A Special Issue (Winter 1995): 110–124. 
Empson, William.  The Structure of Complex Words. The Hogarth Press, 1985. 
———.  The Seven Types of Ambiguity.  New Directions, 1966. 
205 
 
 
English, James.  The Economy of Prestige: Prizes, Awards, and the Circulation of 
Cultural Value.  Harvard UP, 2005. 
Ergang, Robert Reinhold.  Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism.  
Columbia UP, 1931.   
Ericson, Edward E.  “The Satanic Incarnation: Parody in Bulgakov’s The Master and 
Margarita.”  The Russian Review 33.1 (1974): 20–36. 
Farrelly, Daniel J. Goethe and inner harmony: A study of the ‘schöne Seele’ in the 
Apprenticeship of Wilhelm Meister.  Irish UP, 1973.   
Faull, Katherine M. “Faith and Imagination: Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf’s Anti-
Enlightenment Philosophy of Self.”  The Bucknell Review 38.2 (January 1995): 
23–56. 
Fazzini, Marco.  Resisting Alterities: Wilson Harris and Other Avatars of Otherness.  
Rodopi, 2004. 
Fiene, Donald M.  “A Comparison of the Soviet and Possev Editions of The Master and 
Margarita, With a Note on Interpretation of the Novel.”  Canadian-American 
Slavic Studies 15.2–3 (Summer–Fall 1981): 330–354. 
Fenger, Henning.  Kierkegaard, the Myths and Their Origins: Studies in the 
Kierkegaardian Papers and Letters.  Trans. George C. Schoolfield.  Yale UP, 
1980.   
Ferris, David.  “Indiscipline.”  Comparative Literature in an Age of Globalization.  Ed 
Haun Saussy.  The Johns Hopkins UP, 2004.   
Fisk, Gloria.  “‘Against World Literature’: The Debate in Retrospect.”  The American 
Reader. http://theamericanreader.com/against-world-literature-the-debate-in-
retrospect/.  Accessed March 23, 2019.   
Fitzpatrick, Sheila, ed.  Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931.  Indiana UP, 1978. 
Fitzsimmons, Lorna, ed.  Goethe’s Faust and Cultural Memory: Comparatist Interfaces.  
Lehigh UP, 2012. 
Frye, Northrup.  “The Road to Excess.” Myth and Symbol: Critical Approaches and 
Applications.  Ed. Bernice Slote.  4th ed.  U of Nebraska P, 1963.    
———.  Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays.  U of Toronto P, 2006.   
Gana, Mouri.  “Donne Undone: The Journey of Psychic Re-integration in Wilson 
Harris’s ‘Palace of the Peacock.’”  ariel: A Review of International English 
Literature 32.1 (January 2001): 153–170. 
Geldern, James von.  “Conclusion: Epic Revisionism and the Crafting of a Soviet 
Public.”  Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as Stalinist 
Propaganda.  Eds. Kevin M. F. Platt and David Brandenberger.  U of Wisconsin 
P, 2006.  325–340.   
Gemeda, Eshete.  African Egalitarian Values and Indigenous Genres: A Comparative 
Approach to the Functional and Contextual Studies of Oromo National 
Literature in a Contemporary Perspective.  LIT, 2012.   
Geary, John.  Goethe’s Faust: The Making of Part I.  Yale UP, 1981.   
Gikandi, Simon.  “Realism, Romance, and the Problem of African Literary History.”  
MLQ 73.3 (2012): 309–328. 
Glicksberg, Charles I.  The Ironic Vision in Modern Literature.  Martius Nijhoff, 1969. 
206 
 
 
Graff, Gerald.  Literature Against Itself: Literary Ideas in Modern Society.  The U of 
Chicago P, 1979. 
———.  “What Was New Criticism?: Literary Interpretation and Scientific 
Objectivity.”  Salmagundi 27 (Summer–Fall 1974): 72–93. 
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. Faust.  Trans. Walter Kaufmann.  Anchor Books, 1961. 
———.  “Some Passages Pertaining to the Concept of World Literature.”  Comparative 
Literature: The Early Years. An Anthology of Essays.  Ed. Hans-Joachim Schulz 
and Phillip H. Rhein.  The U of North Carolina P, 1973.    
———.  Faust: Historische-kritische Edition.  Ed.  Anne Bohnenkamp, Silke Henke, 
and Fotis Jannidis.  Frankfurter Goethe-Haus, 2018. http://faustedition.net/.  
Accessed May 12, 2019.   
Gray, Ronald Douglas.  Goethe the Alchemist: A Study of Alchemical Symbolism in 
Goethe’s Literary and Scientific Works.  Cambridge UP, 1952.   
Gurewitch, Morton.  The Ironic Temper and the Comic Imagination.  Wayne State UP, 
1994.   
Haber, Edythe C.  “The Mythic Structure of Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita.”  
The Russian Review 34.4 (1975): 382–409. 
———.  “The Lamp with the Green Shade: Mikhail Bulgakov and his Father.”  The 
Russian Review 44.4 (October 1985): 333–350. 
———.  “The Mythic Bulgakov: The Master and Margarita and Arthur Drews’s The 
Christ Myth.”  The Slavic and East European Journal 43.2 (1999): 347–360. 
Handwerk, Gary J.  Irony and Ethics in Narrative: From Schlegel to Lacan.  Yale UP, 
1985.   
Hannay, Alastair.  Kierkegaard: A Biography. Cambridge UP, 2001.   
Hansen, Janice Elizabeth.  “Redeeming Faustus: Tracing the pacts of Mariken and Faust 
from the 1500s to the present.”  2016.  University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, PhD Dissertation. 
Haraway, Donna.   Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of 
Nature.  Routledge, 1991. 
Harris, Wilson.  “Art and Criticism.”  Tradition, the Writer and Society.  New Beacon 
Publications, 1967. 
———.  “The Quest for Form.”  Kunapipi 5.1 (1983): 21–27.   
———.  The Infinite Rehearsal.  Faber and Faber, 1987.   
———.  “Comedy and Modern Allegory: A Personal View” in A Shaping of 
Connections: Commonwealth Literature Studies—Then and Now, Essays in 
Honour of A. N. Jeffares.  Ed. Hena Maes-Jelinek, Kirsten Holst Petersen, and 
Anna Rutherford.  Dangaroo Press, 1989.  127–140.   
———.  The Radical Imagination: Lectures and Talks. Ed. Alan Riach and Mark 
Williams.  L3—Liège Language and Literature, 1992. 
———.  “Quetzalcoatl and the Smoking Mirror (Reflections on Originality and 
Tradition).”  Review of Contemporary Fiction 17.2 (1997): 12–23. 
———.  Selected Essays of Wilson Harris: The Unfinished Genesis of the Imagination.  
Ed. A. J. M. Bundy.  Routledge, 1999.   
207 
 
 
Harris, Wilson, and Kerry Johnson.  “Interview with Wilson Harris.”  The Journal of 
Caribbean Literatures 1.1 (Spring 1997): 83–98. 
Harris, Wilson, and Monica Possi.  “A Conversation with Wilson Harris.”  The Journal 
of Caribbean Literatures 2.1, 2, and 3: 260–271. 
Haris, Wilson, and Charles H. Rowell.  “An Interview with Wilson Harris.”  Callaloo 
18.1, Wilson Harris: A Special Issue (Winter 1995): 191–200. 
Hartman, Geoffrey.  Beyond Formalism: Literary Essays 1958–1970.  Yale UP, 1970. 
Hartwich, Wolf-Daniel. “Nichtchristliche ‘Offenbarung.’”  Goethe und die Bibel.  Ed. 
Johannes Anderegg and Edith Anna Kunz.  Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2005.  
111–134. 
Hatfield, Henry.  Aesthetic Paganism in German Literature: From Winckelmann to the 
Death of Goethe. Harvard UP, 1964. 
———.  “The Walpurgis Night: Theme and Variations.”  Journal of European Studies 
8 (1983): 56–74. 
Haugerud, Jennifer. No Billionaire Left Behind: Satirical Activism in America.  Stanford 
UP, 2013. 
Hawkes, David.  The Faust Myth: Religion and the Rise of Representation.  Palgrave, 
2007. 
Headley, Clevis.  “Wilson Harris and Postmodernism: Beyond Cultural 
Incommensurability.”  The CLR James Journal (Winter 1999/2000): 20–58. 
Hedges, Inez.  Framing Faust: Twentieth-Century Cultural Struggles.  Southern Illinois 
UP, 2005.   
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich.  Lectures on the History of Philosophy.  Volume 1.  
Trans. E. S. Haldane. The Humanities Press Inc., 1955. 
———.  The Philosophy of History.  Trans. J. Sibree.  Dover Publications, Inc., 1956. 
———.  Phenomenology of Spirit.  Trans. A. V. Miller, analysis J. N. Findlay.  Oxford 
UP, 1977.   
———.  Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics.  Trans. Bernard Bosanquet.  Penguin 
Books, 1993. 
Heiberg, Johan Ludvig.  On the significance of philosophy for the present age.  Ed. and 
trans. Jon Stewart. C.A. Reitzel, 2005. 
Heller, Erich.  The Artist’s Journey into the Interior and Other Essays.  Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1965.   
Henry, Paget.  “Wilson Harris and Caribbean Philosophical Anthropology.”  The CLR 
James Journal (Winter 1999/2000): 104–134. 
———.  “Framing the Political: Self and Politics in Wilson Harris.”  The Journal of 
Caribbean Literatures 2.1, 2, and 3: 82–95. 
———.  Caliban’s Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy.  Routledge, 2000. 
———.  “Intrasubjectivity in the philosophy of Wilson Harris.”  Journal of 
Postcolonial Writing 49.2 (2013): 209–221. 
Herder, Johann Gottfried.  Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man.  Trans. T. 
Churchill.  Bergman Publishers, 1966.   
———.  J. G. Herder on Social and Political Culture.  Ed. and trans. F. M. Barnard.  
Cambridge UP, 1969.   
208 
 
 
———.  Johann Gottfried Herder—Selected Early Works, 1764–1767: Addresses, 
Essays, and Drafts; Fragments on Recent German Literature. Ed. Ernest A. 
Menze and Karl Menges.  Trans. Ernest A. Menze and Michael Palma.  
Pennsylvania State UP, 1992. 
———.  On World History: An Anthology.  Ed. Hans Adler and Ernest A. Menze.  
Trans. Ernest A. Menze with Michael Palma.  Routledge, 1996.   
———.  Philosophical Writings.  Ed. and trans. Michael N. Forster.  Cambridge UP, 
2002.   
———.  Selected Writings on Aesthetics.  Trans. and ed. Gregory Moore.  Princeton 
UP, 2006.   
Hitchcock, Peter.  The Long Space: Transnationalism and Postcolonial Form.  Stanford 
UP, 2010. 
Hoisington, Sona.   “Fairy-Tale Elements in Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita.”  
The Slavic and East European Journal 25.2 (1981): 44–55. 
Holm, Søren.  Søren Kierkegaards Historiefilosofi.  Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1952. 
Huggan, Graham.  “Prizing ‘Otherness’: A Short History of the Booker.”  Studies in the 
Novel 29.3 (Fall 1997): 412-433.   
Hulse, James W.  The Reputations of Socrates: The Afterlife of a Gadfly.  Peter Lang, 
1995.   
Hunte, Nicola.  “Concepts of a Cross-Cultural Imagination: Wilson Harris’s Critical 
Vision as a Way of Reading Narratives of Memory.”  Shibboleths: A Journal of 
Comparative Theory and Criticism 4.1 (2016): 42–60.   
Hunter, Ian.  “The History of Theory.”  Critical Inquiry 33.1 (Autumn 2006): 78–112. 
Hutcheon, Linda.  Irony’s Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony.  Routledge, 1994.   
———.  A Theory of Adaptation. Routledge, 2006.   
Ilgner, Richard.  “Goethe’s ‘Geist, der stets verneint’, and its Emergence in the Faust 
works of Odoevsky, Lunacharsky and Bulgakov.”  Germano-Slavica 2 (1978): 
169–80. 
James, C. L. R.  “On Wilson Harris.”  Spheres of Existence: Selected Writings.  Allison 
and Busby, 1980.  157–172.   
Jantz, Harold.  Goethe’s Faust as a Renaissance Man: Parallels and Prototypes.  
Princeton UP, 1951.   
———.  The Form of Faust: The Work of Art and Its Intrinsic Structures.  The Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1978.   
Johnson, Vida Taranovski.  “The Thematic Function of the Narrator in The Master and 
Margarita.”  Canadian-American Slavic Studies 15.2–3 (1981): 271–86. 
Johnson, Kerry L. “Translations of Gender, Pain, and Space: Wilson Harris’s The 
Carnival Trilogy.”  Modern Fiction Studies 44.1 (Spring 1998): 123–143 
Jones, Dylan.  “How social media (finally) killed irony.”  GQ.  July 8, 2018.  
https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/how-social-media-finally-killed-irony.  
Accessed March 19, 2019. 
Kaufmann, Walter. From Shakespeare to Existentialism.  Beacon Press, 1959.    
———.  Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre.  New American Library, 1975.   
Kadir, Djelal, ed. World Literature Today.  1991–1997. 
209 
 
 
Keim, Katharina. “Contemporary African and Brazilian Adaptations of Goethe’s Faust 
in Postcolonial Context.”  International Faust Studies: Adaptation, Reception, 
Translation Ed. Lorna Fitzsimmons.  Continuum, 2008.  244–258. 
Kemper, Hans-Georg, and Hans Schneider, eds.  Goethe und der Pietismus.  Verlag der 
Franckeschen Stiftungen Halle im Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen, 2001. 
Kermode, Frank.  The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction.  Oxford UP, 
2000. 
Kierkegaard, Søren.  The Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to Socrates.  Trans. 
Lee M. Capel.  New York: Harper & Row, 1966.  Print. 
———.  The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates.  Ed. and trans. 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong.  Princeton UP, 1989. 
———.  Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks Volume 1: Journals AA–DD.  Ed. 
Niels Jørgen Cappelørn et al.  Princeton UP, 2007.   
Kilito, Abdelfattah.  Thou Shalt Not Speak My Language.  Trans. Waïl S. Hassan.  
Syracuse UP, 2008.   
Kirmmse, Bruce H.  Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark.  Indiana UP, 1990.  
Knoll, Samson B.  “Herder’s Concept of Humanität.”  Johann Gottfried Herder, 
Innovator Through the Ages.  Ed. Wulf Koepke and Samson B. Knoll.  Bouvier 
Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1982.   
Knox, Dilwyn.  Ironia: Medieval and Renaissance Ideas on Irony.  E. J. Brill, 1989.   
Knox, Norman.  The Word Irony and Its Context, 1500–1755.  Duke UP, 1961. 
Kovac, Anton.  “The Problem of Good and Evil in Bulgakov’s Novel The Master and 
Margarita.”  New Zealand Slavonic Journal (Summer 1968): 26–34. 
Krimmer, Elisabeth.  “Then Say What Your Religion Is”: Goethe, Religion, and Faust.” 
Religion, Reason, and Culture in the Age of Goethe.  Ed. Elisabeth Krimmer and 
Patricia Anne Simpson.  Camden House, 2013.  99–119.   
Kutzinski, Vera M.  “The Composition of Reality: A Conversation with Wilson Harris.”  
Calalloo 18.1, Wilson Harris: A Special Issue (Winter 1995): 13–32.   
———.  “New Personalities: Race, Sexuality, and Gender in Wilson Harris’s Recent 
Fiction.”  Review of Contemporary Fiction 17.2 (Summer 1997): 72–83. 
———.  “Realism and Reversibility in Wilson Harris’s Carnival.”  Journal of 
Caribbean Literatures 2.1, 2, 3: 147–167. 
Lang, Candace.  Irony/Humor: Critical Paradigms.  The Johns Hopkins UP, 1987 
Lee, Yoon Sun.  Nationalism and Irony: Burke, Scott, Carlyle.  Oxford UP, 2004. 
Lentricchia, Frank.  After the New Criticism.  The U of Chicago P, 1980. 
Lewis, Krishna Ray.  “‘The Infinite Rehearsal’ and Pastoral Revision.”  Callaloo 18.1, 
Wilson Harris: A Special Issue (Winter 1995): 83–92. 
Linder, Luz-María. Goethes Bibelrezeption: Hermeneutische Reflexion, fiktionale 
Darstellung, historisch-kritische Bearbeitung.  Peter Lang, 1998. 
Lisi, Leonardo F. Marginal Modernity: The Aesthetics of Dependency from 
Kierkegaard to Joyce. Fordham UP, 2013. 
Longinović, Thomislav Z. Borderline Culture: The Politics of Identity in Four 
Twentieth-Century Slavic Novels.  U of Arkansas P, 1993. 
210 
 
 
Lu, Xun.  “The True Story of Ah Q.”  Diary of a Madman and Other Stories.  Trans. 
William A. Lydell.  U of Hawai’i P, 1990.   
Lukács, Georg.  Goethe and His Age.  Trans. Robert Anchor.  Merlin Press, 1968.   
Luther, Martin, and Kurt Aland. Martin Luther's 95 Theses: With the Pertinent 
Documents from the History of the Reformation. Concordia Publishing House, 
1967.  
Lyden, John C.  Film as Religion: Myths, Morals, and Rituals.  NYU P, 2003. 
Mackey, Louis.  Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet.  U of Pennsylvania P, 1971.   
MacKinnon, Elaine McClarnand.  “Writing History for Stalin: Isaak Izrailevich Mints 
and the Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny.”  Kritika: Explorations in Russian and 
Eurasian History 6.1 (2005): 5–54. 
Maes-Jelinek, Hena.  “Ambivalent Clio: J.M. Coetzee’s In The Heart of the Country 
and Wilson Harris’s Carnival.”  Journal of Commonwealth Literature 2.1 
(1987): 87–98. 
———.  “The Wisdom of Uncertainty: ‘Re-Visionary Strategies’ in Wilson Harris’s 
‘The Infinite Rehearsal.’”  Semper Aliquid Novi.  Littérature comparée et 
Littérature d’Afrique.  Mélanges offerts à Albert Gérard.  Ed. János Riesz and 
Alain Ricard.  Gunter Nar, 1989.  157–166. 
———.  “‘Numinous Proportions’: Wilson Harris’s Alternative to All ‘Posts.’”  Past 
the Last Post: Theorizing Post-Colonialism and Post-Modernism.  Ed. Ian Adam 
and Helen Tiffin.  U of Calgary P, 1990.  47–64. 
———.  “‘Ulyssean Carnival’: Epic Metamorphoses in Wilson Harris’s Trilogy.”  
Callaloo 18.1, Wilson Harris: A Special Issue (Winter 1995): 45–58. 
———.  “Another Future for Post-Colonial Studies?: Wilson Harris’ Post-Colonial 
Philosophy and the ‘Savage Mind.’”  Wasafiri 24 (Autumn 1996): 3–8. 
———.  “Carnival of Fiction: Creative Masks of Recent Caribbean Writing.”  
Anglistentag: Proceedings of the conference of the German Association of 
University Teachers of English, vol. 19. Ed. Raimund Borgmeier.  WVT 
Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 1998. 127–137. 
———.  “‘Latent Cross-Culturalities’: Wilson Harris’s and Wole Soyinka’s Creative 
Alternative to Theory.”  European Journal of English Studies 2.1 (1998): 37–48. 
———.  “‘Immanent Substance’: Reflections on the Creative Process in Wilson 
Harris’s The Infinite Rehearsal.” The CLR James Journal (Winter 1999/2000): 
59–77. 
———.  “Europe and post-colonial creativity: a metaphysical cross-culturalism.”  
European Review 13.1 (2006): 91–102. 
———.  The Labyrinth of Universality: Wilson Harris’s Visionary Art of Fiction. 
Rodopi, 2006 
Mahlow, Elena N.  Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita: The Text as Cipher.  Vantage 
Press, 1975. 
Malantschuk, Gregor.  Kierkegaard’s Thought.  Trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong. Princeton UP, 1971. 
Malik, Habib C.  Receiving Søren Kierkgaard: The Early Impact and Transmission of 
His Thought.  The Catholic U of America P, 1997.   
211 
 
 
Marchand, Susanne. German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and 
Scholarship.  Cambridge UP, 2009.   
Mateo Marta.  “The Translation of Irony.”  Meta 40.1 (March 1995): 171–178. 
Mason, Eudo C.  Goethe’s Faust: Its Genesis and Purport.  U of California P, 1967.   
McIntyre, Sean M.  “Aesthetic Liberalism and Literary Autonomy in the Kunstperiode.”  
2003.  Stanford U, PhD Dissertation.   
Mead, Rebecca.  “Jeremy Corbyn and the English Fetishization of Irony.”  The New 
Yorker.  August 27, 2018.  https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-
comment/the-english-fetishization-of-irony.  Accessed March 24, 2019. 
Mellor, Anne K.  English Romantic Irony. Harvard UP, 1980. 
Merrill, Jessica E.  “The Stalinist Subject and Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and 
Margarita.”  The Russian Review 74 (2015): 293–310. 
Mesnard, Pierre.  Le vrai visage de Kierkegaard.  Beauchesne et ses fils, 1948.   
Mills, Judith M.  “Of dreams, devils, irrationality and The Master and Margarita.”  
Russian Literature and Psychoanalysis. Ed. Daniel Rancour-Laferriere.  John 
Benjamins Publishing Company, 1989.  303–328 
Milne, Lesley.  The Master and Margarita: A Comedy of Victory.  Birmingham 
Slavonic Monographs no. 3.  University of Birmingham, 1977.   
Mitchell, Michael.  “The Seignory of Faust: Gnostic Scenery in The Infinite Rehearsal.”  
Journal of Caribbean Literatures 2.1, 2, and 3: 168–178. 
———.  Hidden Mutualities: Faustian Themes from Gnostic Origins to the 
Postcolonial.  Rodopi, 2006. 
Mnookin, Seth.  “In Disaster’s Aftermath, Once-Cocky Media Culture Disses the Age 
of Irony.” Inside.com.  September 18, 2001.  Accessed March 26, 2019.   
Mooney, Edward F.  On Søren Kierkegaard: Dialogue, Polemics, Lost Intimacy, and 
Time. Ashgate, 2007.   
Moretti, Franco.  Modern Epic: The World-System from Goethe to García Márquez. 
Trans. Quintin Hoare.  Verso, 1996.   
———.  Graphs, Maps, Trees: Abstract Models for Literary History.  Verso, 2005.   
———.  Distant Reading.  Verso, 2013. 
Moss, Kevin.  “Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita: Masking the Supernatural and 
the Secret Police.”  Russian Language Journal 38.129–130 (1984): 115–131. 
Muecke, D. C.  The Compass of Irony. Methuen, 1969.  
———.   Irony and the Ironic.  Methuen, 1982.    
Mufti, Aamir.  Forget English!: Orientalisms and World Literatures.  Harvard UP, 
2016.   
Murray-Román, Jeannine.  “Rereading the Diminutive: Caribbean Chaos Theory in 
Antonio Benítez-Rojo, Edouard Glissant, and Wilson Harris.”  small axe 46 
(March 2015): 20–46. 
Muthu, Sankar.  Enlightenment Against Empire.  Princeton UP, 2003.   
Nagley, Winfield E.  “Kierkegaard on Liberation.”  Ethics 70.1 (October 1959): 47–58.   
Newmark, Kevin.  “Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: The Space of Translation.”  Søren 
Kierkegaard: Modern Critical Views.  Ed. Harold Bloom.  Chelsea House 
Publishers, 1989.   
212 
 
 
———.  Irony on Occasion: From Schlegel and Kierkegaard to Derrida and de Man.  
Fordham UP, 2012.   
Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o.  Devil on the Cross.  Trans. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o.  Penguin Books, 
1982. 
———.  Wizard of the Crow.  Trans. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o.  Anchor Books, 2006.   
Niblett, Michael.  “The Unfinished Body: Narrative, politics, and global community in 
Wilson Harris’s The Infinite Rehearsal.”  Journal of Postcolonial Writing 43.1 
(2007): 18–31. 
———.  “The ‘impossible quest for wholeness’: sugar, cassava, and the ecological 
aesthetic in The Guyana Quartet.”  Journal of Postcolonial Writing 49.2 (2013): 
148–160. 
———.  “Strange Correspondences: Late Capitalism and Late Style in the work of 
Wilson Harris and John Berger.” ariel: A Review of International English 
Literature 47.1–2 (2016): 163–191. 
Nicholls, Angus James.  Goethe’s Concept of the Daemonic: After the Ancients.  
Camden House, 2006.   
Nielsen, Aldon L.  “Hieroglyphics of Space.”  Wilson Harris in ‘The Waiting Room.’”  
Callaloo 18.1, Wilson Harris: A Special Issue (Winter 1995): 125–131. 
Nordentoft, Kresten. Kierkegaard’s Psychology. Duquesne studies. Psychological series 
v. 7. Duquesne UP, 1978. 
Noyes, John K. “Goethe on Cosmopolitanism and Colonialism: Bildung and the 
Dialectic of Critical Mobility.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 39.4 (2006): 443–
462. 
———.  “Herder, Postcolonial Theory and the Antinomy of Universal Reason.”  
Cambridge Journal of Literary Inquiry 1.1 (March 2014): 107–122.   
———.  Herder: Aesthetics Against Imperialism.  U of Toronto P, 2015.   
Olson, Roger E. and Christian T. Collins Winn.  Reclaiming Pietism: Retrieving an 
Evangelical Tradition.  William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2015. 
Onyeoziri, Gloria Nne.  Shaken Wisdom: Irony and Meaning in Postcolonial African 
Fiction.  U of Virginia P, 2011.   
Opitz, Andrew. “Impassioned Satire and Militant Irony: An Investigation into the 
Evolving Politics of Satire.”  2007.  University of Minnesota, PhD Dissertation.     
Owen, Stephen.  “The Anxiety of Global Influence: What is World Poetry?” New 
Republic November 19, 1990.  28–32.   
———.  “Stepping Forward and Back: Issues and Possibilities for ‘World’ Poetry.”  
Modern Philology 100.4 (May 2003): 532–548.   
Pasha, Sukrishnalall, Mark D. Wenner, and Dillon Clarke. “Toward the Greening of the 
Gold Mining Sector of Guyana: Transition Issues and Challenges.”  IDB 
Technical Note 1290. Inter-American Development Bank, 2017. 
Pattison, George.  “Søren Kierkegaard: A Theatre Critic of the Heiberg School” The 
British Journal of Aesthetics 23 (1983): 25–33.   
———.  Kierkegaard, Religion and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Culture.  
Cambridge UP, 2002.   
213 
 
 
Pattison, George, and Steven Shakespeare, eds.  Kierkegaard: The Self in Society.  St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998.   
Pearce, C. E. “A Closer Look at Narrative Structure in Bulgakov’s The Master and 
Margarita.”  Canadian Slavonic Papers 22.3 (1980): 358–371. 
Perkins, Robert L., ed.  The Concept of Irony (International Kierkegaard Commentary 
2). Mercer UP, 2001. 
Petri, Alexandra.  “‘Hamilton’ and the end of irony.”  The Washington Post.  September 
21, 2015.  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/compost/wp/2015/09/21/hamilton-and-
the-end-of-irony/?utm_term=.824aeb2834cd.  Accessed March 19, 2019. 
Pickney, Darryl, and Joan Didion.  “Obama: In the Irony-Free Zone.”  The New York 
Review of Books.  December 8, 2008.  
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2008/12/18/obama-in-the-irony-free-zone/.  
Accessed March 19, 2019. 
Piper, D. G. B. “An Approach to The Master and Margarita.”  Forum for Modern 
Language Studies 7 (1971): 134–57. 
Pittman, Riita H.  The Writer’s Divided Self in Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita.  
St. Martin’s Press, 1991. 
Pizer, John.  The Idea of World Literature: History and Pedagogical Practice.  LSU P, 
2006. 
Poole, Roger.  Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication.  The U of Virginia P, 1993.   
Pope, Richard W. F.  “Ambiguity and Meaning in The Master and Margarita: The Role 
of Afranius.”  Slavic Review 36.1 (March 1977): 1–24.   
Possen, David D.  “F. C. Baur: On the Similarity and Dissimilarity Between Jesus and 
Socrates.”  Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries.  Ed. Jon Stewart.  
Ashgate, 2007.   
———.  “Søren Kierkegaard and the Very Idea of Advance Beyond Socrates.”  2009.  
The University of Chicago, PhD Dissertation. 
Pound, Ezra.  “Irony, Laforgue, and Some Satire.”  Poetry 11.2 (Nov. 1917): 93–98. 
Prendergast, Christopher, ed.  Debating World Literature.  Verso, 2004.   
Prizel, Yuri.  “M. Bulgakov’s ‘Master i Margarita’: The True Absolute.”  Russian 
Language Journal 30.107 (Fall 1976): 109–118.    
Proffer, Ellendea. “On The Master and Margarita.”  Russian Literature Triquarterly 15 
(1973): 533–564. 
———.  “The Master and Margarita.”  Major Soviet Writers: Essays in Criticism. Ed. 
Edward J. Brown, Oxford UP, 1973.  388–411. 
———.  Bulgakov.  Ardis, 1985.   
Puchner, Martin, et al.  The Norton Anthology of World Liteature.  4th ed. W. W. Norton 
& Company, 2018.  6 vols. 
Purdy, Jedidiah.  For Common Things: Irony, Trust, and Commitment in America 
Today.  Random House, 2010. 
Raleigh, Sir Walter.  The Discovery of Guiana.  Project Gutenburg.  March 25, 2006.  
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2272/2272-h/2272-h.htm.  Accessed March 24, 
2019.   
214 
 
 
Ransom, John Crowe.  The New Criticism. Greenwood Press, 1968. 
Rasmussen, Joel.  Between Irony and Witness: Kierkegaard’s Poetics of Faith, Hope, 
and Love.  T & T Clark, 2005.   
Redner, Harry.  In the Beginning was the Deed: Reflections on the Passage of Faust.  U 
of California P, 1982.   
Reidel-Schrewe, Ursula.  “Key and Tripod in Mikhail Bulgakov’s Master and 
Margarita.” Neophilologus 79.2 (1995): 273–282.   
Riach, Alan.  “The Presence of Actual Angels: The Fractal Poetics of Wilson Harris.”  
Calalloo 18.1, Wilson Harris: A Special Issue (Winter 1995): 33–44. 
Richards, I. A.  Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgment.  Harcourt, Brace & 
World, Inc., 1929. 
———.  Principles of Literary Criticism.  Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965. 
Richter, Karl, Gerhard Sauder, and Gerhard Schmidt-Henkel, eds.  Carl Friedrich 
Bahrdt (1740–1792).  Werner J. Röhrig Verlag, 1992.   
Rizal, José.  Noli Me Tángere.  Trans. Ma. Soledad Lacson-Locsin.  Ed. Raul L. Locsin.  
U of Hawai’i P, 1997. 
Robinette, Nicholas. “The World Laid Waste: Herder, Language Labor, Empire.”  New 
Literary History 42.1 (Winter 2011): 193–203.   
Robinson, Gemma.  “The reality of trespass: Wilson Harris and an impossible poetics of 
the Americas.”  Journal of Postcolonial Writing 49.2 (2013): 133–147. 
Roopnarine, Lomarsh.  “Wounding Guyana: Gold Mining and Environmental 
Degradation.”  Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe 73 
(October 2002): 83–91. 
Rosenblatt, Roger.  “The Age of Irony Comes to an End.” Time Magazine.  September 
24, 2001. 
Rosenshield, Gary.  “The Master and Margarita and the Poetics of Aporia: A Polemical 
Article.”  Slavic Review 56.2 (Summer 1997): 187–211.   
Rushdie, Salman.  The Satanic Verses.  Random House, 2008.   
Rzhevsky, L.  “Pilate’s Sin: Cryptography in Bulgakov’s Novel, The Master and 
Margarita.”  Canadian Slavonic Papers 13.1 (1971): 1–19.  
Said, Edward W.  Orientalism.  25th Anniversary Edition.  Vintage Books, 1979. 
———.  The World, the Text, and the Critic.  Harvard UP, 1983.   
———.  Culture and Imperialism.  Vintage Books, 1994.   
Schöne, Albrecht.  Goethes Farbentheologie.  C. H. Beck, 1987.   
Schulte, Hans, John Noyes, and Pia Kleber, eds.  Goethe’s Faust: Theatre of Modernity.  
Cambridge UP, 2011.   
Scopetea, Sophia.  Kierkegaard og græciteten: En kamp med ironi.  C. A. Reitzel, 1995.  
Sedgewick, G. G.  Of Irony: Especially in Drama.  U of Toronto P, 1967. 
Seery, John Evan.  Political Returns: Irony in Politics and Theory from Plato to the 
Antinuclear Movement.  Westview Press, 1990. 
Shantz, Douglas H.  An Introduction to German Pietism: Protestant Renewal at the 
Dawn of Modern Europe.  Johns Hopkins UP, 2013. 
Sharpe, Lesley, ed.  The Cambridge Companion to Goethe.  Cambridge UP, 2002.   
215 
 
 
Sharrad, Paul. “The Art of Memory and the Liberation of History: Wilson Harris’s 
Witnessing of Time.”  Callaloo 18.1, Wilson Harris: A Special Issue (Winter 
1995): 93–108. 
Shaw, Gregory.  “Art and Dialectic in the Work of Wilson Harris.”  New Left Review 
I/153 (September–October 1985): 121–128. 
Sheehan, Jonathan.  The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture.  
Princeton University Press, 2007.   
Shirane, Haruo.  “Comic and Satiric Poetry.”  Early Modern Japanese Literature: An 
Anthology, 1600–1900.  Ed. Haruo Shirane.  Columbia UP, 2002.  520–537. 
Shookman, Ellis.  “Goethe’s Baccalaureus and the concepts of romantic irony in 
Faust.”  European Romantic Review 20.4 (2009): 491–511.   
Simek, Nicole.  Hunger and Irony in the French Caribbean: Literature, Theory, and 
Public Life.  Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.   
Simon, Louis.  “The Politics of Complex Faith: Wilson Harris’s Resurrection at Sorrow 
Hill.”  Journal of Commonwealth Literature 31.2 (1996): 75–86. 
Simpson, David.  Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry.  Palgrave Macmillan, 1979. 
“Skaz.”  The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, 2008.  Oxford Reference.  
https://www.oxfordreference.com/abstract/10.1093/acref/9780199208272.001.0
001/acref-9780199208272-e-1061?rskey=dmWHKQ&result=1066.  Accessed 
May 15, 2019. 
Skorov, Pierre.  “Translating Literary Irony: Elements for a Practical Framework.  
Vertimo Studijos 2 (2009): 88–103.   
Slemon, Stephen.  “‘Carnival’ and the Canon.”  ariel: A Review of International English 
Literature 19.3 (1988): 59–75. 
———.  Post-Colonial Allegory and the Transformation of History.”  Journal of 
Commonwealth Literature 23.1 (1988): 157–168. 
Sloterdijk, Peter.  Critique of Cynical Reason. Trans. Michael Eldred.  U of Minnesota 
P, 1987. 
Smythe, John Vignaux.  A Question of Eros: Irony in Sterne, Kierkegaard, and Barthes.  
Florida State UP, 1986.   
Soderquist, K. Brian.  The Isolated Self: Truth and Untruth in Søren Kierkegaard’s On 
the Concept of Irony.  Museum Tusculanum Press, 2013 
Sokolov, B. V.  “The Sources for Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita.”  
Soviet Review 30.4 (1989): 76–96. 
Spengler, Oswald.  The Decline of the West, Volume I: Form and Actuality.  Trans. 
Charles Francis Atkinson.  Alfred A. Knopf, 1996.   
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty.  A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of 
the Vanishing Present.  Harvard UP, 1999.   
———.  Death of a Discipline.  Columbia UP, 2003.   
Spurlin, William J., and Michael Fischer, eds.  The New Criticism and Contemporary 
Theory: Connections and Continuities.  Garland Publishing, Inc., 1995. 
Steiner, George.  After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation.  3rd ed.  Oxford 
UP, 1998. 
Steinhauer, Harry.  “Faust’s Pact with the Devil.”  PMLA 71.1 (1956): 180–200. 
216 
 
 
Stenbock-Fermor, Elisabeth.  “Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita and Goethe’s 
Faust.”  The Slavic and East European Journal 13.3 (1969): 309–325. 
Stewart, Jon.  Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered.  Cambridge UP, 2003. 
Stewart, Jon, ed.  The Hegel Myths and Legends.  Northwestern UP, 1996.   
———.  Kierkegaard and His Danish Contemporaries, Tome III: Literature, Drama 
and Aesthetics.  Kierkegaard Research: sources, Reception and Resources.  
Routledge, 2016. 
Stewart, Jon, and Katalin Nun.  “Goethe: A German Classic Through the Filter of the 
Danish Golden Age.”  Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, Tome II: 
Literature and Aesthetics.  Ed. Jon Stewart.  Ashgate, 2006.   
Stoffler, F. Ernest.  German Pietism During the Eighteenth Century. E.J. Brill, 1973. 
Strawser, Michael.  Both/And: Reading Kierkegaard from Irony to Edification. 
Fordham UP, 1997. 
Strich, Fritz.  Goethe and World Literature.  Trans. C. A. M. Sym.  Routledge, 1949.   
Swales, Martin. “Goethe’s Faust and the Drama of European Modernity.”  Publications 
of the English Goethe Society 74.1: 83–94. 
Swales, Martin, and Erika Swales. Reading Goethe: A Critical Introduction to the 
Literary Work.  Camden House, 2002. 
Swift, Jonathan.  “A Modest Proposal for preventing the children of poor people in 
Ireland, from being a burden on their parents or country, and for making them 
beneficial to the publick.”  1729.  Project Gutenburg, 2013.  
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1080/1080-h/1080-h.htm.  Accessed March 23, 
2019. 
———.  Gulliver’s Travels.  Ed. Herbert Davis.  Oxford UP, 1977.   
Tandon, Suneera.  “An IBM team identified deep gender bias from 50 years of Booker 
Prize shortlists.”  Quartz India.  July 28, 2018.  
https://qz.com/india/1333644/ibm-identifies-gender-bias-in-booker-prize-novel-
shortlists/.  Accessed May 16, 2019. 
Tantillo, Astrida Orle. Goethe’s Modernisms.  Continuum, 2010. 
Tate, Allen.  The Man of Letters in the Modern World: Selected Essays: 1928–1955.  
Meridian Books, 1964. 
Taylor, Mark C.  Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the 
Self.  Princeton UP, 1975. 
Teilanyo, Diri I.  “Figurative Language in Translation: A Study of J. P. Clark’s The 
Ozidi Saga.”  Meta 52.2 (June 2007): 309–326.   
Thomson, J. A. K.  Irony: An Historical Introduction.  George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
1926. 
Thulstrup, Niels.  Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel.  Trans. Paul L. Holmer.  Princeton 
UP, 1980.   
Tikos, Laszlo.  “Some Notes on the Significance of Gerbert Aurillac in Bulgakov’s The 
Master and Margarita.”  Canadian-American Slavic Studies 15.2–3 (1981): 
321–29.   
Tillman, Thomas.  Hermeneutik und Bibelexegese beim jungen Goethe.  Walter de 
Gruyter, 2006.   
217 
 
 
Tisch, J. H.  “Milton and the German Mind in the Eighteenth Century.”  Studies in the 
Eighteenth Century.  Ed. R. F. Brissenden.  U of Toronto P, 1968. 
Tumanov, Vladimir.  “Diabolus ex Machina: Bulgakov’s Modernist Devil.”  Scando-
Slavica 35 (1989): 49–61. 
Urquhart, Ilona.  “Diabolical Evasion of the Censor in Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master 
and Margarita.”  Censorship and the Limits of the Literary: A Global View.  Ed. 
Nicole Moore.  Bloomsbury Academic, 2015.  133–46.    
Van der Laan, J. M. Seeking Meaning for Goethe’s Faust.  Continuum, 2007.   
Van Horn Melton, James.  “Pietism, Politics, and the Public Sphere in Germany.”  
Religion and Politics in Enlightenment Europe.  Ed. James E. Bradley and Dale 
K. van Kley.  U of Notre Dame P, 2001.   
Vatulescu, Cristina.  Police Aesthetics: Literature, Film, and the Secret Police in Soviet 
Times Stanford UP, 2010. 
Venuti, Lawrence.  The Translator’s Invisibility: A History of Translation.  Routledge, 
1995.   
———.  The Scandals of Translation: Towards an ethics of difference.  Routledge, 
1998.   
Walkowitz, Rebecca L.  Born Translated: The Contemporary Novel in an Age of World 
Literature.  Columbia UP, 2015.   
Wallace, David Foster.  “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction.”  Review of 
Contemporary Fiction 13.2 (Summer 1993): 151–194. 
Walsh, Sylvia.  Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics.  The 
Pennsylvania State UP, 1994. 
Wampole, Christy.  “How to Live Without Irony.”  The New York Times.  November 
17, 2012. https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/17/how-to-live-
without-irony/.  Accessed March 19, 2019. 
Weeks, Laura D.  “Hebraic Antecedents in The Master and Margarita: Woland and 
Company Revisited.”  Slavic Review 43.2 (1984): 224–241. 
Weeks, Laura D., ed.  The Master and Margarita: A Critical Companion.  Northwestern 
UP, 1996. 
Weir, Justin.  The Author as Hero: Self and Tradition in Bulgakov, Pasternak, and 
Nabokov.  Northwestern UP, 2002. 
Weisinger, Kenneth D.  The Classical Façade: A Neoclassical Reading of Goethe’s 
Classicism. The Pennsylvania State UP, 1988. 
Wellek, René.  Confrontations: Studies in the Intellectual and Literary Relations 
Between Germany, England, and the United States in the Nineteenth Century. 
Princeton UP, 1965. 
———.  Attack on Literature and Other Essays. The U of North Carolina P, 1982.   
Wellek, René, and Austin Warren.  The Theory of Literature.  Harcourt, Brace, 1949. 
West, Stephanie.  “Tacitean Sidelights on The Master and Margarita.”  International 
Journal of the Classical Tradition 3.4 (Spring 1997): 473–484. 
Westphal, Merold.  Kierkegaard’s Critique of Reason and Society.  Mercer UP, 1987.   
Wheeler, Kathleen.  Sources, Processes and Methods in Coleridge’s ‘Biographia 
Literaria.’ Cambridge UP, 1980. 
218 
 
 
Widenmann, Robert J.  “Sibbern.”  Kierkegaard’s Teachers.  Bibliotheca 
Kierkegaardiana X.  C. A. Reitzels Forlag, 1982.   
Wilkinson, Elizabeth M.  “The Theological Basis of Faust’s Credo.”  German Life and 
Letters 10.3 (April 1957): 229–239.  
Williams, Forrest.  “A Problem in Values: The Faustian Motivation in Kierkegaard and 
Goethe.”  Ethics 63.4 (July 1953): 251–261.   
Wimsatt, W. K.  The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry.  The UP of 
Kentucky, 1954. 
Wimsatt, W. K., and Cleanth Brooks.  Literary Criticism: A Short History. Knopf, 
1957.   
Wimsatt, W. K., and M. C. Beardsley.  “The Intentional Fallacy.”  The Sewanee Review 
54.3 (Jul.–Sep. 1946): 468–488. 
Wixted, John Timothy.  “Mori Ōgai: Translation Transforming the Word/World.”  
Japonica Humboldtiana 13 (2009–2010): 61–109. 
Wolfson, Susan.  “Reading for Form.” MLQ: Modern Language Quarterly 61.1 (March 
2000): 1–16.     
“World Lite: What is Global Literature?”  n + 1 17: The Evil Issue (Fall 2013). 
Wright, A. C. “Satan in Moscow: An Approach to Bulgakov’s The Master and 
Margarita.” PMLA 88.5 (October 1973): 1162–1172. 
———.  Mikhail Bulgakov: Life and Interpretations.  U of Toronto P, 1978. 
———.  “Mikhail Bulgakov’s Developing World View.”  Canadian-American Slavic 
Studies 15.2–3 (Summer–Fall 1981): 151–66.   
———.  “Christ Interrogated: Bulgakov and Others.”  Transactions of the Association 
of Russian-American Scholars in the U. S. A. 24 (1991): 163–176. 
Yoder, Peter James.  “Rendered ‘Odious’ as Pietists: Anton Wilhelm Böhme’s 
Conception of Pietism and the Possibilities of Prototype Theory.”  The Pietist 
Impulse in Christianity. Ed. Christian T. Collins Winn et al.  Pickwick 
Publications, 2011. 17–26. 
Zinzendorf, Nicholaus Ludwig Count von.  Nine Public Lectures on Important Subjects 
in Religion.  Trans. and ed. George W. Forell.  U of Iowa P, 1973. 
 
